对遵行规则的意向论和倾向论解释(2021夏季卷-04)
转自:清华西方哲学研究
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哲学园鸣谢
对遵行规则的意向论和倾向论解释
马健(MA Jian)*
摘要:如何妥善地理解肇始于维特根斯坦(1958)的遵行规则考量(rule-following considerations),仍然是一个莫衷一是的论域。尽管遭受了克里普克(1982)的无情攻击,意向论者和倾向论者还是做出了许多挽救各自立场的努力。本文选取了或许是意向论和倾向论阵营中构思最为精巧的两个版本——赖特(2001)的意向论和金斯伯格(2011)的倾向论,分别作为他们各自立场的代表,考察他们的方案能否应对克里普克(1982)的怀疑论挑战,并对遵行规则给出令人满意的解释。不幸的是,二者的理论依然存在致命的缺陷。然而,他们的失败无疑是富有教益的,因为他们失败的根源都是因为预设了遵行规则主体的概念能力。在诊断这一失败的同时,我们也能更加充分地理解维特根斯坦自己对于解决遵行规则的怀疑论悖论留下的提示(reminder)。
关键词:遵行规则;意图;倾向;概念能力
Intentionalism and Dispositionalism in the Rule-Following Considerations
Abstract: How to properly appreciate the rule-following considerations that originated with Wittgenstein (1958) remains a field of dissent. Despite the implacable attacks from Kripke (1982), intentionalists and dispositionalists have taken pains to salvage their positions. I pick perhaps the two most ingenious versions of the intentionalist and dispositionalist accounts of rule-following, Wright's theory of intention and Ginsberg's theory of primitive normativity, as representatives of their respective positions, and examine whether their plans can meet Kripke's skeptical challenge meanwhile provide a satisfactory explanation for our practices of rule-following. Unfortunately, both theories remain fatally flawed. However, their failure is rather instructive, since their failure is due to a presupposition of conceptual capacity of the rule-follower. In diagnosing this failure, we shall apprehend Wittgenstein’s reminder of resolving the skeptical paradox of rule-following more adequately as well.
Keywords: rule-following, intention, disposition, conceptual capacity
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*马健,清华大学哲学系博士研究生(MA Jian, PhD Candidate, Department of Philosophy, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China, Email: [email protected])。
参考文献
Boghossian, Paul A., 2012, “Blind Rule-Following”, in Coliva, A. (ed.), Mind, Meaning, and Knowledge: Themes from the Philosophy of Crispin Wright, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 27–48.
Ginsborg, Hannah, 2011, “Primitive Normativity and Skepticism About Rules”, Journal of Philosophy, 108(5): 227–54.
Haase, Matthias, 2009, “The Laws of Thought and the Power of Thinking”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy Supplementary Volume, 35: 249–97.
Kripke, Saul A., 1982, Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language: An Elementary Exposition, Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.
McDowell, John, 1996, Mind and World: With a New Introduction by the Author, Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.
———, 1998, “Meaning and Intentionality in Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy”, in Mind, Value, and Reality, Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 263–278.
Ryle, Gilbert, 2009, The Concept of Mind, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1958, Philosophical Investigations, Translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, Second Edition, Oxford: Blackwell.
Wright, Crispin, 2001, “On Making Up One’s Mind: Wittgenstein on Intention”, in Rails to Infinity: Essays on Themes from Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 116–142.
———, 2008, “Rule-Following without Reasons: Wittgenstein’s Quietism and the Constitutive Question”, in Preston, John (ed.), Wittgenstein and Reason, Oxford: Blackwell, 123–144.
[1] 除了意向性的和倾向性的心灵状态,至少还有一类现象性的心灵状态,即带有独特现象性特征的心灵状态。克里普克将其等同于“可被内省到的(introspectible)心灵状态”,因为克里普克认为,一个可被内省到的心灵状态必定具有某种独特的现象性特征,并正因其现象性特征才可被内省到。克里普克反对关于这类心灵状态的事实能够辩护一个行动是在对某个规则的遵行之下做出的,因为它既不能捕捉到遵行规则的实然性面相,也不能捕捉到遵行规则的应然性面相,相反,它更多地是一种伴随性的心灵状态。本文认为克里普克的这一论证是决定性的,因而不再展开论述。
[2] 赖特强调,这种依赖性不仅体现在我当前的判断对于我当前意图的构成上,还存在于我当前对于我过去意图的判断上(Wright,2001:141–2)。然而,这会面临如下困难。对于同一个意图,在它最初形成之时,它由我当时关于它的判断构成,例如,我曾真诚地宣称我有意图做P;然而,假如我最终没有诉诸行动,那么当我后来回顾这一意图时,我可能会宣称我当时并非真的有去做P的意图。按照赖特的主张,我们似乎总要以后来的说法为准,也就是说,事后的判断总是更权威,以此为依据,则能够判定我当初形成意图时的宣称必定违反了某项构成性条件。然而,我当然也有可能是面对困难临阵退缩了,只不过出于难以接受这一事实的羞耻感,我成功地欺骗自己说自己当时并不真的想做P。无条件地接受后来的说法反而会使人受到当下自欺的蒙蔽,从而误判过去情况的真诚性。然而,按照赖特的方案,我们却不再有进一步的证据去衡量后来的说法,因而似乎永远没有把握去确证后一种情况。
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