判例译析 | LEEGIN v. PSKS —— 美国纵向价格限制的合法性问题的新发展

译者｜徐鑫源 乔治城大学LL.M.

审稿｜刘汉青 北京师范大学硕士

编辑｜王冰子 烟台大学本科

责编｜戚琳颖 大连海事大学本科

本案是美国对于反垄断领域中常见的限定最低转售价格行为（resale price maintenance），又称纵向价格限制（vertical price restraint），的合法性问题的新发展。联邦最高法院在1911年Dr. Miles Medical Co.诉John D. Park & Sons Co.一案（以下简称“Dr.Miles案”）中认为限制最低转售价格属于《谢尔曼法》第一条禁止的共谋违法行为，由此确立的本身违法原则（per se rule）是日后美国反垄断领域处理此类行为的基本原则，即严格禁止限制最低转售价格这一违法垄断行为。[1]而近一百年以后，联邦最高法院以5:4的微弱多数推翻了Dr.Miles案，认为应当适用合理原则（rule of reason）为审查限制最低转售价格合法性的基本原则，通过权衡个案中限制最低转售价格对竞争的消极影响和积极影响来判断是否应禁止。

1991年，Leegin创意皮革公司（本案被告，以下简称“Leegin”）开始以Brighton品牌销售皮带和其他女性配件。Brighton品牌取得了成功，Leegin公司随后向全美5000多家零售商供应Brighton产品。PSKS公司（本案原告，以下简称“PSKS”）经营的一家女装店Kay’s Kloset（以下简称“Kay’s”）于1995年开始销售Brighton产品。在接下来的几年里，Brighton产品占到了Kay’s所获利润的四至五成。1997年，Leegin开始实行一项新规则，不再向售价低于Leegin建议销售价格的零售商出售Brighton产品。Leegin采取该规则是为了给其零售商提供足够的利润空间，以向客户提供更好的服务，这也是Leegin分销计划的核心。Leegin还担心打折会损害Brighton品牌的形象和声誉。

In 2002, Leegin learned that Kay’s had been selling the entire line of Brighton products at discount prices. Kay’s refused to stop selling below the prices suggested by Leegin, and Leegin subsequently refused to sell any more Brighton products to Kay’s. The loss of the Brighton brand had a considerable negative impact on the store’s revenue from sales.

2002年，Leegin得知Kay’s一直在以折扣价销售Brighton全线产品。Kay’s拒绝停止以低于Leegin建议价格销售的行为，Leegin随即不再向Kay’s供应任何Brighton产品。不再被允许销售Brighton产品对Kay’s的利润造成了显著的负面影响。

PSKS sued Leegin in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, arguing that Leegin was violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act by engaging in anticompetitive price fixing. Under the Supreme Court's 1911 decision in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., mandatory minimum price agreements are per se illegal under the Act - that is, they are automatically illegal regardless of the circumstances.

PSKS随之向德克萨斯州东部地区法院提起诉讼，认为Leegin公司的限制最低转售价格协议是限制竞争的价格垄断行为，违反了《谢尔曼法》第1条，并向其提出巨额赔偿。根据联邦最高法院于1911年对于Dr.Miles 案的判决，强制性的限制最低转售价格协议本身就是非法的，也就是说，无论在什么情况下，该协议都是违法的。

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Leegin argued that this rule was based on outdated economics. It contended that a better legal analysis would be the "rule of reason," under which price minimums would be held illegal only in cases where they could be shown to be anticompetitive. Both the District Court and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected these arguments. The courts felt compelled to follow the Supreme Court's rule in the Dr. Miles case, under which Leegin's practices were illegal regardless of the economic arguments put forward by the company. We granted certiorari to determine whether vertical minimum resale price maintenance agreements should continue to be treated as per se unlawful. 549 U.S. 1092, 127 S.Ct. 763, 166 L.Ed.2d 590 (2006).

Leegin公司辩称，本身违法原则所依据的经济学理论现已过时。Leegin认为，用合理原则是更优的法律分析方法。根据合理原则，只有当限制最低价格协议被证明是限制竞争的情况下，才会被认定为非法。德州地区法院和美国第五巡回上诉法院都驳回了这些论点，支持了PSKS公司的诉讼请求。法院认为必须遵循最高法院在Dr. Miles案中确立的本身违法原则，即无论限制价格行为是否存在有利的经济影响，Leegin限制最低价格的做法本身就构成违法。我们签发了调卷令(certiorari)来决定是否应该适用本身违法原则来审查限制最低价格行为的合法性。

Is it per se illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act for a manufacturer to set mandatory minimum prices for its products?

如果没有任何有关“故意”的指根据《谢尔曼法》第1条规定，制造商对其产品强制限制最低转售价格的行为是否构成“本身违法”（per se illegal）？

联邦最高法院于2007年06月28日，以5:4的微弱多数对本案做出判决，颠覆性地推翻了其于1911年Dr.Miles案中设立的本身违法原则，即不再对限制最低转售价格一概禁止，转而主张对其应该适用合理原则，通过在个案中分析权衡限制最低转售价格行为对竞争的积极促进或消极限制影响，从而判断其合法性。

In Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 31 S.Ct. 376, 55 L.Ed. 502 (1911), the Court established the rule that it is per se illegal under § 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, for a manufacturer to agree with its distributor to set the minimum price the distributor can charge for the manufacturer’s goods. The question presented by the instant case is whether the Court should overrule the per se rule and allow resale price maintenance agreements to be judged by the rule of reason, the usual standard applied to determine if there is a violation of § 1. The Court has abandoned the rule of per se illegality for other vertical restraints a manufacturer imposes on its distributors. Respected economic analysts, furthermore, conclude that vertical price restraints can have procompetitive effects. We now hold that Dr. Miles should be overruled and that vertical price restraints are to be judged by the rule of reason.

在Dr.Miles案中，本法院依据《谢尔曼法》第1条确立了本身违法原则，认为制造商对零售商销售货物的最低价格采取限制的行为本身即违法。本案面临的问题是本院是否应该推翻本身违法原则，并使用合理原则对限制最低转售价格协议是否违反《谢尔曼法》第1条进行审查。本院已经推翻了使用本身违法原则对制造商与零售商间的其他纵向价格协议进行审查。此外，经济分析师认为，纵向价格限制有促进竞争的作用。现在，我们认为Dr.Miles案的判决应该被推翻，并且对纵向价格限制的审查应当适用合理原则。

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（I部分为事实部分描述，故省略）

Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States.” Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1. While § 1 could be interpreted to proscribe all contracts, see, e.g., Board of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238, 38 S.Ct. 242, 62 L.Ed. 683 (1918), the Court has never “taken a literal approach to [its] language,” Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5, 126 S.Ct. 1276, 164 L.Ed.2d 1 (2006). Rather, the Court has repeated time and again that § 1 “outlaw[s] only unreasonable restraints.” State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10, 118 S.Ct. 275, 139 L.Ed.2d 199 (1997).

《谢尔曼法》第1条禁止“任何限制各州间进行贸易或商业活动的合同、合并或共谋行为”。尽管本条可以被解读适用于所有合同，但本院从不仅以字面意思来解读法条。相反，本院一直以来都在废除不合理的限制。

The rule of reason is the accepted standard for testing whether a practice restrains trade in violation of § 1. See Texaco, supra, at 5, 126 S.Ct. 1276. “Under this rule, the factfinder weighs all of the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition.” Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49, 97 S.Ct. 2549, 53 L.Ed.2d 568 (1977). Appropriate factors to take into account include “specific information about the relevant business” and “the restraint’s history, nature, and effect.” Khan, supra, at 10, 118 S.Ct. 275. Whether the businesses *886 involved have market power is a further, significant consideration. See, e.g., Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768, 104 S.Ct. 2731, 81 L.Ed.2d 628 (1984) (equating the rule of **2713 reason with “an inquiry into market power and market structure designed to assess [a restraint’s] actual effect”); see also Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 45–46, 126 S.Ct. 1281, 164 L.Ed.2d 26 (2006). In its design and function the rule distinguishes between restraints with anticompetitive effect that are harmful to the consumer and restraints stimulating competition that are in the consumer’s best interest.

合理原则是审查是否存在违反《谢尔曼法》第1条行为的通用标准。“根据合理原则，法官在决定是否应该因为一项限制性行为对竞争存在不合理的限制而对其禁止时，应当权衡所有情况。”这些因素包括“相关行业的特殊情况，限制行为的历史、性质和影响”。案涉企业是否存在市场支配地位是另一个重要的考虑因素。在合理原则的设计和功能上，其区分了对消费者有害的限制竞争情形和符合消费者最佳利益的刺激竞争情形。

The rule of reason does not govern all restraints. Some types “are deemed unlawful per se.” Khan, supra, at 10, 118 S.Ct. 275. The per se rule, treating categories of restraints as necessarily illegal, eliminates the need to study the reasonableness of an individual restraint in light of the real market forces at work, Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723, 108 S.Ct. 1515, 99 L.Ed.2d 808 (1988); and, it must be acknowledged, the per se rule can give clear guidance for certain conduct. Restraints that are per se unlawful include horizontal agreements among competitors to fix prices, see Texaco, supra, at 5, 126 S.Ct. 1276, or to divide markets, see Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49–50, 111 S.Ct. 401, 112 L.Ed.2d 349 (1990) (per curiam).

合理原则并非适用于所有限制行为。某些限制行为仍旧本身即违法。在本身违法原则下，某些类型的限制行为必然违法，因而无需再研究单一限制行为对实际市场影响的合理性。此外，不可否认的是，本身违法行为对于规范某一行为提供了明确的导向。本身违法的限制行为包括竞争者间横向限制价格的协议，或分割市场的协议。

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Resort to per se rules is confined to restraints, like those mentioned, “that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition and decrease output.” Business Electronics, supra, at 723, 108 S.Ct. 1515 (internal quotation marks omitted). To justify a per se prohibition a restraint must have “manifestly anticompetitive” effects, GTE Sylvania, supra, at 50, 97 S.Ct. 2549, and “lack ... any redeeming virtue,” Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 289, 105 S.Ct. 2613, 86 L.Ed.2d 202 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).

本身违法原则仅适用于限制行为，即“那些总是或几乎总是会限制竞争和降低产出”的行为。要证明某限制行为本身违法，该限制应该具有“显著限制竞争”的效果并且没有任何积极影响。

As a consequence, the per se rule is appropriate only after courts have had considerable experience with the type of restraint at issue, see Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 9, 99 S.Ct. 1551, 60 L.Ed.2d 1 (1979), and only if courts can predict with confidence that it would be invalidated in all or almost all instances under the rule of reason, see Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc., 457 U.S. 332, 344, 102 S.Ct. 2466, 73 L.Ed.2d 48 (1982). It should come as no surprise, then, that “we have expressed reluctance to adopt per se rules with regard to restraints imposed in the context of business relationships where the economic impact of certain practices is not immediately obvious.” Khan, supra, at 10, 118 S.Ct. 275 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263, 83 S.Ct. 696, 9 L.Ed.2d 738 (1963) (refusing to adopt a per se rule for a vertical nonprice restraint because of the uncertainty concerning whether this type of restraint satisfied the demanding standards necessary to apply a per se rule). And, as we have stated, a “departure from the rule-of-reason standard must be based upon demonstrable economic effect rather than ... upon formalistic line drawing.” GTE Sylvania, supra, at 58–59, 97 S.Ct. 2549.

因此，只有当法院对于案涉限制行为有足够判决经验时，且当法院有足够把握预测在所有或几乎所有情形下，用合理原则审查该限制行为都是违法时，才可以适用本身违法原则。所以，对于在商业关系中没有造成明显影响的限制行为，不再采用本身违法行为进行审查也不足为奇。而且，正如我们所指出的，“不采用合理原则必须基于可证明的经济效果，而不是......基于形式主义的刻画。”

The Court has interpreted Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 31 S.Ct. 376, as establishing a per se rule against a vertical agreement between a manufacturer and its distributor to set minimum resale prices. See, e.g., Monsanto Co. v. Spray–Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761, 104 S.Ct. 1464, 79 L.Ed.2d 775 (1984). In Dr. Miles the plaintiff, a manufacturer of medicines, sold its products only to distributors who agreed to resell them at set prices. The Court found the manufacturer’s control of resale prices to be unlawful. It relied on the common-law rule that “a general restraint upon alienation is ordinarily invalid.” 220 U.S., at 404–405, 31 S.Ct. 376. The Court then explained that the agreements would advantage the distributors, not the manufacturer, and were analogous to a combination among competing distributors, which the law treated as void. Id., at 407–408, 31 S.Ct. 376.

本院在Dr.Miles案中，认为应该对制造商和分销商间设立最低转售价格协议的审查适用本身违法原则。在Dr.Miles案中，原告为一家药物制造商，其只向与其达成限定最低转售价格协议的分销商提供产品。本院认为，制造商限定最低转售价格的行为违法。判决的依据是普通法规则：对转让进行限制的行为通常无效(a general restraint upon alienation is ordinarily invalid)。法院随后解释了该协议有利于分销商，而非制造商，并且该协议类似于处于竞争关系的各分销商间形成了合并关系，而这是为法律所视为无效的。

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……The Court in Dr. Miles relied on a treatise published in 1628, but failed to discuss in detail the business reasons that would motivate a manufacturer situated in 1911 to make use of vertical price restraints. Yet the Sherman Act’s use of “restraint of trade” “invokes the common law itself, ... not merely the static content that the common law had assigned to the term in 1890.” Business Electronics, supra, at 732, 108 S.Ct. 1515. The general restraint on alienation, especially in the age when then-Justice Hughes used the term, tended to evoke policy concerns extraneous to the question that controls here. Usually associated with land, not chattels, the rule arose from restrictions removing real property from the stream of commerce for generations. The Court should be cautious about putting dispositive weight on doctrines from antiquity but of slight relevance. We reaffirm that “the state of the common law 400 or even 100 years ago is irrelevant to the issue before us: the effect of the antitrust laws upon vertical distributional restraints in the American economy today.” GTE Sylvania, supra, at 53, n. 21, 97 S.Ct. 2549 (internal quotation marks omitted).

本院在Dr.Miles案中的判决依据是一部颁布于1628年的专著，但没有考虑到在1911年的其他会推动造商使用限制最低转售价格的商业原因。诚然《谢尔曼法》对限制交易的禁止源于普通法，但是其内容不会仅限于1890年确立时普通法的内容本身而一成不变。对转让的一般限制，特别是在当时Hughes大法官使用该术语的时代，往往会引起与本案无关的政策关注。该规则通常与不动产有关，而非与动产有关，因为该规则产生于对不动产在商业社会中世代相传的限制。法院应该审慎地对待此类古老但关联性不强的学说。我们重申，“400年甚至100年前的普通法状况与我们所面对的问题无关，现在的问题是反垄断法对当今美国经济中纵向分配限制的影响。”

Dr. Miles, furthermore, treated vertical agreements a manufacturer makes with its distributors as analogous to a horizontal combination among competing distributors. See 220 U.S., at 407–408, 31 S.Ct. 376. In later cases, however, the Court rejected the approach of reliance on rules governing horizontal restraints when defining rules applicable to vertical ones. See, e.g., Business Electronics, supra, at 734, 108 S.Ct. 1515 (disclaiming the “notion of equivalence between the scope of horizontal per se illegality and that of vertical per se illegality”); Maricopa County, supra, at 348, n. 18, 102 S.Ct. 2466 (noting that “horizontal restraints are generally less defensible than vertical restraints”). Our recent cases formulate antitrust principles in accordance with the appreciated differences in economic effect between vertical and horizontal agreements, differences the Dr. Miles Court failed to consider.

此外，Dr.Miles案将制造商和其分销商间的纵向协议视为类似于处于竞争关系的各分销商间的横向协议。而在随后的案件中，法院区分了适用于横向限制协议和纵向限制协议的原则。（见Business Electronics案[2]，本案否认了横向限制协议本身违法和纵向限制协议本身违法具有同等性；见Maricopa County案[3]，本案认为相较于纵向限制协议，横向限制协议更不具有正当性。）在最近的判决中，我们根据纵向和横向限制协议对经济效果的明显差异制定了反垄断审查原则，这些差异是Dr.Miles案没有考虑的。

The reasons upon which Dr. Miles relied do not justify a per se rule. As a consequence, it is necessary to examine, in the first instance, the economic effects of vertical agreements to fix minimum resale prices, and to determine whether the per se rule is nonetheless appropriate. See Business Electronics, 485 U.S., at 726, 108 S.Ct. 1515.

Dr.Miles案所依据的理论目前不足以证明应当继续适用本身违法原则。因此，目前有必要先审查的是纵向最低价格转售协议的经济影响以及决定本身违法原则是否仍继续适用。

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Though each side of the debate can find sources to support its position, it suffices to say here that economics literature is replete with procompetitive justifications for a manufacturer’s use of resale price maintenance. Even those more skeptical of resale price maintenance acknowledge it can have procompetitive effects.

尽管争论各方都能找到支持其立场的论据，需要指出的是，足够多的经济学文献都认为制造商限制最低转售价格有利于竞争。即使是对限制最低转售价格持怀疑立场的一方，也承认其有促进竞争的效果。

……The justifications for vertical price restraints are similar to those for other vertical restraints. See GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S., at 54–57, 97 S.Ct. 2549. Minimum resale price maintenance can stimulate interbrand competition—the competition among manufacturers selling different brands of the same type of product—by reducing intrabrand competition—the competition among retailers selling the same brand. See id., at 51–52, 97 S.Ct. 2549. The promotion of interbrand competition is important because “the primary purpose of the antitrust laws is to protect [this type of] competition.” Khan, 522 U.S., at 15, 118 S.Ct. 275. A single manufacturer’s use of vertical price restraints tends to eliminate intrabrand price competition; this in turn encourages retailers to invest in tangible or intangible services or promotional efforts that aid the manufacturer’s position as against rival manufacturers. Resale price maintenance also has the potential to give consumers more options so that they can choose among low-price, low-service brands; high-price, high-service brands; and brands that fall in between.

证明纵向价格限制有利的理由与证明其他纵向限制有利的理由相似。限制最低转售价格可以通过减少同品牌竞争——售卖同一品牌的不同零售商间的竞争，来促进跨品牌竞争——售卖同一类型产品的不同制造商间的竞争。促进跨品牌竞争十分重要，因为“反垄断法的重要目的就是为了保护这种竞争”[4]。同一制造商采用纵向价格限制有利于消除同品牌的价格竞争；这样反而能鼓励零售商投资于各类有形或无形的服务或促销活动，这有助于提升制造商与对手在竞争中的地位。限制最低转售价格还有可能给消费者提供更多的选择，使他们可以在提供低价格和有限服务的品牌、提供高价格和高质量服务的品牌以及介于两者之间的品牌中选择。

Absent vertical price restraints, the retail services that enhance interbrand competition might be underprovided. This is because discounting retailers can free ride on retailers who furnish services and then capture some of the increased demand those services generate. GTE Sylvania, supra, at 55, 97 S.Ct. 2549. Consumers might learn, for example, about the benefits of a manufacturer’s product from a retailer that invests in fine showrooms, offers product demonstrations, or hires and trains knowledgeable employees. R. Posner, Antitrust Law 172–173 (2d ed.2001) (hereinafter Posner). Or consumers might decide to buy the product because they see it in a retail establishment that has a reputation for selling high-quality merchandise. Marvel & McCafferty, Resale Price Maintenance and Quality Certification, 15 Rand J. Econ. 346, 347–349 (1984) (hereinafter Marvel & McCafferty). If the consumer can then buy the product from a retailer that discounts because it has not spent capital providing services or developing a quality reputation, the high-service retailer will lose sales to the discounter, forcing it to cut back its services to a level lower than consumers would otherwise prefer. Minimum resale price maintenance alleviates the problem because it prevents the discounter from undercutting the service provider. With price competition decreased, the manufacturer’s retailers compete among themselves over services.

在没有纵向价格限制的情况下，零售商可能会不愿提供足够的加强品牌间竞争的零售服务。这是因为打折的零售商可以搭上提供服务的零售商的便车，然后获取由这些服务所带来的部分需求增长。比如，消费者原本可能会从一个投资于精美展厅、提供产品展示或雇用和培训知识渊博的员工的零售商那里了解到制造商产品的好处。或者消费者可能会因为从一家以销售高质量的经销商零售店处看到产品而决定购买。而如果消费者现在可以从一家不提供服务或者质量口碑并不佳的打折商店低价购买到该产品，则提供高质量服务的零售商会因此流失客户，迫使其削减那些消费者所喜欢的服务。限制最低转售价格可以缓解这一问题，因为其能防止折扣商店的售价低于那些提供服务的零售商。随着价格竞争的减少，制造商的零售商们会在服务上下更多功夫。

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Resale price maintenance, in addition, can increase interbrand competition by facilitating market entry for new firms and brands. “[N]ew manufacturers and manufacturers entering new markets can use the restrictions in order to induce competent and aggressive retailers to make the kind of investment of capital and labor that is often required in the distribution of products unknown to the consumer.” GTE Sylvania, supra, at 55, 97 S.Ct. 2549; see Marvel & McCafferty 349 (noting that reliance on a retailer’s reputation “will decline as the manufacturer’s brand becomes better known, so that [resale price maintenance] may be particularly important as a competitive device for new entrants”). New products and new brands are essential to a dynamic economy, and if markets can be penetrated by using resale price maintenance there is a procompetitive effect.

此外，限制最低转售价格有助于更多新公司新品牌进入市场，从而增加跨品牌竞争。“新成立的制造商和进入新市场的制造商可以利用这些限制，来促进有能力的、积极进取的零售商进行资本和劳动力的投资，而这种投资在分销不为消费者所熟知的产品时往往是需要的。” 对于一个有活力的经济而言，新产品和新品牌是必不可少的，如果可以通过限制最低转售价格来渗透市场，则会产生有利于竞争的效果。

Resale price maintenance can also increase interbrand competition by encouraging retailer services that would not be provided even absent free riding. It may be difficult and inefficient for a manufacturer to make and enforce a contract with a retailer specifying the different services the retailer must perform. Offering the retailer a guaranteed margin and threatening termination if it does not live up to expectations may be the most efficient way to expand the manufacturer’s market share by inducing the retailer’s performance and allowing it to use its own initiative and experience in providing valuable services.

即使在没有免费搭便车的情形下，限制最低转售价格也可以通过鼓励零售商提供原本不会提供的服务来增加跨品牌竞争。对于制造商来说，与零售商签订合同，要求零售商必须提供的不同服务，可能是困难和低效的。而制造商向零售商保证利润空间，并在其没有达到预期的情况下有权终止合同，可能是扩大制造商市场份额的最有效方式，因为它可以促进零售商的表现，使其利用自己的创造性和经验来提供有价值的服务。

While vertical agreements setting minimum resale prices can have procompetitive justifications, they may have anticompetitive effects in other cases; and unlawful price fixing, designed solely to obtain monopoly profits, is an ever–present temptation. Resale price maintenance may, for example, facilitate a manufacturer cartel. See Business Electronics, 485 U.S., at 725, 108 S.Ct. 1515. An unlawful cartel will seek to discover if some manufacturers are undercutting the cartel’s fixed prices. Resale price maintenance could assist the cartel in identifying price-cutting manufacturers who benefit from the lower prices they offer. Resale price maintenance, furthermore, could discourage a manufacturer from cutting prices to retailers with the concomitant benefit of cheaper prices to consumers. See ibid.; see also Posner 172; Overstreet 19–23.

虽然限制最低转售价格的纵向限制协议被证明可以促进竞争，在不同情况下，它们也可能会限制竞争；单纯为了获得垄断利润的违法的价格限定行为从古至今一直存在。比如，限制最低转售价格可能会促进制造商卡特尔的形成。非法的卡特尔会设法去发现制造商是否存在降低卡特尔限定价格的行为。限制最低转售价格能帮助卡特尔发现那些从提供低价中获利的制造商。此外，限制最低转售价格还可以阻止制造商向零售商降价，从而使消费者不能获得更便宜的价格。

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Vertical price restraints also “might be used to organize cartels at the retailer level.” Business Electronics, supra, at 725–726, 108 S.Ct. 1515. A group of retailers might collude to fix prices to consumers and then compel a manufacturer to aid the unlawful arrangement with resale price maintenance. In that instance the manufacturer does not establish the practice to stimulate services or to promote its brand but to give inefficient retailers higher profits. Retailers with better distribution systems and lower cost structures would be prevented from charging lower prices by the agreement. See Posner 172; Overstreet 13–19. Historical examples suggest this possibility is a legitimate concern. See, e.g., Marvel & McCafferty, The Welfare Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 28 J. Law & Econ. 363, 373 (1985) (hereinafter Marvel) (providing an example of the power of the National Association of Retail Druggists to compel manufacturers to use resale price maintenance); Hovenkamp 186 (suggesting that the retail druggists in Dr. Miles formed a cartel and used manufacturers to enforce it).

纵向价格现在也可能会被用于在零售商层面形成卡特尔。一群零售商可能串通起来固定销售价格，然后迫使制造商以限制最低转售价格的方式促成这种非法安排。在这种情况下，制造商的限制行为不是为了提升服务或推广其品牌，而是为了给低效的零售商提供更高的利润。依据该限制协议，拥有更好的分销系统和更低的成本结构的零售商将被禁止以更低的价格销售。

A horizontal cartel among competing manufacturers or competing retailers that decreases output or reduces competition in order to increase price is, and ought to be, per se unlawful. See Texaco, 547 U.S., at 5, 126 S.Ct. 1276; GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S., at 58, n. 28, 97 S.Ct. 2549. To the extent a vertical agreement setting minimum resale prices is entered upon to facilitate either type of cartel, it, too, would need to be held unlawful under the rule of reason. This type of agreement may also be useful evidence for a plaintiff attempting to prove the existence of a horizontal cartel.

处于竞争关系的制造商或零售商间形成的横向卡特尔为了提高价格，会减少销售或抑制竞争，这种行为本身就是违法的。同样的，若限制最低转售价格的纵向限制协议目的是为了促成纵向或横向卡特尔，则根据合理原则，它们同样应该被认定为违法的。这种形式的协议也可以被原告用作有利证据，以证明存在横向卡特尔。

Resale price maintenance, furthermore, can be abused by a powerful manufacturer or retailer. A dominant retailer, for example, might request resale price maintenance to forestall innovation in distribution that decreases costs. A manufacturer might consider it has little choice but to accommodate the retailer’s demands for vertical price restraints if the manufacturer believes it needs access to the retailer’s  distribution network. See Overstreet 31; 8 P. Areeda & H. Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law 47 (2d ed.2004) (hereinafter Areeda & Hovenkamp); cf. Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928, 937–938 (C.A.7 2000). A manufacturer with market power, by comparison, might use resale price maintenance to give retailers an incentive not to sell the products of smaller rivals or new entrants. See, e.g., Marvel 366–368. As should be evident, the potential anticompetitive consequences of vertical price restraints must not be ignored or underestimated.

此外，限制最低转售价格也可能被有影响力的制造商或零售商滥用。例如，一个占市场主导地位的零售商可能会要求（制造商）限制最低转售价格，以阻止制造商采用其他更低成本的创新分销模式。当制造商为了进入零售商的分销网络时，它可能认为自己别无选择，只能满足零售商对纵向价格限制的要求。相反，一个具有市场支配地位的制造商可能会利用限制最低转售价格来抑制零售商销售来自其他小微制造者或新品牌的产品的动力。由此可见，限定最低转售价格可能对竞争造成的限制影响是不可忽略或低估的。

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Notwithstanding the risks of unlawful conduct, it cannot be stated with any degree of confidence that resale price maintenance “always or almost always tend[s] to restrict competition and decrease output.” Business Electronics, supra, at 723, 108 S.Ct. 1515 (internal quotation marks omitted). Vertical agreements establishing minimum resale prices can have either procompetitive or anticompetitive effects, depending upon the circumstances in which they are formed. And although the empirical evidence on the topic is limited, it does not suggest efficient uses of the agreements are infrequent or hypothetical. See Overstreet 170; see also id., at 80 (noting that for the majority of enforcement actions brought by the Federal Trade Commission between 1965 and 1982, “the use of [resale price maintenance] was not likely motivated by collusive dealers who had successfully coerced their suppliers”); Ippolito 292 (reaching a similar conclusion). As the rule would proscribe a significant amount of procompetitive conduct, these agreements appear ill suited for per se condemnation.

尽管存在违法行为的风险，但任何人都不能有把握声称“限制最低转售价格总是或几乎总是会限制竞争和降低产出”。纵向价格限制协议会有促进或减少竞争的影响，这取决于它们是在何种情况下形成的。尽管在这个话题上先验证据有限，这也不意味着有效使用这些协议是不常见的或是假设的。由于适用本身违法原则的情形下，大量的有利于竞争的行为将被禁止，故这些协议似乎不适用本身违法原则。

Respondent contends, nonetheless, that vertical price restraints should be per se unlawful because of the administrative convenience of per se rules. See, e.g., GTE Sylvania, supra, at 50, n. 16, 97 S.Ct. 2549 (noting “per se rules tend to provide guidance to the business community and to minimize the burdens on litigants and the judicial system”). That argument suggests  per se illegality is the rule rather than the exception. This misinterprets our antitrust law. Per se rules may decrease administrative costs, but that is only part of the equation. Those rules can be counterproductive. They can increase the total cost of the antitrust system by prohibiting procompetitive conduct the antitrust laws should encourage. See Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53 Antitrust L.J. 135, 158 (1984) (hereinafter Easterbrook). They also may increase litigation costs by promoting frivolous suits against legitimate practices. The Court has thus explained that administrative “advantages are not sufficient in themselves to justify the creation of per se rules,” GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S., at 50, n. 16, 97 S.Ct. 2549, and has relegated their use to restraints that are “manifestly anticompetitive,” id., at 49–50, 97 S.Ct. 2549. Were the Court now to conclude that vertical price restraints should be per se illegal based on administrative costs, we would undermine, if not overrule, the traditional “demanding standards” for adopting per se rules. Id., at 50, 97 S.Ct. 2549. Any possible reduction in administrative costs cannot alone justify the Dr. Miles rule.

被上诉人认为，纵向价格限制协议应该是本身违法的，因为本身违法原则便于行政管理。这种说法认为，本身违法是原则，而非例外。这是对我们的反垄断法的误读。本身违法原则可能会降低行政成本，但这仅仅是等式的一部分。这一原则也会产生反作用。它们可能会通过禁止反垄断法应该鼓励的有利于竞争的行为来增加反垄断系统的总成本。法院因此解释了“行政优势本身并不足以证明适用本身违法原则的理由”，且法院将该原则的适用仅限于审查“显著影响竞争”的限制行为。假如法院现在根据行政成本得出纵向价格限制是本身非法的结论，我们将破坏，甚至推翻采用本身违法原则的传统的“严格标准”。仅仅降低行政成本的理由不足以证明本身违法原则依然适用。

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Respondent also argues the per se rule is justified because a vertical price restraint can lead to higher prices for the manufacturer’s goods. See also Overstreet 160 (noting that “price surveys indicate that [resale price maintenance] in most cases increased the prices of products sold”). Respondent is mistaken in relying on pricing effects absent a further showing of anticompetitive conduct. Cf. id., at 106 (explaining that price surveys “do not necessarily tell us anything conclusive about the welfare effects of [resale price maintenance] because the results are generally consistent with both procompetitive and anticompetitive theories”). For, as has been indicated already, the antitrust laws are designed primarily to protect interbrand competition, from which lower prices can later result. See Khan, 522 U.S., at 15, 118 S.Ct. 275. The Court, moreover, has evaluated other vertical restraints under the rule of reason even though prices can be increased in the course of promoting procompetitive effects. See, e.g., Business Electronics, 485 U.S., at 728, 108 S.Ct. 1515. And resale price maintenance may reduce prices if manufacturers have resorted to costlier alternatives of controlling resale prices that are not per se unlawful. See infra, at 2721 – 2724; see also Marvel 371.

被上诉人还认为，适用本身违法原则是适当的，因为纵向价格限制会导致制造商的价格变得更高。被上诉人在缺乏证明存在进一步限制竞争行为的情况，仅依赖价格效应的观点是错误的。正如前文所述，反垄断法的主要设计目的是保护跨品牌竞争，从而使价格更低。此外，尽管在促进竞争过程中价格可能会变高，本院在审查其他纵向限制时采用了合理原则。而且如果制造商转而选择其他花费更高但不是本身违法的替代行为时，限制最低转售价格可能会使价格降低。

Respondent’s argument, furthermore, overlooks that, in general, the interests of manufacturers and consumers are aligned with respect to retailer profit margins. The difference between the price a manufacturer charges retailers and the price retailers charge consumers represents part of the manufacturer’s cost of distribution, which, like any other cost, the manufacturer usually desires to minimize. See GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S., at 56, n. 24, 97 S.Ct. 2549; see also id., at 56, 97 S.Ct. 2549 (“Economists ... have argued that manufacturers have an economic interest in maintaining as much intrabrand competition as is consistent with the efficient distribution of their products”). A manufacturer has no incentive to overcompensate retailers with unjustified margins. The retailers, not the manufacturer, gain from higher retail prices. The manufacturer often loses; interbrand competition reduces its competitiveness and market share because consumers will “substitute a different brand of the same product.” Id., at 52, n. 19, 97 S.Ct. 2549; see Business Electronics, supra, at 725, 108 S.Ct. 1515. As a general matter, therefore, a single manufacturer will desire to set minimum resale prices only if the “increase in demand resulting from enhanced service ... will more than offset a negative impact on demand of a higher retail price.” Mathewson & Winter 67.

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此外，被上诉人的论点还忽略了通常情况下，制造商和消费者的利益在零售商的利润空间方面是一致的。制造商向零售商收取的价格与零售商向消费者售卖的价格差属于制造商的分销成本，与其他成本一样，制造商通常希望将其降至最低。制造商没有动机来过渡补贴零售商不正当的利润空间。零售商，而非制造商，会从高零售价中获利。制造商通常是跨品牌竞争里的输家。跨品牌竞争会削弱制造商的竞争力和市场份额，因为消费者会“购买其他品牌的相同产品”。因此，通常来说，只有在 “加强服务所带来的需求增长......将足以抵消较高零售价格对需求的负面影响”时，单一制造商才会希望限定最低转售价格。

The implications of respondent’s position are far reaching. Many decisions a manufacturer makes and carries out through concerted action can lead to higher prices. A manufacturer might, for example, contract with different suppliers to obtain better inputs that improve product quality. Or it might hire an advertising agency to promote awareness of its goods. Yet no one would think these actions violate the Sherman Act because they lead to higher prices. The antitrust laws do not require manufacturers to produce generic goods that consumers do not know about or want. The manufacturer strives to improve its product quality or to promote its brand because it believes this conduct will lead to increased demand despite higher prices. The same can hold true for resale price maintenance.

（如果依据）被上诉人的立场，则产生的影响是深远的。制造商通过一致行动做出的许多决定都可能会导致价格上涨。例如，制造商可能与不同的供应商签订合同，以获得更好的原材料来提高产品质量。或者它可能雇用广告公司来提高其产品的知名度。然而，没有人会认为因为这些行为导致了价格升高，所以它们违反了《谢尔曼法》。反垄断法并不要求制造商生产消费者不知道或不需要的普通商品。制造商努力提高其产品质量或推广其品牌，是因为它相信尽管产品价格较高，这种行为会导致产品需求增加。同样的情况也可以适用于限制最低转售价格行为。

Resale price maintenance, it is true, does have economic dangers. If the rule of reason were to apply to vertical price restraints, courts would have to be diligent in eliminating their anticompetitive uses from the market. This is a realistic objective, and certain factors are relevant to the inquiry. For example, the number of manufacturers that make use of the practice in a given industry can provide important instruction. When only a few manufacturers lacking market power adopt the practice, there is little likelihood it is facilitating a manufacturer cartel, for a cartel then can be undercut by rival manufacturers. See Overstreet 22; Bork 294. Likewise, a retailer cartel is unlikely when only a single manufacturer in a competitive market uses resale price maintenance. Interbrand competition would divert consumers to lower priced substitutes and eliminate any gains to retailers from their price-fixing agreement over a single brand. See Posner 172; Bork 292. Resale price maintenance should be subject to more careful scrutiny, by contrast, if many competing manufacturers adopt the practice. Cf. Scherer & Ross 558 (noting that “except when [resale price maintenance] spreads to cover the bulk of an industry’s output, depriving consumers of a meaningful choice between high-service and low-price outlets, most [resale price maintenance arrangements] are probably innocuous”); Easterbrook 162 (suggesting that “every one of the potentially-anticompetitive outcomes of vertical arrangements depends on the uniformity of the practice”).

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当然，限制最低转售价格确实会对经济产生危害。如果使用合理原则审查纵向价格限制协议，法院需要勤勉于消除市场上这些协议的限制竞争影响。这是一个实际目标，而且调查与某些特定因素有关。比如，在某一行业中采用这种做法的制造商的数量可以提供重要参考。当只有少数缺乏市场地位的制造商采用这种做法时，它几乎不可能促进形成制造商卡特尔，因为这种卡特尔可以被竞争对手压制。同样的，当行业中只有单一制造商限制最低转售价格时，零售商卡特尔也不可能形成。跨品牌竞争会使消费者选择更低价的产品并限制零售商从单一品牌的价格限制协议中获利。相反，如果在行业多数竞争的制造商都限制最低转售价格时，法院需要对该行为做出更仔细的审查。

The source of the restraint may also be an important consideration. If there is evidence retailers were the impetus for a vertical price restraint, there is a greater likelihood that the restraint facilitates a retailer cartel or supports a dominant, inefficient retailer. If, by contrast, a manufacturer adopted the policy independent of retailer pressure, the restraint is less likely to promote anticompetitive conduct. Cf. Posner 177 (“It makes all the difference whether minimum retail prices are imposed by the manufacturer in order to evoke point-of-sale services or by the dealers in order to obtain monopoly profits”). A manufacturer also has an incentive to protest inefficient retailer-induced price restraints because they can harm its competitive position.

限制的缘由也是一个重要的考虑因素。如果有证据表明零售商推动纵向价格限制的原因，那么这种限制更有可能促进形成零售商卡特尔或有利于占主导地位的低效零售商。相反，如果制造商并非基于零售商的压力而限制最低转售价格，这种行为对竞争的限制作用可能性不大。制造商同样会反对由零售商主导的价格限制，因为这会影响它的竞争地位。

As a final matter, that a dominant manufacturer or retailer can abuse resale price maintenance for anticompetitive purposes may not be a serious concern unless the relevant entity has market power. If a retailer lacks market power, manufacturers likely can sell their goods through rival retailers. See also Business Electronics, supra, at 727, n. 2, 108 S.Ct. 1515 (noting “[r]etail market power is rare, because of the usual presence of interbrand competition and other dealers”). And if a manufacturer lacks market power, there is less likelihood it can use the practice to keep competitors away from distribution outlets.

最后，除非相关主体具有市场支配地位，一个有市场主导地位的制造商或零售商出于限制竞争目的滥用限制最低转售价格行为并不足以构成一个严重的问题。如果一个零售商缺乏市场支配地位（而限制最低价格），制造商会有可能将产品出售给与其竞争的其他零售商。（见Business Electronics案，“具有市场支配地位的零售商不多见，因为存在跨品牌竞争和其他销售商”）同样的，如果一个制造商缺乏市场支配地位，其利用限制价格协议将其它竞争者排除出自己的分销架构的可能性不大。

The rule of reason is designed and used to eliminate anticompetitive transactions from the market. This standard principle applies to vertical price restraints. A party alleging injury from a vertical agreement setting minimum resale prices will have, as a general matter, the information and resources available to show the existence of the agreement and its scope of operation. As courts gain experience considering the effects of these restraints by applying the rule of reason over the course of decisions, they can establish the litigation structure to ensure the rule operates to eliminate anticompetitive restraints from the market and to provide more guidance to businesses. Courts can, for example, devise rules over time for offering proof, or even presumptions where justified, to make the rule of reason a fair and efficient way to prohibit anticompetitive restraints and to promote procompetitive ones.

合理原则的设计和使用目的是为了消除市场中的限制竞争行为。这一标准原则适用于纵向价格限制。声称因限定最低转售价格的纵向协议而受到损害的一方，一般来说会有信息和资源来证明该协议的存在及其运作范围。随着法院在判决中使用合理原则对限制行为的影响做出审查的经验不断累积，他们可以建立诉讼体系，以确保该原则的适用能够消除市场上的限制竞争措施，并为企业提供更多指导。例如，随着时间的推移，法院可以设计出举证规则，甚至在合理的情况下进行推定，使合理原则成为禁止限制竞争和促进有利竞争的一个公平和有效的方式。

（图片来源于网络）

For all of the foregoing reasons, we think that were the Court considering the issue as an original matter, the rule of reason, not a per se rule of unlawfulness, would be the appropriate standard to judge vertical price restraints.

基于上述理由，我们认为，如果法院把该问题作为一个原始问题来考虑，合理原则，而不是本身违法原则，将是判断纵向价格限制的合适标准。

我们撤销了上诉法院的判决，并根据本判决意见发回重审。

It is so ordered.

特此判决。

本院在Dr.Miles案中树立了一条明确的界线（a bright-line rule），即限制最低转售价格行为是本身违法的。近一个世纪以来，本身违法原则是法律界、商界和公众领域所依赖的原则。而今天，本院决定不再使用本身违法原则来审查最低转售价格的合法性，转而使用合理原则。

目前的争议焦点是，法院审查限制最低转售价格行为时，应该适用本身违法原则还是合理原则。而这是一个难以回答的问题。为了更好解释为什么这是一个难以回答的问题，我简要总结了支持和反对本身违法原则的争论。这些争论主要考虑三个因素，即限制最低转售价格可能产生的限制竞争的影响、可能产生的有利竞争的影响和行政因素。

（图片来源于网络）

对于零售商而言，限制最低转售价格协议和横向价格协议一样，都会减少或限制同一品牌间或跨品牌不同零售商间的竞争。如此可能会导致产品售价上升，服务减少，限制愿意提供低价的零售商进入市场等结果；对于制造商而言，限制最低转售价格会抑制集中产业中的竞争，如这些产业中的企业会默契共谋，观察对手企业的售价并调整自己的售价，从而避免价格竞争。

这些限制竞争的可能性有先验结果支持。国会在1975年废除了《Miller-Tydings公平交易法案》，该法案允许各州依据本州的公平交易法来审查限制最低转售价格行为的合法性。在该法案被废除时，36个州认为限制最低转售价格合法，14个州认定其违法。而司法部在比较了不同州的商品价格后发现，允许这类行为的州的所涉商品价格比禁止这类行为的州的价格平均贵19%至27%。许多经济学家也在有影响力的反垄断论文中指出，限制最低转售价格会导致更高的售价。

支持者认为，限制最低转售价格有利于竞争具体表现为两点。一是此类行为可以促进新公司进入市场。二是如果没有限制最低转售价格，零售商推销商品的动力会因为其他对手的搭便车行为而削弱。

此外，当单一制造商，而非一群制造商同时寻求限制最低转售价格协议时，有理由相信它是为了追求某种有利竞争的利益。这是因为相同情况下，相较于零售商，制造商更希望价格竞争，希望拥有更多的市场份额来赚取更多利润。因此，当一个没有市场主导地位的制造商主动寻求最低价格限制时，更有理由相信他们是为了促进竞争而获取某些利益，如允许新零售商进入市场、减少搭便车行为等。

由于对此问题经济学家的结论不一，即限制最低转售价格既可能有利于竞争，也可能对经济有害。经济学家据此从行政管理角度对反垄断法提出了各种建议。但这是否是法院应该适用合理原则来审查其合法性的理由呢？

反垄断法不能也不应该精确地复制经济学家的观点（它们有时是相互冲突的）。这是因为法律应用与经济学不同，法律的效果源于原则和生效判决的内容，而这些原则和生效判决只能由法院的法官和陪审团作出，并为向客户提供咨询的律师来应用。而这一事实意味着，法院往往会在判决中带入自己的行政考量与判断，比如对某些行为适用本身违法原则，即使这些行为有时会带来好处。

综上，考虑到争议焦点存在太多不确定性，在没有生效判决的情况下作出回答是十分困难的。但是由于本身违法原则已经确立近百年，如果一定要我对争议焦点作出回答，我更倾向于为本身违法原则设定一些例外，而非改变这个已经确立了近百年的原则。

[1]Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911)

[2]Business Electronics, supra, at 734, 108 S.Ct. 1515

[3]Maricopa County, supra, at 348, n. 18, 102 S.Ct. 2466

[4]See Khan, 522 U.S., at 15, 118 S.Ct. 275

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