作者 | 朱晗 康奈尔大学法学院LL.M. 
一审 | 田雅琦 青岛大学本科
二审 | 汪晨涵 复旦大学法律硕士
编辑 | 于杰 上海对外经贸大学本科
责编 | 王有蓉 西安外国语大学本科 
礼让原则对美国反垄断法域外效力的限制
——罗氏公司诉恩帕戈蓝公司案评析
01
案件背景
属地管辖允许国家对在其领土内发生的行为行使管辖权,作为一种最基本的管辖原则,属地管辖在发展中逐渐形成了新的边界。在“合众国诉美国铝业公司(United States v. Aluminum Co. of America)案” 中,法官勒恩德·汉德(Learned Hand)指出任何国家都可以对发生在境外但对境内产生影响的行为行使管辖权,即使针对非本国居民。[1]通过将行为地扩大解释为行为效果地,在境外垄断行为对美国境内市场产生了影响时,美国便能适用其反垄断法。这种基于行为效果的管辖逐渐发展为效果管辖(Effects Jurisdiction)原则。
然而,在经济全球化的背景下,境外的商业活动很容易在境内产生或多或少的影响。[2]如果仅仅依靠行为效果作为判断标准,很容易导致一国行使管辖权的同时干涉了他国主权。在“汀伯兰木材公司诉美国银行(Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America)案” 中,联邦第九巡回法院指出单纯的行为效果地标准是不充分的,还需要考虑其他两项标准:行为效果是否足以对原告产生了法律认可的损害;且与其他国家相比,美国的利益是否足以为域外管辖提供正当性。[3]
此后,为了更明确地限制反垄断执法管辖,国会通过了《1982年外贸反垄断改进法》(FTAIA,Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982),发展了汀伯兰案中对反垄断域外管辖的限制,其中指出境外行为对境内的影响应当是“直接、实质且合理可预见的”。[4]然而,FTAIA作为一部简短的修正型法律,对于比较复杂的事实仍然无法给出明确结论。例如,当一境外垄断行为同时对境内外买家造成损害时,美国法院是否能管辖境外买家的诉求?一方面,这一行为对境内市场的影响是“直接、实质且合理可预见的”,符合FTAIA规定的境内损害例外情形;另一方面,美国如果选择管辖境外垄断行为对境外买家的影响,将会不可避免地将美国反垄断法的效果作用在他国领土上,进而影响他国主权。
(图片源自网络)
02
相关立法
《1982年外贸反垄断改进法》,[5]被编入《美国法典第十五卷(商业和贸易)》第一章(限制贸易的垄断和联合)第六节之一(涉及与外国贸易或商业的行为),[6]以下是全文及其翻译。
Sections 1 to 7 of this title shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations unless--
(1) such conduct has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect--
(A) on trade or commerce which is not trade or commerce with foreign nations, or on import trade or import commerce with foreign nations; or
(B) on export trade or export commerce with foreign nations, of a person engaged in such trade or commerce in the United States; and
(2) such effect gives rise to a claim under the provisions of sections 1 to 7 of this title, other than this section.
本章第一至七节不适用于除进口商贸外的涉外商贸,除非这种行为可以根据本章第一至七节提出诉讼请求,并且对非涉外商贸、进口商贸或美国境内从事出口商贸的人产生直接、实质且合理可预见的影响。
If sections 1 to 7 of this title apply to such conduct only because of the operation of paragraph (1)(B), then sections 1 to 7 of this title shall apply to such conduct only for injury to export business in the United States.
如果适用本节第一款第二项规定(对美国境内从事出口商贸的人产生直接、实质且合理可预见的影响),第一至七节的诉求仅可用于损害美国出口业务的行为。
(图片源自网络)
03
案件事实和程序概要
恩帕戈蓝(Empagran)公司和其他购买维生素用于分销的国内外企业向包括罗氏(F. Hoffmann-La Roche)公司在内的多家国内外维生素销售商提起集体诉讼。维生素采购商指控销售商合谋操纵价格,销售商动议驳回外国采购商的诉讼请求,声称这些诉求基于境外行为,超出了国内反垄断法的管辖范围。联邦地区法院认可了销售商的抗辩并驳回了外国采购商的诉讼请求,国内采购商则另案处理。联邦巡回法院推翻了地方法院驳回外国采购商诉讼请求的意见,指出即使争议行为仅仅影响了境外价格,该行为也属于对国内商业有直接和实质影响行为的合谋。维生素销售商向联邦最高法院提交了调卷申请。[7]联邦最高法院同意调卷并指出,如果价格操纵行为对美国国内外均产生了重大不利影响,但境外影响独立于任何不利的境内影响,则FTAIA的境内损害例外不适用,因此《谢尔曼法》也不适用。[8]
04
判决结果和说理
The Supreme Court, Justice Breyer, held that: 
最高法院布雷耶大法官判决如下:
1. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA) exclusionary rule was not limited only to conduct involving exports;
(一)《外贸反垄断改进法》的例外情形不限于涉及出口的行为。

2. where price-fixing conduct significantly and adversely affected customers both outside and within United States, but adverse foreign effect was independent of any adverse domestic effect, Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA) domestic injury exception did not apply, and thus, neither did Sherman Act, to claim based solely on foreign effect; abrogating Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 284 F.3d 384; and
(二) 如果价格操纵行为对美国国内外均产生了重大不利影响,但境外影响独立于任何不利的境内影响,则FTAIA的境内损害例外不适用,因此《谢尔曼法》不适用。废除“克鲁曼诉佳士得国际公司案”。[9]
3. on remand, Court of Appeals could consider whether foreign purchasers properly preserved their alternative argument that foreign injury was not in fact independent of domestic effects and, if so, could consider and decide related claim.
(三)发回重审时,上诉法院可以考虑外国采购商是否恰当论证了他们的让步论点,即外国损害事实上不独立于国内影响。如果外国采购商论点成立,上诉法院可以决定支持相应的诉求。
For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
因此,上诉法院的判决被撤销,本案被发回重审,重审须与本意见一致。
(图片源自网络)
[. . .]
Respondents make a threshold argument. They say that the transactions here at issue fall outside the FTAIA because the FTAIA's general exclusionary rule applies only to conduct involving exports. The rule says that the Sherman Act “shall not apply to conduct involving trade or commerce (other than import trade or import commerce) with foreign nations.” [10]The word “with” means between the United States and foreign nations. And, they contend, commerce between the United States and foreign nations that is not import commerce must consist of export commerce—a kind of commerce irrelevant to the case at hand.
被告首先提出争议行为超出了FTAIA的适用范围,因为FTAIA只意在排除《谢尔曼法》对出口商贸的适用。FTAIA表明“《谢尔曼法》不应当适用于进口商贸外的涉外商贸”,[11]其中,“涉外”指美国与其他国家。而涉外商贸,若非进口,必为出口,而出口并非本案所涉商业活动。
The difficulty with respondents' argument is that the FTAIA originated in a bill that initially referred only to “export trade or export commerce.” [12]But the House Judiciary Committee subsequently changed that language to “trade or commerce (other than import trade or import commerce).”[13] And it did so deliberately to include commerce that did not involve American exports but which was wholly foreign.
被告的论证难以成立,因为尽管FTAIA法案最初仅提及“出口商贸”,[14]但众议院司法委员会将表述更改为“进口商贸外的涉外商贸”,[15]这处更改有意涵盖不涉及美国出口而完全位于境外的商业活动。
[. . .]
The price-fixing conduct significantly and adversely affects both customers outside the United States and customers within the United States, but the adverse foreign effect is independent of any adverse domestic effect. In these circumstances, we find that the FTAIA exception does not apply (and thus the Sherman Act does not apply) for two main reasons.
价格操纵行为对美国境内外的客户均产生了重大不利影响,但对境外的不利影响独立于对境内的不利影响。由此,我们发现FTAIA的例外情形不适用本案(因此《谢尔曼法》也不适用本案)有以下两个主要原因。
First, this Court ordinarily construes ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other nations.[16] This rule of construction reflects principles of customary international law—law that (we must assume) Congress ordinarily seeks to follow. [17]
首先,本法院通常会以避免不当干涉他国主权的方式解释模棱两可的立法。如《国家劳动关系法》对外国船舶的适用、[18]《琼斯法》在海事案件的适用。这种来源于国际礼让原则的解释方法,[19]反映了法院应当限制对与他国有关的人或事不当行使管辖权的习惯国际法,而法院应当推定国会通常会遵循这一习惯国际法。[22]
[. . .]
Second, the FTAIA's language and history suggest that Congress designed the FTAIA to clarify, perhaps to limit, but not to expand in any significant way, the Sherman Act's scope as applied to foreign commerce.[23] And we have found no significant indication that at the time Congress wrote this statute courts would have thought the Sherman Act applicable in these circumstances.
其次,FTAIA的措辞和历史表明,国会设计FTAIA是为了澄清或限制《谢尔曼法》对外国商业活动的适用范围,而不是以任何显著的方式扩大其适用范围。[24]我们没有发现任何重要的迹象表明在国会立法时,法院认为《谢尔曼法》可适用于本案情形。
[. . .]
Finally, respondents point to policy considerations, namely, that application of the Sherman Act in present circumstances will (through increased deterrence) help protect Americans against foreign-caused anticompetitive injury. Petitioners, however, have made important experience-backed arguments (based upon amnesty-seeking incentives) to the contrary. We cannot say whether, on balance, respondents' side of this empirically based argument or the enforcement agencies' side is correct. But we can say that the answer to the dispute is neither clear enough, nor of such likely empirical significance, that it could overcome the considerations we have previously discussed and change our conclusion.
最后,被告指出法院应当考虑的政策,即在本案情形中适用《谢尔曼法》能够增强威慑力以保护美国人免受外国反竞争行为的损害。然而,原告也提出了相反的重要经验论证,指出在本案中适用《谢尔曼法》将损害境外实体自愿报告垄断行为寻求特赦的动力。总体上,我们无法说哪一方的观点更正确,但我们可以说,政策争议的答案既不够明确,也不足以提供经验价值,以推翻前述讨论的结论。
(图片源自网络)
05
案例评析
上世纪八十年代末,主要的维生素生产商组建了一个庞大的国际卡特尔联盟,以控制全球维生素市场并抬高价格。本案中,国内外的采购商在美国联邦法院提起诉讼,希望借助美国的反垄断法打破维生素市场的国际卡特尔。法院在解释FTAIA时,没有像以往那样分析卡特尔的结构,而是采用了一种过去仅出现在反对意见中的解释方法。这种解释方法一方面坚持了不干涉他国主权的国际法原则,另一方面促进了其他国家用本国法律监管不正当竞争行为,而非依赖美国的立法和执法。
当然,本案确立的适用情形相对狭窄,除非境外损害毫无争议地独立于国内影响,本案能否适用将取决于法院如何决定境内外影响是否独立。尽管有这种潜在的模糊性,本案仍然能有效限制外国原告提起的诉讼,从而缓解美国和外国法院之间的紧张关系。通过将礼让原则作为解释法律域外适用的主要工具,法院遏制了一些早期判决的帝国主义倾向,并为美国反垄断法的域外适用创造了新的标准。
脚注
[1]United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
[2]See Nicholas DeBelleville Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances in Interstate and International Law, 65 Yale L.J. 1087, 1150 (1956).
[3]Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., N.T. and S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 611-13 (9th Cir. 1976).
[4]15 U.S.C.A. § 6a (West).
[5]Pub.L. 97-290, Title IV, § 402, Oct. 8, 1982, 96 Stat. 1246.
[6]15 U.S.C. § 6a.
[7]See Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd., CIV.001686TFH, 2001 WL 761360 (D.D.C. June 7, 2001), rev'd and vacated sub nom. Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche, Ltd., 315 F.3d 338 (D.C. Cir. 2003), vacated sub nom. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004), and aff'd sub nom. Empagran S.A. v. F. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Ltd., 417 F.3d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
[8]F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
[9]Kruman v. Christie's Int'l PLC, 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002).
[10]15 U.S.C. § 6a.
[11]15 U.S.C. § 6a.
[12]H.R. 5235, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., § 1 (1981).
[13]15 U.S.C. § 6a.
[14]H.R. 5235, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., § 1 (1981).
[15]15 U.S.C. § 6a.
[16]See, e.g., McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 20–22, 83 S.Ct. 671, 9 L.Ed.2d 547 (1963) (application of National Labor Relations Act to foreign-flag vessels); Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 382–383, 79 S.Ct. 468, 3 L.Ed.2d 368 (1959) (application of Jones Act in maritime case); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578, 73 S.Ct. 921, 97 L.Ed. 1254 (1953) (same).
[17]See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States §§ 403(1), 403(2) (1986) (limiting the unreasonable exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction with respect to a person or activity having connections with another State); Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118, 2 L.Ed. 208 (1804) (“[A]n act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains”); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 817, 113 S.Ct. 2891, 125 L.Ed.2d 612 (1993) (SCALIA, J., dissenting) (identifying rule of construction as derived from the principle of “ ‘prescriptive comity’ ” ).
[18]McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 20–22, 83 S.Ct. 671, 9 L.Ed.2d 547 (1963).
[19]Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 382–383, 79 S.Ct. 468, 3 L.Ed.2d 368 (1959); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578, 73 S.Ct. 921, 97 L.Ed. 1254 (1953).
[20]Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 817, 113 S.Ct. 2891, 125 L.Ed.2d 612 (1993) (SCALIA, J., dissenting).
[21]See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States §§ 403(1), 403(2) (1986).
[22]Cf. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 2 Cranch 64, 118, 2 L.Ed. 208 (1804) (“[A]n act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains”).
[23]See House Report, at 2–3, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, 2487, 2487–2488.
[24]See House Report, at 2–3, U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1982, 2487, 2487–2488.
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