译者 | 徐可心 华东政法大学LL.B.
一审 | 陈思源 北京大学
二审 | Cindy Wong University of Leeds LL.B.
编辑 | NYZ 武汉大学本科
         于杰 上海对外经贸大学本科
责编 | 王有蓉 中国政法大学硕士
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COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION
Amendments to the Communication from the Commission
Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings
欧盟委员会函件
欧盟委员会关于适用《欧共体条约》第82条查处支配地位企业排他性滥用行为的执法重点指南（修正草案）
1. Over the years, the European Union (‘EU’) rules on competition have been instrumental in protecting the competitive process within the EU’s internal market. The enforcement of those rules, namely Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (‘TFEU’), ‘serves Europe well by contributing to a level playing field where markets serve consumers’. It can moreover contribute to achieving objectives that go beyond consumer welfare, such as plurality in a democratic society.
1.多年来，欧盟竞争规则在保护欧盟内部市场的竞争过程方面发挥着重要作用。《欧盟运行条约》（ TFEU）第101条和第102条的适用，旨在“营造为消费者服务的公平竞争市场环境，进而为欧洲提供更好服务”。此外，它能够促成消费者福利以外的目标，例如民主社会中的多元化。
2. Against this backdrop, it is of the utmost importance that the Union’s competition rules are  applied vigorously and effectively. This is all the more necessary in times of economic  hardship, and in view of increasing market concentration in various industries.
2.在此背景下，尤其是在经济困难时期，各行业市场集中度日益增高的情况下，积极有效地实施欧盟竞争规则至关重要。
3. Article 102 TFEU prohibits the abuse of a dominant position by undertakings that operate in the Internal Market. It has been instrumental in disciplining the conduct of dominant undertakings, which have a special responsibility not to allow their behaviour to impair genuine, undistorted competition on the internal market.
3.《欧盟运行条约》第102条禁止在欧盟内部市场经营的企业滥用市场支配地位，这有助于约束支配地位企业的行为。这些企业负有特殊责任，禁止其行为损害欧盟内部市场中真实、不受扭曲的竞争。
4. On 5 December 2008, the Commission adopted the Communication from the Commission – Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty [now Article 102 TFEU] to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings (‘Guidance on enforcement priorities’).
4.2008年12月5日，委员会通过了《委员会函件——适用<欧共体条约>第82条（现为《欧盟运行条约》第102条）查处市场支配地位企业排他性滥用行为的执法重点指南》（下称“《执法重点指南》”）。
5. That Communication set out the Commission’s enforcement priorities with regard to  exclusionary abuses of dominance in order to provide greater clarity and predictability as regards the Commission’s general framework of analysis in determining whether to pursue as a matter of priority certain cases of exclusionary conduct. The Guidance on enforcement priorities contributed to fostering an enforcement of Article 102 TFEU focussed on the capability of a given conduct to harm competition, through the analysis of market dynamics, which has been described as the effects-based approach.
5.该函件规定了委员会在排他性滥用支配地位方面的执法重点指南，以促使委员会在确定是否优先处理某些排他性行为案件时所遵循的一般分析框架更加明确并且可预测。《执法重点指南》有助于促进《欧盟运行条约》第102条的执行，通过对市场动态的分析，关注特定行为损害竞争的能力，这被称为 “基于效果的方法”（ Effects-based Approach）。
6. The Guidance on enforcement priorities, however, did not constitute a statement of the law and did not provide an interpretation of the notion of abuse of a dominant position, but merely set out the Commission’s approach as to the choice of cases that it intends to pursue as a matter of priority. 
6.然而，《执法重点指南》并不构成法律陈述，也不对“滥用支配地位”的概念作出解释，而是仅仅规定了委员会在选择其作为执法重点优先处理的案件时的方法。
7. The Commission’s enforcement priorities have evolved over time, thanks to the experience gained through the Commission’s practice which took into account the evolution of the case law of the Union Courts, as well as market developments. Notably, the case law of the Union Courts has confirmed an effects-based approach to Article 102 TFEU as well as clarified the meaning and scope of certain concepts included in the Guidance on enforcement priorities. 
7.委员会的执法重点随着时间推移而演变，这归功于委员会将联邦法院判例法的演变以及市场的发展考虑在内的实践。值得注意的是，联邦法院的判例法确认了《欧盟运行条约》第102条的“基于效果的方法”（ Effects-based Approach），并阐释了《执法重点指南》中某些概念的定义和范围。
8. In light of those developments, this Communication amends parts of the Guidance on enforcement priorities that no longer reflect the Commission’s approach in determining whether to pursue certain cases as a matter of priority. The amendments are done in accordance with the principle of good administration and with a view to enhancing transparency on the principles underpinning the Commission’s enforcement action. 
8.鉴于上述发展，本函件修订了《执法重点指南》中的部分内容，这些内容不再反映委员会在确定是否将某些案件作为执法重点处理时的方法。修正是根据善意行政原则进行的，旨在提高委员会执法行动所依据原则的透明度。
9. The amendments to the Guidance on enforcement priorities are listed in the Annex to this Communication.
9.对《执法重点指南》的修改，请见本函件附件。
（图片源于网络）
ANNEX
附件
1.Taking into account the experience gained through the Commission’s enforcement practice and the clarifications provided by the case law of the Union Courts, it is appropriate to clarify that the concept of ‘anti-competitive foreclosure’ (Guidance on enforcement priorities, paragraph 19) refers not only to cases where the dominant undertaking’s conduct can lead to the full exclusion or marginalisation of competition but also to cases where it is capable of resulting in the weakening of competition, thereby hampering the competitive structure of the market to the advantage of the dominant undertaking and to the detriment of consumers. Moreover, in view of the Commission’s enforcement practice and the case law of the Union Courts, it is important to clarify that it is not appropriate to use the element of profitability of the dominant undertaking’s conduct in order to determine the Commission’s enforcement priorities, i.e. to pursue cases as a matter of priority only where the dominant undertaking can profitably maintain supra-competitive prices or profitably influence other parameters of competition, such as production, innovation, variety or quality of goods or services. Therefore, in paragraph 19 of the Guidance on enforcement priorities, the second sentence is replaced by the following text:
1.鉴于委员会在执法实践中所获经验与欧盟法院判例法的说明，应当认定“反竞争封锁”（ Anti-competitive Foreclosure）的概念（《执法重点指南》第19段）不仅是指支配企业的行为能够导致竞争被完全排除或边缘化，也包括导致竞争被削弱从而妨碍市场竞争结构，利于支配企业但损害消费者的情况。此外，考虑到委员会的执法实践和欧盟法院的判例法，有必要说明，利用支配企业行为的盈利性因素来确定委员会的执法重点并不妥当，也即只有在支配企业能够盈利地维持超竞争价格或盈利地影响其他竞争指标，如商品或服务的产量、创新、品种或质量的情况下，才会优先追究案件。因此，在原《执法重点指南》第19段中，第二句话被替换为以下文字：
‘In this document the term ‘anti-competitive foreclosure’ is used to describe a situation where the conduct of the dominant undertaking adversely impacts an effective competitive structure(1a)  thus allowing the dominant undertaking to negatively influence, to its own advantage and to the detriment of consumers, the various parameters of competition, such as price, production, innovation, variety or quality of goods or services.’
“本指南所称的‘反竞争封锁’是指，占支配地位的企业的行为对有效的竞争结构（1a）产生不利影响，从而使支配企业为了自身利益而对竞争的各种指标，如商品或服务的价格、产量、创新、品种或质量等产生损害消费者的负面影响。”
2. Taking into account the experience gained through the Commission’s enforcement practice and the clarifications provided by the case law of the Union Courts, it is not appropriate, as regards price-based exclusionary conduct of a dominant undertaking, to pursue as a matter of priority only conduct that may lead to the market exit or the marginalisation of competitors that are as efficient as the dominant undertaking in terms of their cost structure. Indeed, in certain circumstances genuine competition may also come from undertakings that are less efficient than the dominant firm, in terms of their cost structure. Therefore, as set out below, two amendments to the Guidance on enforcement priorities are made:
2.鉴于委员会在执法实践中所获经验与欧盟法院判例法的说明，对于支配企业基于价格的排他性行为，只将导致在成本结构上与支配企业同等效率的竞争者退出市场或被边缘化的行为作为执法重点并非妥当。事实上，在某些情况下真正的竞争也可能来自于那些在成本结构上比支配企业效率低的企业。因此，如下所述，对原《执法重点指南》进行了两处修正，如下所示：
(a)In paragraph 23 of the Guidance on enforcement priorities, the last sentence is replaced with the following text:
‘With a view to preventing anti-competitive foreclosure, the Commission will generally intervene where the conduct concerned has already been or is capable of hampering competition from competitors that are considered to be as efficient as the dominant undertaking.’
（a）在原《执法重点指南》第23段中，最后一句话被替换为以下文字：
“为阻止反竞争封锁效应，当有关行为已经或有可能妨碍被认为与支配企业有同等效率的竞争者的竞争时，委员会通常会进行干预。”
(b) In paragraph 24 of the Guidance on enforcement priorities, the first sentence is replaced with the following text:
 ‘At the same time, the Commission recognises that in certain circumstances a less efficient competitor may also exert a constraint which should be taken into account when considering whether particular price-based conduct leads to anti-competitive foreclosure.’
（b）原《执法重点指南》第24段中，第一句话被替换为以下文字：
“同时，委员会认识到，在某些情况下效率较低的竞争者也可能施加竞争限制，应对基于价格的特定行为是否会导致反竞争封锁进行考量。”
(图片源自网络）
3. As has emerged from the Commission’s enforcement practice and the clarifications provided by the case law of the Union Courts, the price-cost “as-efficient competitor test” is only one of a number of methods for assessing, together with all other relevant circumstances, whether a conduct is capable of producing exclusionary effects. The Court of Justice has also clarified that the use of an ‘as efficient competitor test’ is optional and that a test of that nature may be inappropriate depending on the type of practice or the relevant market dynamics. As a result, a generalised use of such test to determine which cases of price-based exclusionary conduct to pursue as a matter of priority is not warranted and, if such test is carried out, its results should in any event be assessed together with all other relevant circumstances. Therefore, as set out below, two amendments to the Guidance on enforcement priorities are made: 
3.从委员会的执法实践和欧盟法院的判例法中可以看出，价格成本的“同等效率竞争者测试”（ As-efficient Competitor Test）仅仅是与所有其他相关情况评估某一行为是否能够产生排斥性效果的若干方法之一。法院指出，使用 “同等效率竞争者测试”是可供选择的，在某些行为类型或相关的市场动态情形下，使用“同等效率竞争者测试”可能不合适。因此，普遍使用这种测试来确定优先哪些基于价格的排他性行为的案件为执法重点是没有必要的，若进行这种测试，其结果在任何情况下都应与所有其他相关情况一起评估。因此，对原《执法重点指南》进行了如下两项修正：
（a）In paragraph 25 of the Guidance on enforcement priorities, the first sentence is replaced with the following text:
 ‘In order to determine whether even a hypothetical competitor as efficient as the dominant undertaking in terms of costs would likely be foreclosed by the conduct in question, the Commission may examine economic data relating to cost and sales prices, and in particular whether the dominant undertaking is engaging in below-cost pricing.’
（a） 在原《执法重点指南》第25段中，第一句话被替换为以下文字：
“为判断一个假设的与占支配地位的企业具有同等效率的竞争者是否可能被有关行为封锁，委员会可以审查与成本和销售价格有关的经济数据，特别是占支配地位的企业是否进行了低于成本的定价。”
(b) Paragraph 27 of the Guidance on enforcement priorities is replaced by the following text:
‘When analysing data to assess whether an equally efficient competitor can compete effectively with the pricing conduct of the dominant undertaking, the Commission will integrate this analysis in the general assessment of anti-competitive foreclosure (see Section B above), taking into account other relevant quantitative and/or qualitative evidence.’
（b）原《执法重点指南》第27段被替换为以下文字：
“在分析数据以评估同等效率的竞争者是否能与占支配地位的企业的定价行为进行有效竞争时，委员会将把这一分析纳入对反竞争封锁的一般评估中（见上文B节），同时考虑其他相关的定量和/或定性证据。”
4. Taking into account the experience gained through the Commission’s enforcement practice regarding access to the dominant undertaking’s input or assets and the clarifications provided by the case law of the Union Courts on such access, it is important to distinguish situations of outright refusal to supply from situations where the dominant company makes access subject to unfair conditions (‘constructive refusal to supply’). In situations of constructive refusal to supply, it is not appropriate to pursue as a matter of priority only cases concerning the provision of an indispensable input or the access to an essential facility. This is in line with the case law of the Union Courts, which has clarified that such cases cannot be equated to an outright refusal to supply and therefore the criterion of indispensability of the product or service in question does not apply.
4.鉴于委员会在获取支配企业的投入或资产方面的执法实践中所获得的经验，以及欧盟法院在此类获取方面的判例法所提供的陈述，重点要将直接拒绝供应的情况与支配企业在不公平条件下进行提供（“推定拒绝供应”）的情况区分开来。在推定拒绝供应的情况下，只把提供不可或缺的投入或获取基本设施的案件作为执法重点是不合适的。这与欧盟法院的判例法一致，该判例法明确指出，这种情况不能等同于直接拒绝供应，因此有关产品或服务的不可或缺性标准并不适用。
Therefore, in paragraph 79 of the Guidance on enforcement priorities, the last two sentences are deleted.
因此，在原《执法重点指南》第79段中，最后两句被删除。
(图片源自网络）
5. Taking into account the experience gained through the Commission’s enforcement practice and the clarifications provided by the case law of the Union Courts, it is not appropriate to pursue as a matter of priority margin squeeze cases only where those cases involve a product or service that is objectively necessary to be able to compete effectively on the downstream market. This is in line with the case law of the Union Courts, which has clarified that a margin squeeze is not a type of refusal to supply but an independent form of abuse that is subject to different criteria of assessment. Therefore, as set out below, four amendments to the Guidance on enforcement priorities are made.
5.鉴于委员会在执法实践中所获经验与欧盟法院判例法的说明，仅在涉及到在下游市场上有效竞争客观上所必需的产品或服务的情况下，将利润挤压的案件作为执法重点是不合适的。这与欧盟法院的判例法是一致的，这些判例法阐明了利润挤压不是拒绝供应的一种类型，而是一种独立的滥用形式，需依据不同的评估标准。因此，如下文所述，对原《执法重点指南》进行了四项修正。
(a)The title preceding paragraph 75 of the Guidance on enforcement priorities is replaced by the following title:
‘D. Refusal to supply’;
（a）原《执法重点指南》第75段原标题由以下标题取代：
“D. 拒绝供应”；
(b) Paragraph 80, including footnotes 8 and 9, is deleted; 
（b）第80段，包括脚注8和9，被删除；
(c) Paragraphs 81 to 90 are renumbered as follows:
Paragraph 81 is renumbered paragraph 80; Paragraph 82 is renumbered paragraph 81; 
Paragraph 83 is renumbered paragraph 82; Paragraph 84 is renumbered paragraph 83; 
Paragraph 85 is renumbered paragraph 84; Paragraph 86 is renumbered paragraph 85; 
Paragraph 87 is renumbered paragraph 86; Paragraph 88 is renumbered paragraph 87; 
Paragraph 89 is renumbered paragraph 88; Paragraph 90 is renumbered paragraph 89.
（c）第81至90段重新编号如下：
第81段重新编号为第80段；第82段重新编号为第81段； 
第83段重新编号为第82段；第84段重新编号为第83段； 
第85段重新编号为第84段；第86段重新编号为第85段； 
第87段重新编号为第86段；第88段重新编号为第87段； 
第89段重新编号为第88段；第90段重新编号为第89段。
(d) After new paragraph 89 of the Guidance on enforcement priorities, the following title and paragraph 90 are inserted: 
‘E. Margin squeeze’ 
‘90. A dominant undertaking may charge a price for the product on the upstream market which, compared to the price it charges on the downstream market, does not allow even an equally efficient competitor to trade profitably in the downstream market on a lasting basis (a so-called ‘margin squeeze’). In margin squeeze cases the benchmark which the Commission will generally rely on to determine the costs of an equally efficient competitor are the LRAIC of the downstream division of the integrated dominant undertaking.’
（d）在《执法重点指南》新第89段之后，插入以下标题和第90段：
“E. 利润挤压”
“90. 一个支配企业在上游市场可能对产品采取定价，使该定价与其在下游市场收取的价格相比，不允许一个同等效率的竞争者在下游市场上持久地进行交易而获利（即“利润挤压”）。在利润挤压的情况下，委员会通常会以一体化的支配企业的下游部门的长期平均增量成本，来确定同等效率的竞争者的成本。”

原文链接：
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_23_1911
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