法律翻译｜《法与经济学杂志》第64卷第4期

We study the causal impact of trust in business elites and trust in government on preferences for taxation at the top. Using new survey data, we find that distrust causes an increase in desired taxes on the top 1 percent. For example, our distrust-in-business-elites treatment leads to an increase in desired taxes on the top 1 percent of 2.4 percentage points (it closes 27 percent of the Democrat-Republican gap in tax preferences) when trust in government is low; a similar result is obtained for our distrust-in-government treatment.

本文研究了针对商业精英和政府的信任对于高层税收偏好的因果影响。新的调查数据表明对商业精英和政府的不信任会导致对收入前1%的人的税收期望增加。例如，我们对商业精英的不信任将导致对前1%的人的税收期望增加2.4个百分点（民主党和共和党在税收偏好上的差距将因此缩小27%）；当对政府的信任较低时，我们对政府的不信任也得到了类似的结果。

（图片源于网络）

Several US states ban employers’ use of credit reports in hiring decisions. This paper evaluates whether these bans help financially distressed individuals find employment. We use the Survey of Income and Program Participation to identify individuals likely to directly benefit: unemployed individuals with recent trouble meeting expenses. Exploiting the staggered passage of state laws, we find that banning credit checks increases the job-finding rates among financially distressed job seekers by about 28 percent. We also find an increase in the employment duration of financially distressed individuals who do find jobs, which suggests that they obtain more stable and permanent positions. Finally, we find a small and insignificant change in job-finding rates among nondistressed individuals, but we cannot rule out that this group is harmed by pooling with financially distressed individuals.

美国几个州禁止雇主在招聘决策中使用征信报告。本文评估了这些禁令是否有助于经济困难者寻求工作。我们使用收入调查和项目参与等方法来确定这些禁令潜在的直接受益者：最近经济困难的失业人员。通过分析各州法律实践，我们发现，禁止信用调查会将经济困难求职者的求职率提高约28%。我们还发现，找到工作的经济困难者的就业持续时间会延长，这表明他们获得了更加稳定和更加长期的职位。最后，我们认为，非经济困难者的求职率变化很小且并不明显，但不能排除这一群体因与经济困难者捆绑在一起而受到影响。

（图片源于网络）

Coordinated effects are merger-related harms that arise because a subset of postmerger firms modify their conduct to limit competition among themselves, particularly in ways other than explicit collusion. We provide a measure of the risk of such conduct by examining the individual rationality of participation by subsets of firms in market allocation schemes. This measure of risk for coordinated effects distinguishes markets that are at risk from those that are not and distinguishes mergers that increase risk from those that do not. A market’s risk for market allocation by a subset of firms varies with the degree of outside competition, symmetry and strength of the subset of firms, buyers’ power, and vertical integration. We make precise the widely used but rarely rigorously defined notion of a maverick firm and provide foundations for a maverick-based approach to coordinated effects. In addition, we identify previously unrecognized trade-offs between unilateral and coordinated effects.

协调效应是指与并购相关的损害，其产生的原因是并购后一部分公司为了限制企业之间的竞争，尤其是以明确串通以外的方式限制竞争，而改变自己的行为。我们通过研究部分企业参与市场分配方案的个体合理性，提供了衡量此类行为风险的方法。这种衡量协调效应风险的方法将有风险的市场与没有风险的市场区分开来，并将增加风险的并购与没有风险的并购区分开来。市场对一部分企业进行市场配置的风险因外部竞争程度、企业子公司的对称性和实力、买方力量和垂直一体化而异。我们明确了背离企业（maverick firm）这一被广泛使用但很少被严格定义的概念，并为基于背离企业的协调效应方法提供了基础。此外，我们还发现了以前未曾认识到的单边效应与协调效应之间的权衡问题。

This paper evaluates the impacts of the Lifeline subsidy on high-speed Internet prices, demand, and welfare. Results show that low-income households would require large price reductions to subscribe to basic broadband. Simulations of competition between cable and telephone firms show that the $9.25 subsidy lowers the prices for low-quality plans and incentivizes about 6 percent of low-income households to take up high-speed Internet. When firms price discriminate by charging different prices to low- and high-income households choosing the same plan, about 25 percent of low-income households enter the market and consume high-speed Internet. When the social planner sets prices and price discriminates, 68 percent of low-income households enter the market, and more higher-speed plans are consumed.

本文评估了生命线补贴对高速互联网价格、需求和福利的影响。结果显示，低收入家庭需要在互联网价格大幅下降时才能订阅基本宽带。对有线电视和电话公司之间竞争的模拟表明，9.25美元的补贴降低了低质量上网计划的价格，并激励约6%的低收入家庭使用高速互联网。当企业通过向选择相同计划的低收入和高收入家庭收取不同的价格来进行价格歧视时，大约25%的低收入家庭进入市场并消费高速互联网。当社会规划者设定价格并进行价格歧视时，68%的低收入家庭会进入市场，消费更多的高速上网计划。

（图片源于网络）

Ban-the-box (BTB) laws, which prevent employers from asking prospective employees about their criminal histories at initial job screenings, are intended to increase employment opportunities and reduce incentives for crime. This study is the first to comprehensively explore the relationship between BTB laws and arrests. Using data from the National Incident-Based Reporting System, we find that BTB laws are associated with a 16 percent increase in criminal incidents involving Hispanic male arrestees. This finding is supported by parallel analysis using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 and is consistent with BTB-law-induced job loss due to employer-based statistical discrimination. We find less evidence that BTB laws increase property crime among African American men. Supplemental analyses from the American Community Survey suggest that barriers to welfare participation among Hispanic men may partially explain this result. Our estimates suggest that BTB laws generate approximately $350 million in additional annual crime costs.

BTB（Ban-the-box/禁止查询求职者犯罪记录）法禁止雇主在初次求职筛选时询问潜在雇员的犯罪记录，其旨在增加就业机会并减少犯罪动机。本研究首次全面探讨BTB法与逮捕之间的关系。全国事件报告系统（National Incident-Based Reporting System）的数据表明 BTB 法与涉及西班牙裔男性被捕者的犯罪事件增加 16% 这一现象有关。这一发现得到了 1997 年全国青年纵向调查的平行分析的支持，并且与 BTB 法因基于雇主的统计歧视而导致的失业相一致。本文发现，很少有证据表明 BTB 法增加了非裔美国男性的财产犯罪。美国社区调查的补充分析表明，西班牙裔男性参与福利的障碍可能部分解释了这一结果。本文估计，BTB 法每年会产生约 3.5 亿美元的额外犯罪成本。

本文观察到，避税地银行客户信息的首次泄露导致了避税地存款突然外逃，以及已知协助逃税的银行市值急剧下降。市值损失最大的是逃税行为最严重的银行。随后的泄密事件虽然影响较小，但在性质上与之相似。我们的研究结果表明，避税地银行的告密行为会增加逃税和协助逃税的风险，从而对境外逃税者起到威慑作用。

（图片源于网络）

Estimates of crime’ s burden inform public and private decisions about crime-prevention measures. More than counts of criminal offenses, the aggregate cost of crime conveys the scale of problems from crime and the value of deterrence. This article offers an estimate of the total annual cost of crime in the United States, including the direct costs of law enforcement, criminal justice, and victims’ losses and the indirect costs of private deterrence, fear and agony, and time lost to avoidance and recovery. The findings update crime-cost estimates of past decades while expanding the scope of coverage to include categories missing from past studies. The estimated annual cost of crime is $4.71–$5.76 trillion including transfers from victims to criminals and $2.86–$3.92 trillion net of transfers.