译者 | 汪雨莘 美国乔治城大学 LL.M.
审稿 | 汪晨涵 复旦大学法律硕士
　　　晏世伟 PKU LL.B.
编辑 | 杨玟萱 中南财经政法大学本科
         李建云 湖南师范大学本科

责编 | 戚琳颖 大连海事大学本科
  01
The NYSBA 2019 William Howard Taft Lecture
Assessing Qualitative Justifications Under Taft's Rule of Reason
塔夫脱合理分析原则下的合理性定性评估
作者：William H. Rooney
Timothy G. Fleming
In his landmark opinion in United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., then-Judge William Howard Taft focused on the question of whether the restraint of trade there at issue was the primary motivation for the agreement or “merely ancillary to the main purpose of a lawful contract.” The doctrine of naked and ancillary restraints that Taft developed in Addyston Pipe marked the origins of the per se rule and rule of reason, which together form the fundamental framework that governs the Sherman Act today. In Taft’s presentation, restraints of trade must be understood in the context of their relationship to the purpose of the primary agreement. Where that purpose is legitimate and the relationship of the restraint is ancillary, courts should be hesitant to invalidate the restraint. 
在United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.一案中，时任法官威廉·霍华德·塔夫脱（William Howard Taft）提出了具有里程碑意义的观点，他着重探讨了此案争议的贸易限制是所涉协议的主要动机还是“仅仅从属于此合法协议的主要目的”。塔夫脱在Addyston Pipe一案中提出的直接限制（naked restraint）和附属性限制（ancillary restraint）标志着本身违法原则（per se rule）和合理分析原则（rule of reason）的起源，这两条原则共同构成了如今《谢尔曼法》[1]的基本框架。塔夫脱认为，贸易限制必须结合其与所属主要协议目的的关系作为背景加以理解。如果主要协议的目的是合法正当的，而贸易限制从属于此目的，法院不应轻易地宣告贸易限制无效。
Balancing Unquantified Harms and Benefits in Antitrust Cases Under the Consumer Welfare Standard
在消费者福利标准下平衡反垄断案件中无法量化的损害和利益
作者：The Hon. Douglas H. Ginsburg
William Howard Taft—the most under-appreciated constitutional figure since George Mason, the father of the Bill of Rights—is no doubt best known as the 27th President, but his most significant contributions to our constitutional order came as Chief Justice. The federal judiciary today is the federal judiciary Taft gave us. During his tenure as Chief Justice, Taft convinced the Congress to create the Judicial Conference as the governing body of the federal courts; give the Supreme Court its own building; and, in the Judiciary Act of 1925, eliminate most of the Supreme Court’s mandatory jurisdiction. These reforms bolstered the independence of the federal judiciary, and permanently elevated its role in our society.
威廉·霍华德·塔夫脱（William Howard Taft）——自《权利法案》之父乔治·梅森（George Mason）以来最被低估了的宪法人物——无疑是作为第27任总统而为人所知，但他最重大的贡献是其作为首席大法官时对我们宪法规则的构建及改善。今天的联邦司法系统可以说是塔夫脱给我们的联邦司法系统。在他担任首席大法官期间，塔夫脱说服国会设立司法会议（亦被译作司法委员会）作为联邦法院的管理机构；给予最高法院独立的建筑大楼；并在《1925年司法条例》中取消了最高法院大部分的强制管辖权。这些改革增强了联邦司法的独立性，并永久提升了联邦司法在我们的社会中的作用。
（图片来源于网络）
Taft also made important contributions to antitrust, both as a judge and during his time as president. Although his predecessor, Teddy Roosevelt, is remembered as the “trustbuster,” Taft’s administration brought nearly twice as many cases in half the time. As Jeff Rosen explains in his excellent brief biography of Taft, TR and his successor had diametrically opposed ideas about how best to assure the competitiveness of markets. Roosevelt championed a regulatory model, with strict federal oversight of large corporations. Taft favored a law enforcement model, with aggressive prosecution of anticompetitive conduct, bearing in mind that “[m]ere size is no sin against the law.” In my view, Taft’s approach was preferable and has been vindicated over the course of the last century. The regulatory model would have substituted the discretion of regulators for the decisions of risk takers, with distortionary and welfare-reducing effects. The law enforcement approach, by contrast, protects competition while adhering to the rule of law. In this Article I hope to continue in Taft’s reformist footsteps by suggesting some additional tools antitrust enforcers and courts can use to make coherent, evidence-based decisions in the face of measurement difficulties.
塔夫脱在担任法官和总统的期间，还为反垄断作出了重要贡献。尽管他的前任总统泰迪·罗斯福（Teddy Roosevelt）被认为是“托拉斯破坏者”，但由塔夫脱领导的政府在一半的时间里审理了与罗斯福在任期间相比近两倍的案件。杰夫·罗森（Jeff Rosen）在其笔酣墨饱的的塔夫脱简介中解释道，关于如何最好地保持市场竞争力，罗斯福和他的继任者有着截然相反的观点。罗斯福支持监管模式，对大型公司实行严格的联邦监管。塔夫脱倾向采取执法模式，积极对反竞争行为起诉，并使公众牢记“规模本身不足以违法”的概念。在笔者看来，塔夫脱的方法更为可取，其方法的可行性亦经上个世纪（的不断实践）得以证明。罗斯福支持的监管模式将以监管者的自由裁量权取代风险承担者的决策，这一方法会产生扭曲以及福利减少的效果。相反，执法模式在坚持法治的同时还保护了竞争。在本文中，笔者希望跟随着塔夫脱的改革脚步，提出一些额外的方式，以供反垄断执法人员和法院在面临判断方面的困境时作出连贯一致的、基于证据的决定。
An Economic Perspective on Balancing Unquantified Harms and Benefits Under the Consumer Welfare Standard
消费者福利标准下从经济学视角平衡无法量化的损害与利益
作者：Debra Aron
Steven Ten
Judge Ginsburg’s address on how to balance unquantified benefits and harms under the consumer welfare standard highlights two distinct roles for qualitative assessment. The first is the role of qualitative evidence in antitrust analyses. The second is the consideration of both price and non-price effects. While these two topics are related—e.g., analysis of non-price competitive effects often relies on qualitative evidence—they raise distinct issues. We provide an economic perspective on these topics as a complement to Judge Ginsburg’s learned legal commentary. Specifically, we explain the central role that sound qualitative evidence traditionally and properly plays in the economic analysis of both price and non-price effects of mergers and accused conduct. We also discuss the state of economic analysis when a broad economic interpretation of the consumer welfare standard would require balancing the welfare of one group against another.
关于如何在消费者福利标准下平衡无法量化的利弊，金斯伯格（Ginsburg）法官的演讲强调了定性评估的两个不同作用。其一是定性证据在反垄断分析中的作用。其二是对价格和非价格效应的双重考虑。虽然这两个作用是相关的——例如，对非价格竞争效应的分析常常依赖于定性证据——但它们提出了不同的问题。笔者从经济学的角度来看待上述作用及问题，以补充金斯伯格法官精深的法律评论。具体而言，在兼并行为及被指控行为的价格和非价格效应方面，我们解释了可靠的定性证据传统上于其经济分析中所扮演的核心角色。笔者也讨论了当消费者福利标准的广义经济解释要求平衡一个群体与另一个群体的福利时，应当如何进行经济分析。
  02
Articles
Making Disclosure Work for Start-Up Employees
为起步公司的员工提供信息披露
作者：Yifat Aran
Equity-based compensation of startup employees is attracting growing and skeptical attention in academia and the media. Legal and finance scholars have raised concerns that employees are misinformed regarding the value of their equity grants in a manner that could distort their employment and investment decisions. This Article addresses these emerging concerns by articulating a theoretical and practical framework for the regulation of start-up employees’ human capital investments. This framework balances the confidentiality interests of employers with employees’ need for ongoing and realistic valuation of the return on their labor.
初创公司员工接受股权的薪酬方式引起学术界和媒体提出越来越多的质疑。法律和金融学者担心员工会被错误地告知被授予的股权的价值，从而可能扭曲他们对于就业和投资的决策。本文以一个初创公司员工的人力资本投资为基础，阐述了此方面投资监管的理论和实践框架，并通过这个框架解决了上述法律和金融学者的担忧。此框架平衡了雇主的保密利益和员工对其劳动薪酬的持续以及现实估值的需要。
（图片来源于网络）
Start-ups commonly rely on Rule 701 of the Securities Act to grant equity-based compensation to their employees without registering these securities with the Securities and Exchange Commission. This Article describes the flaws of the current regulation and proposes concrete amendments including (1) replacing the requirement to disclose the issuer’s financial statements with a requirement to disclose fair market valuation and exit waterfall analysis; (2) changing the threshold that triggers the enhanced disclosure requirement from when the company issues equity-based compensation exceeding $10 million within a twelve month period, to when the company issues securities to at least 100 employees, and these securities aggregately convey over 10% ownership in any class of shares; and (3) advancing the timing of the disclosure from its current post-employment stage to the offer letter stage.
初创公司通常依据《证券法》第701条向员工发放基于股权的薪酬，且无需向美国证券交易委员会（SEC）对该等证券进行登记备案。本文阐述了现行法规的缺陷并提出了具体的修改建议，包括：（1）要求发行人披露市场公允的估值以及退出估值的瀑布分析[2]，而非披露其财务报表；（2）修订强化披露要求的触发标准，将触发的阈值从公司12个月内发行的股权薪酬超过1,000万美元，修改为公司向至少100名员工发行证券，且上述证券涉及任何类别股份的所有权合计超过10%；及（3）将披露时间从目前要求的聘用后阶段提前至录用函发出阶段。
Corporate Management in the Age of AI
人工智能时代的企业管理
作者：Martin Petrin
Recent media reports and press releases have created the impression that Artificial Intelligence (AI) is on the verge of assuming an important role in corporate management. While, upon closer inspection, it turns out that these stories should not always be taken at face value, they clearly highlight AI’s growing importance in management and hint at the enormous changes that corporate leadership may experience in the future. This Article attempts to anticipate that future by exploring a thought experiment on corporate management and AI. It argues that it is not an insurmountable step from AI generating and suggesting expert decisions (which is already common today) to AI making these decisions autonomously. The Article then proceeds based on the assumption that next-generation AI will be able to take over the management of business organizations and explores the corporate law and governance consequences of this development. In doing so, the Article focuses on the fundamental areas of corporate leadership and management structures, managerial liability, and the corporate purpose. It also considers the phenomenon of algorithmic entities and leaderless entities.
根据最近的媒体报道和新闻稿给人的印象，人工智能（以下简称“AI”）即将在公司管理中扮演重要角色。然而经过仔细观察，就会发现不应仅停留在这些新闻媒体报道的表面意义，它们显然强调了AI在管理中日益增长的重要性，并暗示了未来公司领导层可能经历的巨大变化。本文试图通过探索关于公司管理和AI的思想实验来预测次这一未来变化。本文认为，从AI针对特定问题进行内部运作后为专家决策提出建议（这在当今已经很普遍），到AI自主做出这些决策，这样的发展并不是不可逾越的一步。其次，本文以下一代 AI将接管商业组织管理的假设为基础，探讨了上述发展对公司法和公司治理的影响。由此，本文聚焦于涉及公司领导层及其管理结构、管理责任和公司目标的基本领域。本文还研究了在AI发展下产生算法主体[3]和无领导主体的现象。
  03
Notes
May the Fourth Be with You
— Charting the Future of Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute After Jesner v. Arab Bank
愿第四巡回上诉法院与你同在
——Jesner v. Arab Bank案后
《外国人侵权法令》下公司责任的未来
 作者：Benjamin Estes
The Alien Tort Statute (the “ATS”) has been the subject of much curiosity ever since it became a conduit for human rights lawsuits nearly 40 years ago. Many of these lawsuits have been directed at corporate defendants, with businesses around the world accused of conscience-shocking behavior. However, the Supreme Court has in recent years restricted the scope of corporate ATS liability. In 2013, the Court held in Kiobel that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies to the ATS, and in 2018, it held in Jesner that foreign corporations cannot be sued under the ATS. In the wake of these developments, observers have questioned whether the statute’s vitality is reaching its end.
自近40年前成为人权诉讼渠道以来，《外国人侵权法令》（Alien Tort Statute，以下简称“ATS”）就一直是人们津津乐道的话题。许多涉及ATS的诉讼是以公司作为被告的，指控这些公司在全球范围运营的业务存在伤天害理的行为。但是，最高法院近年来限制了公司于ATS下的责任范围。2013年，最高法院在Kiobel一案中认为，反治外法权的推定适用于ATS。而2018年，最高法院在Jesner一案中认为，不得根据ATS起诉外国公司。鉴于上述案件所体现的发展趋势，法律研究者曾质疑ATS的生命力是否已日薄西山。
This Note charts the path forward for the ATS. After tracing the development of the statute from its murky Founding origins to its modern incarnation as a powerful litigation tool, the Note examines how several circuits have analyzed the issues of corporate liability and the presumption against extraterritoriality under the ATS. The Note ultimately argues that the Fourth Circuit’s approach provides the best regime for the ATS in light of Jesner and the other considerations that have long informed ATS cases.
本文为ATS指明了前进的道路。本文首先追溯了ATS的发展历程，即从其含糊的立法起源到如今其作为有力诉讼工具的地位，接着本文还考察了几个巡回上诉法院是如何分析ATS下的公司责任和反治外法权的推定问题的。本文最终认为：鉴于Jesner一案及其他长期以来一直为ATS相关案件所关注的因素，第四巡回上诉法院采取的解释方法为ATS提供了最佳的实践机制。
（图片来源于网络）
Standard Essential Patents and

Antitrust Law
— Balancing Innovation and Competition
标准必要专利和反垄断法
——创新与竞争的平衡
作者：Kyle L. Greene
Antitrust and patent law have always been uneasy allies. Although both seek to encourage innovation and competition in the long run, patent law does so primarily by granting creators exclusive fiefdoms over their intellectual property, and antitrust law does so primarily by proscribing firms from anticompetitive conduct. Yet today’s world is flush with patent-rich products and industries that depend on the fruitful, simultaneous application of both of these bodies of law. Industries reliant on flourishing networks, such as those in the information and communication technology sector, are particularly influenced by the intersection of antitrust and patent law. Because of the central importance of well-functioning networks to these industries, many have developed standard setting organizations (“SSOs”) to designate technical standards that ensure product compatibility and interoperability between offerings from different firms. These standards incorporate many specific patents, known as standard essential patents (“SEPs”). Further, standards promulgated by SSOs oblige SEP holders to license their SEPs to implementers of the standard in a fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (“FRAND”) fashion. As a result, SEP holders and their counterparties stand, precariously, where antitrust and patent law meet.
反垄断法和专利法一直以来都是关系不稳定的盟友。虽然从长远目标来看，二者都是为了鼓励创新和竞争，但二者实现此目的的方式不同：专利法主要通过授予专利创造者对其知识产权的专属领地[4]，反垄断法主要通过禁止企业的反竞争行为。然而，当今世界充斥着大量专利丰富的产品和行业，这些产品和行业依赖于对上述两个法律体系的同时且有效的适用。若一个行业依赖于蓬勃发展的互联网，则将尤其受到反垄断法和专利法交叉领域的影响，例如信息和通信技术行业。考虑到良好运作的网络对这类行业的核心重要性，许多具有上述特性的行业均通过建立标准制定组织（SSOs）来制定技术标准，以确保不同公司提供的产品之间具有兼容性和互通性。这些标准纳入了许多特定的专利，这些被纳入的专利被称为标准必要专利（SEPs）。此外，标准制定组织公布的标准使标准必要专利的权利人有义务按照公平、合理和非歧视（以下简称“FRAND”）的方式将其标准必要专利的许可授予符合该标准的实施者。因此，标准必要专利（SEP）的权利人及其相对人在反垄断法和专利法中的处境岌岌可危。
This Note will argue that an SEP holder who violates their FRAND commitments by unilaterally refusing to deal with a prospective implementer of the relevant standard should be presumed to have antitrust liability under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. In other words, such a firm should be presumed to have market power and to have participated in exclusionary conduct with anticompetitive effects. Part I will describe the landscape of standard setting, its effect on competition, and the place of antitrust and patent law in the standards landscape. Part II will explore the antitrust case law concerning refusals to deal in greater depth, paying particular attention to cases involving intellectual property and patents. Finally, Part III will build off of the previous two Parts to make and justify the argument that SEP holders should face a presumption that they have violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act when they violate their FRAND commitments by refusing to deal.
本文认为，若标准必要专利（SEP）的权利人违反其FRAND义务，单方面拒绝与符合相关标准的潜在实施者进行交易，则应当被推定承担《谢尔曼法》第2条下的反垄断责任。换言之，上述公司[5]应当被推定拥有市场势力，并参与了具有反竞争影响的排他性行为。本文第一部分将描述标准制定的概况、其对市场竞争的影响以及反垄断法和专利法在标准制定领域的地位。本文第二部分将更深入地探讨与拒绝授予专利许可有关的反垄断判例法，并特别关注上述判例法中与知识产权和专利有关的案例。最后，本文第三部分将在前两部分内容的基础上进一步提出并论证了以下观点：标准必要专利（SEP）的权利人因拒绝授予专利许可而违反其FRAND义务时，应当被推定其已违反《谢尔曼法》第2条的规定。
Insider Interest, Not Industry Influence
— The Practice of Federal Reserve Bank Presidential Appointments
内部人的利益，而非行业的影响
——美国联邦储备银行行长任命的实践分析
作者：William Hayes
Conceived as a counterweight to public administration of monetary policy, the quasi-private Federal Reserve Banks now seem an institutional anomaly. The role that private interests play in Reserve Bank governance has prompted criticism that their anomalous structure renders the Reserve Banks unduly insulated and prone to financial industry influence. Yet a survey of the practical effect of the Reserve Banks’ unusual governance structure demonstrates not a privileging of private industry interests, but instead a pattern of elevating Federal Reserve System insiders, with potential involvement from publicly appointed Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. As a result, this Note argues that conventional fears of the consequences of Reserve Bank governance are largely unrealized. This pattern of elevating Federal Reserve System insiders, however, raises alternate concerns of institutional homogeneity. This Note thus advocates for transparency reforms aimed at mitigating these concerns—reforms that address not a problem of industry influence in Reserve Bank governance, but one of Federal Reserve System insularity.
半私人性质的美国联邦储备银行[6]（以下简称“美联储”）曾被认为是与货币政策的公共管理模式抗衡，但如今看起来却是一种制度上的异常现象。私人利益在美联储治理中所扮演的角色招致批评，这些批评者认为掺杂了私人利益的异常结构使美联储处于过度孤立的境遇，且容易受到金融业的影响。然而，经过调查美联储不同寻常的管理结构所产生的实际影响，调查结果并未呈现出类似私营组织中存在的特殊利益，反而体现出一种联邦储备系统内部人员的晋升模式，且公开任命的联邦储备系统理事会可能参与其中。因此，虽然人们一直以来担忧美联储的治理结构将带来与私营组织特权相关的负面后果，但本文认为这种担忧在很大程度上并没有变成现实，反而上述联邦储备系统内部人员的晋升模式会使公众存有机构同质性方面的担忧。综上，为了减轻此担忧，本文提倡进行透明改革——不是去解决美联储治理受行业影响的问题，而是要打破联邦储备系统这一孤岛。
注释
[1]《谢尔曼法》：美国颁布的第一部联邦反垄断法。
[2] 瀑布分析：瀑布分析是一种经济分析工具，可以帮助投资者和股东创建财务模型，计算出每个股东在公司退出时将获得的总金额。
[3]算法主体：即受算法控制的主体，常见于去中心自治组织。
[4]专属领地：即具有排他性的保护权。
[5]上述公司：即上述标准必要专利（SEP）的权利人。
[6]美国联邦储备银行：美国联邦储备系统包含12个联邦储备区，每区各设有一家主要的联邦储备银行，这些银行在本区的其他城市设有分行；各联邦储备银行都是准公共机构，部分为私有、部分为政府所有，他们的股东来自联邦储备体系在各区的成员私人商业银行。（来源：https://baike.baidu.com/item/美国联邦储备银行/10983592?fr=aladdin.）
原文链接：
https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/CBLR/issue/view/550
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