译者｜徐可心 华东政法大学 
审稿｜刘寅 西南政法大学
         曾梓栩 外交学院 
编辑｜卢晓洋 香港大学
         王冰子 烟台大学 
责编｜李薇 浙江工商大学
01
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Money Market Funds Run Risk
Will Floating Net Asset Value Fix the Problem?
货币市场基金存在风险
浮动资产净值能否解决问题?
作者：Jeffrey N. Gordon, Christopher M. Gandia
The instability of money market mutual funds (“MMF”), a relatively new form of financial intermediary that connects short-term debt issuers with funders who want daily liquidity, became manifest in the financial crisis of 2007–2009.  The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, a major issuer of money market debt, led one large fund to “break the buck” (that is, violate the $1 net asset valuation convention (“NAV”)) and triggered a run on other funds that was staunched only by major interventions from the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve.  One common reform proposal has been to substitute “floating NAV” for “fixed NAV,” on the view that MMF run risk was strongly affected by the potential to arbitrage between the “true” value of MMF assets and the $1 fixed NAV. 
货币市场共同基金（简称“MMF”）是一种较为新颖的金融中介形式，它将短期债务发行人与需要每日资金流动的出资人相互关联，其不稳定性在2007至2009年的金融危机展现地淋漓尽致。货币市场债券的主要发行人雷曼兄弟（“Lehman Brothers”）的破产导致一家大型基金“跌破1美元”，即违反1美元资产净值惯例（简称“NAV”），并挤兑了其他基金。这种挤兑仅在美国财政部和美联储的重大干预下才得到遏制。一项常规改革建议是用“浮动资产净值”代替“固定资产净值”，这是因为货币市场共同基金“真实”价值和1美元固定资产净值之间套利可能性强烈影响了挤兑风险。
It turns out that European MMFs are issued in two forms, “stable NAV” and “accumulating NAV,” which offer a reasonable proxy for the distinction between fixed and floating NAV.  Thus, the comparative run rate of these two MMF types during “Lehman week” offers a natural experiment of the effect of NAV “fixedness.”  We find that the stable/accumulating distinction explains none of the cross-sectional variation in the run rate among these funds.  Instead, two other variables are explanatory: yield in the period immediately prior to Lehman week, which we take as a proxy for the fund’s portfolio risk, and whether the fund’s sponsor is an investment bank, which we take as proxy for sponsor capacity to support the fund.  We then argue that these findings indicate that other stability-enhancing reforms are necessary.
事实证明，欧洲货币市场共同基金以“稳定资产净值”和“累积资产净值”两种形式发行，这为固定资产净值和浮动资产净值间的差异提供了一项合理指标。因此，这两种货币市场共同基金类型在“雷曼时刻”期间的比较挤兑率提供了资产净值“固定”效应的自然实验。我们发现，“稳定资产净值”和“累积资产净值”的区别无法解释这些基金之间营运率的横截面变化。相反，另外两个变量具有解释性：一为雷曼破产前一段时间的收益率，我们将其作为该基金投资组合风险的指标；二为该基金的发起人是否为投资银行，我们将其作为发起人支持该基金的能力的指标。最后，这些结论表明加强稳定的变革是必要的。
02
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Responsible Shares and Shared Responsibility 
In Defense of Responsible Corporate Officer Liability
责任股份和共同责任
为公司责任管理人的辩护
作者：Amy J. Sepinwall
When a corporation commits a crime, whom may we hold criminally liable?  One obvious set of defendants consists of the individuals who perpetrated the crime on the corporation’s behalf. But according to the responsible corporate officer (“RCO”) doctrine, the government may also prosecute and punish those corporate executives who, although perhaps lacking “consciousness of wrongdoing,” nonetheless have “a responsible share in the furtherance of the transaction which the statute outlaws.” In other words, under the RCO doctrine, a corporate executive can come to bear criminal responsibility for an offense of her corporation that she neither participated in nor culpably failed to prevent. As long as the executive in question had the authority to prevent the corporate crime and failed to do so, she may be targeted in a criminal suit.
当一家公司犯罪时，我们可以追究谁的刑事责任？显然，被告包含了以公司名义犯罪的人员。但根据公司责任管理人（the Responsible Corporate Officer，简称“RCO”）原则，政府也可以起诉和惩罚那些虽然可能缺乏“非法行为意识”，但仍然对促成法定非法交易承担部分责任的公司高管。换而言之，根据公司责任管理人原则，公司高管可以为其公司的犯罪行为承担刑事责任，即便他未参与，或者对于疏于防止该犯罪行为的发生是可归责的。只要有关高管有权阻止公司犯罪，但未能做到这一点，他就可能成为刑事诉讼的对象。
The RCO doctrine plainly poses a challenge to our traditional understanding of criminal culpability, according to which guilt is individual—one may be held responsible only for a wrong one has personally committed, and only if one has done so with a guilty mind. Thus, RCO liability, while representing the most common instance of strict criminal liability, has been deemed “at odds with fundamental notions of our criminal justice system,” and likened to the primitive doctrine of frankpledge, under which innocent members of a group could be punished for the wrongful deed of one of their fellows.
公司责任管理人原则显然对于刑事罪责的传统解释提出了质疑。根据这种理解，罪责是个人的——一个人只对他个人所犯的错误且存在犯意时负责。因此，公司责任管理人原则虽然代表了严格刑事责任中最常见的例子，但却被认为“与刑事司法系统基本理念不一致”，并被比作原始的十户联保原则。这种原则下，单位中清白的成员将因其它成员的错误行为而受到惩罚。
On the other hand, corporate crimes have an irreducibly collective aspect. If we take this aspect seriously, as this paper does, then departures from the paradigm of individual culpability may well be warranted.  In particular, we may be justified in assigning responsibility not just to the corporate crime’s immediate perpetrators, but also to those who held prominent positions within the corporation at the time of the crime’s occurrence, and this responsibility may license just the kind of criminal liability that the RCO doctrine contemplates. This paper seeks to determine the circumstances under which this extension of responsibility is permissible, and the grounds of its permissibility.
另一方面，公司犯罪具有不可忽视的集体性特征。倘若如本文所述般严格地对待该特征，那么背离个人罪责的范式则颇具道理。特别是，当我们不仅将责任分配给公司犯罪的直接负责人，而且还分配给犯罪发生时在公司内担任要职的人，这种背离可能更具正当性。这种责任可能正是公司责任管理人原则所考虑的那种刑事责任。本文试图确认在何种情况下允许扩大该类责任，以及了解其相应理由。
More specifically, this Article critiques existing justifications for the doctrine by arguing that these mistakenly construe it as a kind of negligence liability, and in so doing deprive the doctrine of its transformative power. It next offers a defense of the doctrine, according to which personal guilt is not necessary, and then contends with objections to the doctrine, arguing that we need not dispense with the doctrine altogether in order to avoid the concerns of its critics. What is needed instead is a set of guidelines that guard against the doctrine’s misuse or abuse. Finally, this Article ends with a specification of these guidelines. 
具体而言，本文批判现有的支持公司责任管理人原则的理由，认为这些理由错误地将其解释为一种过失责任，从而剥夺了该原则的变革力量。接下来，本文为该原则提供了支持理由，根据该原则，个人罪责是不必要的，然后反驳对公司责任管理人原则的反对意见，认为我们无需完全摒弃公司责任管理人原则从而避免其批评者的担忧。相反，我们需要的是一套防止该原则被误用或滥用的指导方针。最后，本文以这些准则的规范为结尾内容。
03
/ Article /
Protecting the Public in Public-Private Partnerships
Strategies for Ensuring Adaptability in Concession Contracts
在公共私营合作制中保护公益
保证特许合同适应性的策略
作者：Kelsey Hogan
State and local government face ever-growing costs in order to provide adequate services, facilities, and infrastructure for their citizens, but traditional means of financing the provision and maintenance of public services is no longer adequate to cover expenses. Concession contracts—a type of public-private partnership whereby governments lease infrastructure assets to private entities, generally in return for large, up-front payments—have been proposed as a potential, innovative solution. The few concession contracts that have been implemented, however, have generated considerable controversy. The biggest concern is that these concessions—which can last upwards of seventy-five years—sacrifice long-term public interest for short-term economic gain. 
国家和地方政府为其公民提供足够的服务、设施和基础设施。但面临日益增长的成本，传统的公共服务提供和维持的融资方式已入不敷出。特许合同是政府通常为换取大量预付款而将基础设施租赁给私营主体时所依据的公私合营方式，这是一种潜在的创新解决方案。然而，已经实施的少数特许权合同引起了相当大的争议。最令人担忧的是，这些可以持续75年以上的特许经营权合同为了短期的经济收益而牺牲了长期的公共利益。
This Note seeks to evaluate the legal strategies available to governments to ensure that governments who enter into concession contracts are able to adapt to changing circumstances throughout the course of the lease. This Note proposes several strategies that governments can implement through structural, regulatory, and contractual channels in order to maximize long-term adaptability and ensure that public interest is not subordinated to private economic gain.
本文旨在评估各国政府可用的法律战略，以确保订立特许权合同的政府能够在整个租赁过程中适应不断变化的情况。本文提出了政府可以通过结构、监管和合同渠道实施的若干策略，以最大限度地提高长期适应性，并确保公共利益不服从于私人经济利益。
（图片来源于网络）
04
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Necessity is the Mother of Invention
A Renewed Call to Engage the SEC on Social Disclosure
需求乃创造之母
再次呼吁美国证券交易委员会参与社会信息披露
作者：Alexandra Leavy
Corporate law in the United States is undergoing a significant but understated revolution.  Delaware is one of nineteen states to adopt the benefit corporation, a corporate form that legally facilitates the pursuit of both financial and social ends. While the existing state statutes incorporate mandatory disclosure regimes, they lack the enforcement mechanisms necessary to guarantee the accuracy of benefit reports and are not sufficiently uniform to allow investors to make informed decisions. As such, this Note argues that the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”) ought to amend its proxy disclosure and periodic reporting rules to ensure that registrants incorporated under benefit statutes provide substantial information about their social impact.
美国公司法正在经历一场重大但低调的变革。特拉华州是19个采用福利公司的州之一，这种公司形式在法律上有利于追求经济和社会目标。虽然现有的州法规纳入了强制性披露制度，但它们缺乏必要的执行机制来保证收益报告的准确性，也不够统一，无法让投资者做出知情的决定。因此，本文认为美国证券交易委员会(简称“SEC”或“Commission”)应修订其代理披露和定期报告规则，以确保根据福利法规的注册人提供有关其社会影响的实质性信息。
Mandatory social disclosure has been rejected in the past—the condition of “materiality” has long governed corporate disclosure. The recent enactment of the Delaware benefit corporation suggests that some benefit corporations will become public companies. Thus, for the first time, social impact has become a legal obligation of corporate status, effectively expanding the scope of what is “material” to investors. The SEC’s broad investor protection mandate and its history of regulating financial disclosure put the Commission in the best position to introduce a social impact disclosure regime for publicly traded benefit corporations. Such a regime has the ability to preserve the benefit corporation as a legitimate corporate form and, importantly, legitimize its dual mission of purpose and profits.
强制性的社会信息披露曾遭否决——“实质性”条件长期以来一直支配着公司信息披露。最近通过的有关特拉华州福利公司的法案表明，一些福利公司将成为上市公司。因此，社会影响首次成为企业地位的一项法律义务，有效地扩大了对投资者 “实质性”的定义范围。美国证券交易委员会广泛的投资者保护授权及其监管财务披露的历史，使其处于为公开交易的福利公司引入社会影响披露制度的最佳地位。这样的制度有能力保护利益公司作为一个合法的公司形式，重要的是，合法化其对目的和利润的双重使命。
05
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Value-Add: An Empirical Study of Idiosyncratic Value in the 2013 Biotech IPO Market
附加值:2013年生物技术IPO市场特质价值的实证研究
作者：Lee D. Cooper
This Note examines corporate governance trends in the biotechnology industry through an empirical study of the 39 United States-based biotechnology companies that made initial public offerings (“IPOs”) in 2013. This study of Form S-1 and Form 4 SEC filings reveals a cohort of newly public, immature biotech firms with highly consolidated corporate control and cash-flow rights by pre-public investors. On average, pre-public insiders fill 66.2% of the board seats and own 59.8% of the equity in these firms at the time of IPO. Further, pre-public insiders do not immediately sell their equity positions after the expiration of mandatory lock-up periods. 
本文通过对2013年进行首次公开募股（简称“IPO”）的39家美国生物技术公司进行实证研究，考察了生物技术行业的公司治理趋势。对美国证券交易委员会（简称“SEC”）提交的表格S-1和表格4的研究揭示了一批新上市的、尚未成熟的生物技术公司。这些公司拥有高度整合的公司控制权和上市前投资者的现金流权。平均而言，上市前的内部人士在首次公开募股时占据了这些公司66.2%的董事会席位、拥有59.8%的股权。此外，在强制禁售期结束后，未上市的内部人士不会立即出售其股权头寸。
These data, this Note argues, suggest that entrepreneurs and investors in the biotech industry use concentrated ownership structures to pursue idiosyncratic value that will be, if realized, shared pro rata across all public shareholders. This Note demonstrates that in an industry with long-term business plans and high levels of uncertainty, value-maximizing agents (e.g., entrepreneurs, pre-public investors) can bundle boardroom control and illiquid equity holdings to pursue idiosyncratic value while mitigating concerns over agency costs. These findings provide both empirical and theoretical context for guiding policies that seek to facilitate innovative, high-growth industries such as biotechnology.
本文认为，这些数据表明，生物技术行业的企业家和投资者使用集中所有权结构来追求特殊价值，若能实现，这些价值将在所有公众股东中按比例共享。本文表明，在一个具有长期商业计划和高度不确定性的行业中，价值最大化代理人（如企业家、上市前投资者）可以将董事会控制权和非流动性股权进行捆绑，以追求特殊价值，并减轻对代理成本的担忧。这些发现为指导政策提供了实务与理论背景，以促进如生物技术等产业的创新与高增长。
06
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Deterring Discovery-Driven Data Deletion
阻止强制性透露驱动的数据删除行为
作者：Daniel Long Sockwell
Litigation costs frequently frighten companies into deleting valuable data—and this problem has gotten worse with new technology. In the past, litigation costs were dwarfed by the physical costs of storage: keeping letters in filing cabinets was so expensive that companies deleted data without even considering litigation. Now, however, technology has caused physical storage costs to fall dramatically; hard drives are vastly less expensive than filing cabinets. As these costs fell, the litigation costs became more important. Litigation costs now cause a large fraction of data deletion.
诉讼费用经常会迫使公司删除有价值的数据，而且随着新技术发展，该问题愈发严重。过往诉讼成本与存储的物理成本相比微不足道:将信件保存在文件柜中非常昂贵，以至于公司在没有考虑诉讼的情况下就删除了数据。然而，现代技术的发展促使物理存储成本大幅下降;硬盘驱动器比文件柜便宜甚多。随着储存成本下降，诉讼成本变得更加重要。现在，很大一部分数据删除是由诉讼费用引起的。
This Note identifies the rise in discovery-driven data deletion and explains how this data deletion benefits no one and harms society. To solve this problem, this Note proposes reforms to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that would prevent discovery costs from incentivizing so much data deletion. This Note closes with practical thoughts on how judges and attorneys operating under the current Rules can minimize costs.
本说明指出了强制性透露驱动的数据删除的增加，并解释了这种数据删除对任何人均无益处，反而有害于社会。为解决这一问题，本文建议对联邦民事诉讼规则进行变革，以防强制性透露成本带来的如此大量的数据删除。本文以关于法官和律师在现行规则下如何将成本降至最低的实际思考结束。
（图片来源于网络）
文章链接：https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/CBLR/issue/view/86
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