译者 | 吴琦好 中国人民大学法硕
一审 | 胡婧卓 UCLA LLM
二审 | 李梓源 Bristol LLM 
编辑 | 罗彤 西北政法大学法本
         王冰子 烟台大学法本
责编 | 扎恩哈尔·阿黑哈提 新疆农业大学法本
从Blasius案看董事管理权与股东投票权的平衡
引言
1988年的Blasius案是美国特拉华州法院在司法实践中形成的关于董事、目标公司和股东权利义务的判例规则之一，对解决收购纠纷和矫正公司治理失灵具有至关重要的地位和作用。[1]法院认为对董事会出于阻碍股东行使投票权目的而实施的防御行为应施以更为严格的审查标准。Blasius案也被普遍认为是Unocal案中间审查标准的具体规定。[2]除非公司管理层能够证明的确存在令人信服的理由（compelling justification)，否则无论是否真诚地为公司利益着想，均不得干扰股东的选举投票权。
一、案情概述
在Blasius Industries Inc. v. Atlas Corporation案中，Blasius是Atlas的新股东，收购了Atlas 9.1%的股份。为了实现其资产重组计划，Blasius提出了将董事会人数从7人扩大到15人，并提名8位新董事的建议。为了阻止Blasius的提案获得多数股东的支持，Atlas董事会立即决定修改公司章程规定，将董事人数增至9人，并立即任命了两名新董事。即使Blasius的提案通过，原先的董事会成员也将占据半数以上的席位。
二、争议焦点
董事会增加董事并任命新成员的行为是否不公平地干涉股东行使权利？
三、裁判要旨
1.尽管被告为了公司的利益着想，但其行为干扰了公司董事与股东间的关系。
2.董事会决议无效，须予以撤销。
四、主要法律依据
A. The question of legitimacy.
A. 合法性问题
Generally, shareholders have only two protections against perceived inadequate business performance. They may sell their stock (which, if done in sufficient numbers, may so affect security prices as to create an incentive for altered managerial performance), or they may vote to replace incumbent board members.
在认为公司业绩不佳时，股东一般仅有两种保护措施：他们可以抛售股票，如果数量够多，可能会影响股票价格，从而激励管理绩效；或者他们可以投票替换现任董事会成员。
It has, for a long time, been conventional to dismiss the stockholder vote as a vestige or ritual of little practical importance.[3] Be that as it may, however, whether the vote is seen functionally as an unimportant formalism, or as an important tool of discipline, it is clear that it is critical to the theory that legitimates the exercise of power by some (directors and officers) over vast aggregations of property that they do not own.
人们习惯于将股东投票视为没有实际意义的仪式[3]。然而，不论将投票视为不重要的形式，还是一项重要的纪律，投票对于董事高管对其并不拥有的大量财产行使权力的合法性至关重要。
（图片来源于网络）
B. The allocation of authority as between the board and the shareholders.
B．董事会与股东之间的权力分配问题
The ordinary considerations to which the business judgment rule originally responded are simply not present in the shareholder voting context.[4] That is, a decision by the board to act for the primary purpose of preventing the effectiveness of a shareholder vote inevitably involves the question who has authority with respect to a matter of internal corporate governance. This need not be the case with respect to other forms of corporate action that may have an entrenchment effect-such as the stock buybacks present in Unocal, Cheff or Kors v. Carey.[5] Action designed principally to interfere with the effectiveness of a vote inevitably involves a conflict between the board and a shareholder majority. Judicial review of such action involves a determination of the legal and equitable obligations of an agent towards his principal. This is not a question that a court may leave to the agent finally to decide so long as he does so honestly and competently; that is, it may not be left to the agent's business judgment.
商业判断规则最初的一般考虑因素在股东投票中并不存在。[4]董事会的目的是阻碍股东投票的有效性，是公司治理中股东和董事权利分配的问题。至于其他公司行为，例如Unocal案、Cheff案或Kors v. Carey案中的股权回购，则不一定会产生“巩固(entrenchment effect)”效果。干扰投票效力不可避免地会让董事会与多数股东之间产生冲突。对此类行为的司法审查涉及确定代理人对其委托人的法律和公平义务。[5]即使代理人诚实、称职地做出了决定，法院也不能让其最终决定这个问题，即这些问题不在代理人的商业判断范围之内。
1. What rule does apply: per se invalidity of corporate acts or an intermediate standard
1. 适用何种规则：公司行为本身无效还是中间标准
Plaintiff argues for a rule of per se invalidity once a plaintiff has established that a board has acted for the primary purpose of thwarting the exercise of a shareholder vote ...... In two recent cases dealing with shareholder votes, this court struck down board acts done for the primary purpose of impeding the exercise of stockholder voting power. In doing so, a per se rule was not applied. Rather, it was said that, in such a case, the board bears the heavy burden of demonstrating a compelling justification for such action. In Aprahamian v. HBO & Company,[6] the incumbent board had moved the date of the annual meeting on the eve of that meeting when it learned that a dissident stockholder group had or appeared to have in hand proxies representing a majority of the outstanding shares. The court restrained that action and compelled the meeting to occur as noticed, even though the board stated that it had good business reasons to move the meeting date forward, and that that action was recommended by a special committee.
原告认为，一旦证明董事会的主要目的是阻挠股东行使投票权，就应适用本身无效规则……在最近两起涉及股东投票的案件中，法院驳回了以阻碍股东行使投票权为主要目的的董事会行为，并没有适用本身无效规则。相反，法院指出董事会承担证明其行为有令人信服的正当理由的重要举证责任。在Aprahamian v. HBO & Company案中，[6]该公司的现任董事会在得知持不同意见的股东团体已经或似乎已经获得代表多数股份的委托书时，在大会召开前临时改变了会议的日期。尽管董事会表示其有充分的商业理由将会议日期提前，且这一行动是由特别委员建议，法院对此仍然进行了限制，并强制要求会议按通知举行。
In Phillips v. Insituform of North America, Inc.,[7] the court enjoined the voting of certain stock issued for the primary purpose of diluting the voting power of certain control shares. After discussing Canada Southern[8] and Condec[9] in light of the more recent, important Supreme Court opinion in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Company, it was there concluded as follows: One may read Canada Southern as creating a black-letter rule prohibiting the issuance of shares for the purpose of diluting a large stockholder's voting power, but one need not do so. It may, as well, be read as a case in which no compelling corporate purpose was presented that might otherwise justify such an unusual course. Such a reading is, in my opinion, somewhat more consistent with the recent Unocal case.
在 Phillips v. Insituform of North America[7]案中，法庭禁止以稀释控制股为主要目的的投票。在讨论了最近的Canada Southern[8]和Condec[9]案，以及最高院在Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Company中的意见后，总结如下：有人可能认为，可以将Canada Southern解释为创立了一个明文规则，禁止发行股票以稀释大股东的投票权，但并非必须如此。这个案件没有提出足以证明公司必要的迫切目的，这可能会为这种不寻常的做法提供合理的辩解。这样的解读在某种程度上更符合最近的Unocal案。
In applying these cases, I conclude that no justification has been shown that would arguably make the extraordinary step of issuance of stock for the admitted purpose of impeding the exercise of stockholder rights reasonable in light of the corporate benefit sought to be obtained.
应用上述案例得出结论，考虑到所寻求的公司利益，没有任何正当理由可以证明阻碍股东行使权利而发行股票这一特殊步骤是合理的。
（图片来源于网络）
2. Defendants have demonstrated no sufficient justification to prevent an unaffiliated majority of shareholders from effectively exercising their right to elect eight new directors.
2. 被告没有充分理由阻止无关联的多数股东有效行使选举八名新董事的权利。
The board was not faced with a coercive action taken by a powerful shareholder against the interests of a distinct shareholder constituency. It was presented with a consent solicitation by a 9% shareholder. Moreover, here it had time to inform the shareholders of its views on the merits of the proposal subject to stockholder vote. The theory of our corporation law confers power upon directors as the agents of the shareholders; it does not create Platonic masters. It may be that the Blasius restructuring proposal was or is unrealistic and would lead to injury to the corporation and its shareholders if pursued. Having heard the evidence, I am inclined to think it was not a sound proposal. The board certainly viewed it that way, and that view, held in good faith, entitled the board to take certain steps to evade the risk it perceived. It could, for example, expend corporate funds to inform shareholders and seek to bring them to a similar point of view.[10]  But there is a vast difference between expending corporate funds to inform the electorate and exercising power for the primary purpose of foreclosing effective shareholder action. A majority of the shareholders, who were not dominated in any respect, could view the matter differently than did the board. They are entitled to employ the mechanisms provided by the corporation law and the Atlas certificate of incorporation to advance that view. Even finding the action taken was taken in good faith, it constituted an unintended violation of the duty of loyalty that the board owed to the shareholders. I note parenthetically that the concept of an unintended breach of the duty of loyalty is unusual but not novel.[11] That action will, therefore, be set aside by order of this court.
董事会并没有迫于一个强大股东的压力，采取有悖于另一组股东利益的行动。相反，董事会收到了一位拥有公司9%股份的股东的请求。此外，在本案中董事会有时间向股东说明其对需由股东投票表决的提案优点的看法。美国公司法理论赋予董事作为股东代理人的权力，而不是创造理想化的主人。Blasius的重组建议可能不切实际，如果继续实施可能会损害公司及其股东的利益。在听取证据后，我倾向于认为这不是一个合理的建议。董事会也持相同观点，出于善意，他们可以采取措施降低预期风险，例如利用公司资金通知股东，努力说服他们。[10]但是，利用公司资金通知投票者与以阻止股东采取有效行动为主要目的行使权力间存在巨大差异。大多数在任何方面不受支配的股东可能对此事的看法与董事会不同。他们有权利用公司法和Atlas公司注册证书规定的机制提出观点。即使所采取的行动是善意的，也无意中违反了董事会对股东的忠诚义务。无意违反忠诚义务的概念虽不寻常，但并不新颖。[11]因此，本法院将下令撤销该诉讼。
Blasius案体现了美国法律体系中，公司管理层的有关行为将受到严格的监管和审查，以确保其遵循公平、公正的原则，维护股东权益。该案深入探讨了公司管理层是否违反了Blasius标准，这一标准旨在保护股东在董事会选举和决策中的合法权益。
（图片来源于网络）
审理此案时，法院特别关注公司管理层是否采取了不合理的手段来限制股东的权益，如阻碍股东行使权利的行为是否有正当理由的证据等。这种审查不仅体现了法院对公司内部事务的适度干预，更是对股东权益的坚定捍卫。该案明确强调，公司管理层在行使职权时，必须遵循透明、公正的程序，尊重并保护股东的合法权益，不得滥用职权或采取不正当手段。
Blasius案的影响深远，它不仅对公司法和商业法产生了重要影响，还推动了公司治理规范和程序的完善。此案提醒了公司管理层，在公司治理过程中，必须遵循法律法规，尊重股东权益，确保公司决策符合最大利益原则。同时，此案也促使了对公司治理标准和审查标准的进一步研究和讨论，为未来类似案件的处理提供了宝贵的理论参考和实践指导。
脚注
[1] 参见林少伟、王弯：《美国特拉华州收购规则的历史变迁：勃兴与衰落》，载《证券法苑》2017年第19卷，第154页。
[2] See Delaware Supreme Court’s Response to Chancery for Turning Away Stockholder’s Claims, https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2021/07/29/delaware-supreme-courts-response-to-chancery-for-turning-away-stockholders-claims/#4b, accessed on March 1, 2024.
[3] See, e.g., E. Rostow, To Whom and For What Ends Is Corporate Management Responsible, in The Corporation in Modern Society (E.S. Mason ed.1959).
[4] See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, Del.Supr., 488 A.2d 858 (1985); In re Anderson Clayton Shareholders' Litigation, Del.Ch., 519 A.2d 669, 675 (1986).
[5] See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 957 (Del. 1985), holding modified by Coster v. UIP Companies, Inc., 300 A.3d 656 (Del. 2023); Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 496, 199 A.2d 548, 549 (1964); Kors v. Carey, 39 Del. Ch. 47, 50, 158 A.2d 136, 138 (1960).
[6] Aprahamian v. HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1204, 1205 (Del. Ch. 1987).
[7] Phillips v. Insituform of North America, Inc., Del.Ch., C.A. No. 9173.
[8] Canada S. Oils, Ltd. v. Manabi Expl. Co., 33 Del. Ch. 537, 537, 96 A.2d 810, 810 (1953).
[9] Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 355, 230 A.2d 769, 770 (1967).
[10] See Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight Picture Screen Corp., 20 Del. Ch. 78, 171 A. 226, 227 (1934); Hibbert v. Hollywood Park, Inc., 457 A.2d 339, 340 (Del. 1983).
[11] See Lerman v. Diagnostic Data, Inc., 421 A.2d 906, 908 (Del. Ch. 1980); AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 104 (Del. Ch. 1986).
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