法律翻译 | 《法与经济学杂志》第63卷第1期

译者 | 王若舟 北京大学LL.B.

一审 | 佩   佩 布里斯托大学LL.M.

二审 | 俞悠悠 国际关系学院法律本科

编辑 | 吴   萌 上海外国语大学法律硕士

责编 |李   薇 浙江工商大学本科

Most public companies incorporate in Delaware. Is this because they prefer its legal system, or are they simply following a trend? Using the incorporation histories of over 22,000 public companies from 1930 to 2010, I show that firms are more influenced by changes in each other’s decisions than by changes in the law. The analysis exploits an unexpected legal shock that increased Delaware’s long-run share of firms from 30 to 74 percent. I attribute most of this change to a cascading effect in which the decisions of past firms successively influence future cohorts. These decisions are also highly path dependent: in a counterfactual setting without switching costs, firms would be five times more likely to reincorporate in response to a given legal change. I conclude that network effects dominate secular trends in corporate governance.

大多数上市公司都在特拉华州注册设立。这是因为上市公司偏爱特拉华州的法律体系，还是仅在顺应潮流？根据1930年至2010年间22000多家上市公司的注册历史，笔者得出公司受彼此决策变化的影响要大于受法律变化的影响这一结论。本文分析利用了一个未曾料想到的法律冲击，它将特拉华州在公司中的长期份额从30%增加到74%。笔者将这一变化主要归因于级联效应，即过去企业的决策会相继影响未来企业的决策。这些决策也是高度路径依赖的：在没有转换成本的反事实环境中，企业因特定法律变革而重新成立公司的可能性要高出五倍。笔者得出的结论是，网络效应主导着公司治理的长期趋势。

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The use of public-private partnerships (PPPs) is an important development in infrastructure delivery. These contracts between a public-sector owner and a private provider bundle delivery services and provide a middle ground between traditional delivery and privatization. As of 2016, 35 states had enacted PPP-enabling laws that address such questions as the mixing of public- and private-sector funds, the treatment of unsolicited PPP proposals, and the need for prior legislative contract approval. We provide the first comprehensive empirical assessment of the laws’ impact on the utilization of private investment. We analyze the effect of a state having a PPP-enabling law and a law’s average impact. We also assess the impact of PPP-enabling-law provisions. We find that provisions that empower PPPs, such as exemptions from property taxes, exemptions from extant procurement laws, and confidentiality protections, attract private investment.

公私合作关系（PPP）的使用是基础设施交付领域的一项重要发展。公共部门所有者与私人供应商之间的这些合同捆绑了交付服务，并在传统交付和私有化之间提供了一个中间地带。截至2016年，已有35个州颁布了公私合作关系授权法，解决了诸如公共和私营部门资金混同、对未经请求的公私伙伴关系提议的处理以及对合同事先立法批准的需求等问题。本文首次就这些法律对利用私人投资的影响进行了全面的实证评估。本文分析了州立制定公私合作关系授权法的影响以及法律的平均影响，还评估了公私合作关系授权法律条款的影响。本文发现，授权公私合作关系的条款，如免征财产税、免除现行采购法和保密保护等，都能够吸引私人投资。

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Claudia M. Landeo and Kathryn E. Spier

This paper studies the design of optimal enforcement policies with ordered leniency to detect and deter harmful short-term activities committed by groups of injurers. With ordered leniency, the degree of leniency granted to an injurer who self-reports depends on his or her position in the self-reporting queue. We show that the ordered-leniency policy that induces maximal deterrence gives successively larger discounts to injurers who secure higher positions in the reporting queue. This creates a so-called race to the courthouse in which all injurers self-report promptly and, as a result, social harm is reduced. We show that the expected fine increases with the size of the group, which thus discourages the formation of large illegal enterprises. The first-best outcome is obtained with ordered leniency when the externalities associated with the harmful activities are not too great. Our findings complement Kaplow and Shavell’s results for single-injurer environments.

本文研究了有序宽大处理的最优执法政策设计，以发现和阻止由施害者群体实施的短期有害活动。在有序宽大处理政策下，对进行自首的施害者的宽大程度取决于其在自首队列中的顺序。笔者的研究表明，有序宽大处理政策能诱发最大威慑力，对于在自首顺序中靠前的施害者，会连续给予其更多的减免。这就创造了一种所谓的“法院竞赛”，在这一竞赛中，所有施害者都会迅速自首，从而减少了社会危害。笔者发现，预期罚款会随着组织规模的扩大而增加，从而抑制了大型非法企业的形成。当与有害活动相关的外部性不太大时，有序的宽大处理就能获得最佳效果。本文的研究结果补充了卡普洛和沙维尔对单一施害者环境的研究结果。

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We consider vertical contracts in which the retail market may involve search frictions. Minimum-advertised-price (MAP) restrictions act as a restraint on customers’ information and can therefore increase search frictions in the retail sector. Such restraints thereby soften retail competition—an impact also generated by resale price maintenance (RPM). However, by accommodating (consumer or retailer) heterogeneity, MAP restrictions can allow for higher manufacturer profits than RPM. We show that these restrictions can do so through facilitating price discrimination among consumers, encouraging service provision, and facilitating manufacturer collusion. Thus, welfare effects may be positive or negative compared with RPM or with the absence of such restrictions.

笔者考虑了在零售市场可能涉及搜索摩擦的纵向合约。最低广告价格（Minimum-advertised-price，简称MAP）限制是对消费者信息的一种约束，因此会增加零售业的搜索摩擦。这种限制会削弱零售业的竞争——转售价格维持机制（resale price maintenance，简称RPM）也会产生这种影响。然而，通过适应（消费者或零售商）异质性，MAP限制可以使厂商获得比RPM更高的利润。笔者的研究表明，这些限制可以通过促进消费者之间的价格歧视、鼓励提供服务和促进厂商合谋来实现这一目标。因此，与RPM或没有此类限制相比，福利效应可能是积极的，也可能是消极的。

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We investigate peer effects on crime-specific recidivism using register data for the entire Danish prison population. We find that inmates do not acquire new criminal capital in prison (no introductory peer effects). For certain types of crimes, we find that inmates strengthen their criminal capital in prison because of exposure to offenders in their field of specialization (reinforcing peer effects). Our results accord with a theory of crime-specific knowledge transmission and network building: we find reinforcing peer effects for crimes that require specific capital, planning, and networks (for example, drug crimes, theft, burglary, and fencing) and/or are more effective when committed in groups (for example, threats and vandalism). Reinforcing peer effects are especially strong because of exposure to more experienced criminals. By contrast, we find that exposure to offenders in the same specialization deters inmates from recidivism for violent offenses, including sexual offenses and robbery.

笔者利用丹麦所有监狱服刑人员的登记数据，研究了同伴效应对特定犯罪累犯的影响。笔者发现，囚犯在狱中不会获得新的犯罪资本（没有引入性的同伴效应）。对于某些类型的犯罪，笔者发现囚犯在狱中会因为接触到其特定犯罪领域的罪犯而增强其犯罪资本（强化性的同伴效应）。笔者的研究结果与特定犯罪的知识传播和网络构建理论相吻合：笔者发现，对于需要特定资本、计划和网络的犯罪（如毒品犯罪、盗窃、入室盗窃和销赃）和/或在团伙作案时更为有效的犯罪（如胁迫和毁坏财产），会产生强化性的同伴效应。同伴效应的强化会因与更有经验的罪犯接触而尤为强烈。对比之下，笔者发现，与同一犯罪领域的罪犯接触会阻止囚犯重犯暴力犯罪，包括性犯罪和抢劫。

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From 1960 to 2015, opinions of US federal district court judges (trial judges) in cases involving challenges to executive branch authority show that these judges favor executive authority less as they age. We suggest that district judges know that elevation to the federal circuit court of appeals becomes increasingly improbable, and hence have less reason to cooperate with the executive, with advancing age. Political variables, seniority of judges, and other variables introduced as extra regressors do not reverse this main result, nor does it appear to be the product of cohort effects or selection off the district court. When there are contemporaneous vacancies on their circuit courts, district judges in the 11 state circuits (but not the District of Columbia Circuit) are also more likely to favor the executive.

从1960年到2015年，美国联邦地区法院法官（审判法官）在涉及质疑行政部门权力的案件中发表的意见显示，随着年龄的增长，他们对行政权力的支持程度会逐渐降低。笔者认为，地区法官知道晋升联邦巡回上诉法院的可能性越来越小，因此随着年龄的增长，与行政部门合作的理由也越来越少。作为额外回归变量引入的政治变量、法官资历和其他变量并没有扭转这一主要结果，这也不像是组群效应或从地区法院中选择的结果。当巡回法院出现同期职位空缺时，11个州巡回法院（但不包括哥伦比亚特区巡回法院）的地区法官也更倾向于支持行政部门。

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原文链接：https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/toc/jle/2020/63/1