译者 | 燕   然 北京大学国际法学院，J.D. & J.M.
一审 | 李正茂 香港大学普通法学硕士
二审 | 戚若音 UCB LL.M.
编辑 | 罗   彤 西北政法大学
         王冰子 烟台大学
责编 | 扎恩哈尔·阿黑哈提 新疆农业大学
Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders
骏利资产管理集团有限公司（JCG）诉第一衍生品交易商（FDT）案
一、案件背景
Janus Capital Group, Inc. (JCG), is a publicly traded company that created the Janus family of mutual funds. These mutual funds are organized in a Massachusetts business trust, the Janus Investment Fund. Janus Investment Fund retained JCG’s wholly owned subsidiary, JCM, to be its investment adviser and administrator. JCG and JCM are the petitioners here.
骏利资本管理集团有限公司（JCG）是一家上市公司，其创建了骏利（Janus）系列的共同基金。这些共同基金由马萨诸塞州的一家商业信托公司——骏利投资基金（JIF）组织。JIF聘请JCG的全资子公司骏利资本管理有限责任公司（JCM）担任其投资顾问和基金管理人。JCG和JCM 是本诉讼的上诉人。
Although JCG created Janus Investment Fund, Janus Investment Fund is a separate legal entity owned entirely by mutual fund investors. Janus Investment Fund has no assets apart from those owned by the investors. JCM provides Janus Investment Fund with investment advisory services, which include “the management and administrative services necessary for the operation of [Janus] Fun[d],” but the two entities maintain legal independence. At all times relevant to this case, all of the officers of Janus Investment Fund were also officers of JCM, but only one member of Janus Investment Fund's board of trustees was associated with JCM. This is more independence than is required: By statute, up to 60 percent of the board of a mutual fund may be composed of “interested persons.”
虽然JIF由JCG创建，但JIF是一个完全由共同基金投资者所有的独立法人实体。除由投资者所有的资产外，JIF本身没有其他任何资产。JCM向JIF提供投资咨询服务，其中包括“运营JIF所需的管理和行政服务”，然而两个实体保持法律上的独立性。在与此案相关的所有时期，所有JIF高级管理人员者均为JCM的高级管理人员，但JIF董事会内只有一名成员与JCM存在关联。这表现出比法定要求更高的独立性：根据相关法规，[1]共同基金董事会中“利害关系”成员占比最多可达60%。
As the securities laws require, Janus Investment Fund issued prospectuses describing the investment strategy and operations of its mutual funds to investors. The prospectuses for several funds represented that the funds were not suitable for market timing and can be read to suggest that JCM would implement policies to curb the practice.[2] For example, the Janus Mercury Fund prospectus dated February 25, 2002, stated that the fund was “not intended for market timing or excessive trading” and represented that it “may reject any purchase request ... if it believes that any combination of trading activity is attributable to market timing or is otherwise excessive or potentially disruptive to the Fund.” Although market timing is legal, it harms other investors in the mutual fund.
根据证券法的要求，[3]JIF向投资者发布了招股说明书，以描述其共同基金的投资策略和运作情况。几支基金的招股说明书表明，这些基金不适合进行市场择时交易，且招股说明书内容可能被解读为JCM将实施政策来遏制此种做法。例如，2002年2月25日的Janus Mercury基金招股说明书指出，该基金“不适用于进行市场择时交易或过度交易”，并表示“如果该基金认为任何交易活动的组合属于市场择时交易，或以其他方式进行的过度交易，或可能对该基金产生破坏性影响的交易……该基金可能拒绝任何购买请求。”尽管市场择时交易策略是合法的，但它会对共同基金中的其他投资者造成损害。
In September 2003, the attorney general of the State of New York filed a complaint against JCG and JCM alleging that JCG entered into secret arrangements to permit market timing in several funds run by JCM. After the complaint’s allegations became public, investors withdrew significant amounts of money from the Janus Investment Fund mutual funds. Because Janus Investment Fund compensated JCM based on the total value of the funds and JCM's management fees comprised a significant percentage of JCG’s income, Janus Investment Fund’s loss of value affected JCG’s value as well. JCG’s stock price fell nearly 25 percent, from $17.68 on September 2 to $13.50 on September 26.
2003年9月，纽约州总检察长对JCG和JCM提起诉讼，指控JCG达成秘密安排，以允许JCM从运营的几只基金中进行市场择时交易。在指控公之于众后，投资者从JIF管理的共同基金内撤回了大量资金。[4]由于JIF是根据基金的总价值来补偿JCM，且JCM的管理费在JCG的总收入中占了很大比例，因此JIF的价值损失也影响了JCG的价值。JCG的股价从9月2日的17.68美元跌至9月26日的13.50美元，下跌了近25%。
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Respondent First Derivative Traders (First Derivative) represents a class of plaintiffs who owned JCG stock as of September 3, 2003. Its complaint asserts claims against JCG and JCM for violations of Rule 10b–5 and § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. First Derivative alleges that JCG and JCM “caused mutual fund prospectuses to be issued for Janus mutual funds and made them available to the investing public, which created the misleading impression that [JCG and JCM] would implement measures to curb market timing in the Janus [mutual funds].” “Had the truth been known, Janus [mutual funds] would have been less attractive to investors, and consequently, [JCG] would have realized lower revenues, so [JCG’s] stock would have traded at lower prices.”
被上诉人第一衍生品交易商（FDT）是在2003年9月3日持有JCG股票的股东代表，其诉状声称JCG和JCM违反了1934年《证券交易法》第10b-5条和第10(b)条。[5]FDT指控JCG和JCM为JIF发布了共同基金招股说明书，并将其提供给公众投资者，这一行为造成了一种误导性印象，即（JCG和JCM）将采取措施遏制Janus系列共同基金的市场择时交易。“如果真相被投资者知晓，Janus系列共同基金对投资者的吸引力就会降低，JCG的收入也会随之降低，JCG的股价也会降低。”
First Derivative contends that JCG and JCM “materially misled the investing public” and that class members relied “upon the integrity of the market price of [JCG] securities and market information relating to [JCG and JCM].” The complaint also alleges that JCG should be held liable for the acts of JCM as a “controlling person” under § 78t(a).
FDT主张，JCG和JCM“严重误导了公众投资者”，且共同诉讼人依赖“JCG证券市场价格及与JCG和JCM相关的市场信息的真实、准确、完整性”。该诉状还声称，根据《1934年证券交易法》第78t (a)条，作为JCM控制人，JCG应对JCM的行为负责。
The District Court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.[6] The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that First Derivative had sufficiently alleged that “JCG and JCM, by participating in the writing and dissemination of the prospectuses, made the misleading statements contained in the documents.” With respect to the element of reliance, the court found that investors would infer that JCM “played a role in preparing or approving the content of the Janus fund prospectuses,” but that investors would not infer the same about JCG, which could be liable only as a “control person” of JCM under § 20(a).
联邦地区法院因未充分陈述索赔请求而驳回了诉讼请求。[7]联邦第四巡回法院推翻了这一裁决，认为FDT指控JCG和JCM参与了招股说明书的编写和传播且在文件中作出了误导性陈述已属充分。[8]关于信赖要素，法院认为投资者会推断JCM“在准备或批准Janus系列基金招股说明书的内容方面发挥了作用”，[9]但对JCG却不会做出同样的推断。因此，JCG只能根据第20(a)条作为JCM的“控制人”承担责任。[10]
二、托马斯大法官为代表所发表的多数意见
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We granted certiorari to address whether JCM can be held liable in a private action under Rule 10b–5 for false statements included in Janus Investment Fund’s prospectuses. 561 U.S. 1024, 130 S.Ct. 3499, 177 L.Ed.2d 1088 (2010). Under Rule 10b–5, it is unlawful for “any person, directly or indirectly, ... [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact” in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. 17 CFR § 240.10b–5(b). To be liable, therefore, JCM must have “made” the material misstatements in the prospectuses. We hold that it did not.
我们批准了调卷令，以解决JCM是否可以根据第10b-5号规则对包含在JIF基金招股说明书中的虚假陈述在私人诉讼中承担责任。[11]根据第10b-5号规则，在证券的购买或销售过程中，“任何人，直接或间接地作出任何关于重大事实的虚假陈述”均属非法。[12][13]因此，JCM必须在招股说明书中“作出”对重大事实的虚假陈述后，才应承担责任。我们认为JCM并无此行为。[14]（一）判决需与第10(b)条下隐含的私人诉权的狭隘范围相一致，法院不会将责任扩展至对虚假陈述拥有最终控制权的个人或实体之外。
The SEC promulgated Rule 10b–5 pursuant to authority granted under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Although neither Rule 10b–5 nor § 10(b) expressly creates a private right of action, this Court has held that “a private right of action is implied under § 10(b).” That holding “remains the law,” but “concerns with the judicial creation of a private cause of action caution against its expansion”. Thus, in analyzing whether JCM “made” the statements for purposes of Rule 10b–5, we are mindful that we must give “narrow dimensions ... to a right of action Congress did not authorize when it first enacted the statute and did not expand when it revisited the law.”
美国证券交易委员会（SEC）根据《1934年证券交易法》第10(b)条[15]的授权颁布了第10b–5号规则。尽管第10b–5号规则和第10(b)条均未明文规定私人诉权，但我们已经裁定“在第10(b)条下存在隐含的私人诉权。”[16]尽管此裁定未超过第10(b)条的法律范畴，但“对于司法创造私人诉权的担忧，警告我们不应过分扩大该私人诉权的范围。”[17]因此，在分析JCM是否“作出”了第10b–5号规则中规范的陈述时，我们注意到，必须“狭隘地……看待国会在首次颁布法律时未授权且在修改法律时也未扩大的诉讼权利”。[18]
One “makes” a statement by stating it. When “make” is paired with a noun expressing the action of a verb, the resulting phrase is “approximately equivalent in sense” to that verb. For instance, “to make a proclamation” is the approximate equivalent of “to proclaim,” and “to make a promise” approximates “to promise.”  The phrase at issue in Rule 10b–5, “[t]o make any ... statement,” is thus the approximate equivalent of “to state.”
一个人通过陈述来“作出”一项陈述。当“作出”与表示动词的行为的名词搭配时，得到的短语在意义上大致相当于该动词。[19]例如，“作出宣言”大致等同于“宣布”，而“作出承诺”大致等同于“承诺”。[20]在第10b–5号规则中存在争议的短语是“作出任何陈述”，因此该短语大致相当于“陈述”。
For purposes of Rule 10b–5, the maker of a statement is the person or entity with ultimate authority over the statement, including its content and whether and how to communicate it. Without control, a person or entity can merely suggest what to say, not “make” a statement in its own right. One who prepares or publishes a statement on behalf of another is not its maker. And in the ordinary case, attribution within a statement or implicit from surrounding circumstances is strong evidence that a statement was made by—and only by—the party to whom it is attributed. This rule might best be exemplified by the relationship between a speechwriter and a speaker. Even when a speechwriter drafts a speech, the content is entirely within the control of the person who delivers it. And it is the speaker who takes credit—or blame—for what is ultimately said.
根据第10b–5号规则的目的，一项陈述的作出者是对该陈述具有最终控制权的人或实体，该最终控制权包括对陈述内容、陈述是否应传达、以及陈述应以何种方式传达的掌控。如缺少控制权，个人或实体则只能提出建议而不能自行“作出”一项陈述。代表他人准备或发布一项陈述的人不是该陈述的作出者。在一般情况下，陈述中的归属或根据周围情况推断的隐含归属都是有力的证据，证明该陈述是由且仅由归属所指者作出的。这条规则最好的例子是演讲撰稿人和演讲者之间的关系。即使演讲撰稿人起草了一篇演讲稿，但讲稿内容却完全受到演讲者的控制，且对最终发言接受赞扬或指责的人也是演讲者。
This rule follows from Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U.S. 164, 114 S.Ct. 1439, 128 L.Ed.2d 119 (1994), in which we held that Rule 10b–5’s private right of action does not include suits against aiders and abettors. Such suits—against entities that contribute “substantial assistance” to the making of a statement but do not actually make it—may be brought by the SEC, but not by private parties. A broader reading of “make,” including persons or entities without ultimate control over the content of a statement, would substantially undermine Central Bank. If persons or entities without control over the content of a statement could be considered primary violators who “made” the statement, then aiders and abettors would be almost nonexistent.
该规则源自丹佛中央银行诉丹佛第一州际银行案（以下简称“丹佛中央银行案”）。[21]在这个案件中，我们裁定第10b–5号规则的私人诉权不涵盖对帮助者和教唆者的起诉。[22]针对对于一项陈述的发表提供“实质帮助”但并非实际发表的实体的诉讼可以由美国证券交易委员会提出，[23]但不能由私人提出。如果对“作出”一项陈述的定义过于宽泛，从而导致涵盖那些对一项陈述的内容没有最终控制权的人或实体，这将会严重削弱丹佛中央银行案的判决效果。如果那些对一项陈述的内容没有控制权的人或实体被认为是“作出”了该陈述的主要违法者，那么帮助者和教唆者的角色就几乎不存在了。[24]
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This interpretation is further supported by our recent decision in Stoneridge. There, investors sued “entities who, acting both as customers and suppliers, agreed to arrangements that allowed the investors’ company to mislead its auditor and issue a misleading financial statement.” We held that dismissal of the complaint was proper because the public could not have relied on the entities’ undisclosed deceptive acts.  Significantly, in reaching that conclusion we emphasized that “nothing [the defendants] did made it necessary or inevitable for [the company] to record the transactions as it did.” This emphasis suggests the rule we adopt today: that the maker of a statement is the entity with authority over the content of the statement and whether and how to communicate it. Without such authority, it is not “necessary or inevitable” that any falsehood will be contained in the statement.
这一解释在最近的Stoneridge案中得到了进一步支持。在该案中，投资者起诉了既充当顾客又充当供应商的实体。由于这些实体所同意的安排，从而使得投资者公司的审计师受到误导并发布了一份具有误导性的财务报表。”[25]我们认为驳回该诉讼请求是正确的，因为公众不可能对这些实体未披露的欺诈行为产生依赖。[26]值得注意的是，在得出这一结论时，我们强调“被告所做的任何事情都并非公司如此记录交易的必然或不可避免的原因。”[27][28]这种强调暗含了我们今天所采纳的规则，即陈述的作出者是对该陈述的内容，是否传达该陈述，及以何种方式传达该陈述具有控制权的实体。如若缺少这样的控制权，那么陈述中包含虚假信息就并非是一种不可避免或必然的情况。
Our holding also accords with the narrow scope that we must give the implied private right of action. Although the existence of the private right is now settled, we will not expand liability beyond the person or entity that ultimately has authority over a false statement.
我们的判决也与我们需给予隐含私人诉权以狭窄范围一致。[29]尽管私人诉权的存在现在已经确定，但我们不会将责任扩展到对虚假陈述拥有最终控制权的个人或实体之外。（二）采纳美国政府或SEC对“作出”的解释，或基于投资顾问与共同基金间特殊关系的责任理论将导致与先例不一致的结果。
The Government contends that “make” should be defined as “create.” This definition, although perhaps appropriate when “make” is directed at an object unassociated with a verb (e.g., “to make a chair”), fails to capture its meaning when directed at an object expressing the action of a verb.
美国政府认为，“作出”应定义为“创造”。[30]当“作出”指向与动词无关的对象（如“作出一把椅子”）时，这个定义也许是合适的，但当“作出”指向表达动词动作的对象时，这个定义就无法体现其含义了。
Adopting the Government’s definition of “make” would also lead to results inconsistent with our precedent. The Government’s definition would permit private plaintiffs to sue a person who “provides the false or misleading information that another person then puts into the statement.” But in Stoneridge, we rejected a private Rule 10b–5 suit against companies involved in deceptive transactions, even when information about those transactions was later incorporated into false public statements. We see no reason to treat participating in the drafting of a false statement differently from engaging in deceptive transactions, when each is merely an undisclosed act preceding the decision of an independent entity to make a public statement.
采纳政府对“作出”一词的定义也将导致与本院（最高法院）的先例不一致的结果。政府对“作出”一词的定义将允许私人原告起诉那些“提供虚假或误导性信息，然后由他人将这些信息加入陈述中”的个人。[31][32]但在Stoneridge案中，针对涉及欺诈交易的公司，即使这些欺诈交易的信息后来被纳入了虚假的公开陈述中，我们仍驳回了第10b–5号规则下的私人诉讼（请求）。[33]我们认为没有理由把参与起草虚假陈述与从事欺骗性交易区别对待，因为两者都只是在独立实体决定作出公开陈述之前的一项未公开行为。
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For its part, First Derivative suggests that the “well-recognized and uniquely close relationship between a mutual fund and its investment adviser” should inform our decision. It suggests that an investment adviser should generally be understood to be the “maker” of statements by its client mutual fund, like a playwright whose lines are delivered by an actor. We decline this invitation to disregard the corporate form. Although First Derivative and its amici persuasively argue that investment advisers exercise significant influence over their client funds, it is undisputed that the corporate formalities were observed here. JCM and Janus Investment Fund remain legally separate entities, and Janus Investment Fund’s board of trustees was more independent than the statute requires. Any reapportionment of liability in the securities industry in light of the close relationship between investment advisers and mutual funds is properly the responsibility of Congress and not the courts. Moreover, just as with the Government’s theory, First Derivative’s rule would create the broad liability that we rejected in Stoneridge.
对此，FDT建议法院的决定应受到“共同基金及其投资顾问之间的公认且独特密切的关系”的影响。FDT提出，正如同由演员传递其台词的幕后编剧一样，投资顾问通常应被理解为是其共同基金客户的陈述的“作出者”。但法院拒绝这一忽略公司形式的这一请求。尽管FDT及其法庭之友有力地辩称，投资顾问对其共同基金客户产生了重大影响，[34]但毋庸置疑的是，此处行为符合公司的各项规章制度。JCM和JIF仍然是法律上独立的实体，而JIF的董事会独立性甚至比法规要求的最低标准[35]更高。[36]基于投资顾问与共同基金之间密切关系的性质对证券行业责任的重新分配的责任应该归于国会，而非法院。此外，正如上述提及政府理论一样，FDT主张的规则将导向我们在Stoneridge案中所驳回的广泛责任。
Congress also has established liability in § 20(a) for “[e]very person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable” for violations of the securities laws. First Derivative’s theory of liability based on a relationship of influence resembles the liability imposed by Congress for control. To adopt First Derivative's theory would read into Rule 10b–5 a theory of liability similar to—but broader in application than, see post, at 2310 — what Congress has already created expressly elsewhere. We decline to do so.
国会还在第20(a)条中规定了“对违反证券法者的直接或间接控制人”的责任。[37]FDT基于影响关系的责任理论与国会规定的控制责任（理论）相似。如果采纳FDT的理论，就会在第10b-5号规则中解读出一种类似于（但适用范围上更广）国会已经在其他地方明确规定的责任理论。[38]我们拒绝采纳FDT提出的理论。
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Under this rule, JCM did not “make” any of the statements in the Janus Investment Fund prospectuses; Janus Investment Fund did. Only Janus Investment Fund—not JCM—bears the statutory obligation to file the prospectuses with the SEC. The SEC has recorded that Janus Investment Fund filed the prospectuses. There is no allegation that JCM in fact filed the prospectuses and falsely attributed them to Janus Investment Fund. Nor did anything on the face of the prospectuses indicate that any statements therein came from JCM rather than Janus Investment Fund—a legally independent entity with its own board of trustees.
根据这一规则，JCM并未“作出”JIF招股说明书中的任何陈述，陈述作出者应为JIF本身。具有向SEC提交招股说明书的法定义务的主体只有JIF，而非JCM。[39]SEC记录显示，JIF已经提交了招股说明书。[40]不存在主张JCM实际提交了招股说明书并错误地将其归因于JIF的指控。招股说明书的正文也没有任何迹象表明其中的任何陈述来自JCM而非JIF，即一个拥有董事会的法律上独立的实体。[41]
First Derivative suggests that both JCM and Janus Investment Fund might have “made” the misleading statements within the meaning of Rule 10b–5 because JCM was significantly involved in preparing the prospectuses. But this assistance, subject to the ultimate control of Janus Investment Fund, does not mean that JCM “made” any statements in the prospectuses. Although JCM, like a speechwriter, may have assisted Janus Investment Fund with crafting what Janus Investment Fund said in the prospectuses, JCM itself did not “make” those statements for purposes of Rule 10b–5.
FDT称因为JCM在拟定招股说明书方面起到了重要作用，JCM和JIF可能都在第10b–5号规则的意义上“作出”了误导性陈述。但是，JCM的协助受制于JIF的最终控制权，因此该协助并不意味着JCM在招股说明书中“作出”了任何陈述。尽管JCM可能像演讲撰稿人一样协助JIF起草招股说明书中的内容，但就第10b–5号规则而言，JCM本身并没有“作出”这些陈述。[42]
三、判决结果
The statements in the Janus Investment Fund prospectuses were made by Janus Investment Fund, not by JCM. Accordingly, First Derivative has not stated a claim against JCM under Rule 10b–5. The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit is reversed.
JIF招股说明书中的陈述是由JIF而非JCM作出的。因此，FDT未能针对JCM在第10b–5号规则下提出诉讼请求。联邦第四巡回上诉法院的判决被推翻。
It is so ordered.
判决如此。
四、布雷耶大法官发表的反对意见（受金斯伯格大法官、索托马约尔大法官和卡根大法官支持）
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This case involves a private Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b–5 action brought by a group of investors against Janus Capital Group, Inc., and Janus Capital Management LLC (Janus Management), a firm that acted as an investment adviser to a family of mutual funds (collectively, the Janus Fund or Fund). The investors claim that Janus Management knowingly made materially false or misleading statements that appeared in prospectuses issued by the Janus Fund. They say that they relied upon those statements, and that they suffered resulting economic harm.
本案涉及一起由一群投资者根据SEC第10b-5号规则提起的私人诉讼，诉讼针对JCG和JCM。JCM是一家为一系列共同基金（即JIF）充当投资顾问的公司。投资者称，JCM故意发布存在于Janus系列基金的招股说明书中的实质性虚假或误导性陈述。投资者们声称他们依赖这些陈述，并因此遭受了经济损失。
Janus Management and the Janus Fund are closely related. Each of the Fund's officers is a Janus Management employee. Janus Management, acting through those employees (and other of its employees), manages the purchase, sale, redemption, and distribution of the Fund’s investments. Janus Management prepares, modifies, and implements the Janus Fund’s long-term strategies. And Janus Management, acting through those employees, carries out the Fund’s daily activities.
JCM和JIF关系密切。每位JIF的管理人员都是JCM的雇员。JCM通过这些员工（以及其他员工）进行操作，管理基金投资的购买、销售、赎回和分配。JCM负责制定、修改和实施JIF的长期战略。JCM通过这些员工的操作实施基金的日常活动。
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Rule 10b–5 says in relevant part that it is unlawful for “any person, directly or indirectly ... [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact” in connection with the purchase or sale of securities. The specific legal question before us is whether Janus Management can be held responsible under the Rule for having “ma[d]e” certain false statements about the Janus Fund's activities. The statements in question appear in the Janus Fund's prospectuses.
第10b-5号规则在相关部分规定：“任何人，直接或间接地……作出任何关于重大事实的虚假陈述”均属非法。[43]我们面临的具体法律问题是，根据该规则，是否可以追究JCM对其在JIF的活动中“作出”的某些虚假陈述负责。有争议的陈述出现在JIF下属基金的招股说明书中。
The Court holds that only the Janus Fund, not Janus Management, could have “ma [d]e” those statements. The majority points out that the Janus Fund's board of trustees has “ultimate authority” over the content of the statements in a Fund prospectus. And in the majority's view, only “the person or entity with ultimate authority over the statement, including its content and whether and how to communicate it” can “make” a statement within the terms of Rule 10b–5.
法院认为只有JIF而非JCM才可能“作出”那些陈述。多数法官指出，JIF的董事会在基金招股说明书中的陈述内容上拥有“最终控制权”。在多数法官看来，只有“对该陈述具有最终控制权（该控制权包括对陈述内容，陈述是否应传达，以及陈述以何种方式传达）的个人或实体”才能在第10b-5号规则的调整范围内“作出”一项陈述。
In my view, however, the majority has incorrectly interpreted the Rule’s word “make.” Neither common English nor this Court’s earlier cases limit the scope of that word to those with “ultimate authority” over a statement’s content. To the contrary, both language and case law indicate that, depending upon the circumstances, a management company, a board of trustees, individual company officers, or others, separately or together, might “make” statements contained in a firm’s prospectus—even if a board of directors has ultimate content-related responsibility. And the circumstances here are such that a court could find that Janus Management made the statements in question.
然而，在我看来，多数法官对该规则中的“作出”一词的解释是不正确的。无论是通常的英语表达方式，还是本院早期的判例都没有将该词的范围限制在对陈述内容具有“最终控制权”的人身上。相反，该词词义和判例都表明，根据具体情况，基金管理人、董事会、公司高管或其他人可以单独或共同“作出”公司招股说明书中包含的陈述——即使董事会对相关内容负有最终责任。在这种情况下，法院可以认定JCM作出了涉案陈述。
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Respondent's complaint sets forth the basic elements of a typical Rule 10b–5 “fraud on the market” claim. It alleges that Janus Management made statements that “created the misleading impression that” it “would implement measures to curb” a trading strategy called “market timing.” The complaint adds that Janus Management knew that these “market timing” statements were false; that the statements were material; that the market, in pricing securities (including related securities) relied upon the statements; that as a result, when the truth came out (that Janus Management indeed permitted “market timing” in the Janus Fund), the price of relevant shares fell; and the false statements thereby caused respondent significant economic losses.
FDT的诉状陈述了第10b-5号规则下典型“市场欺诈”索赔的基本要素。诉状称，JCM发表的陈述“制造了一种误导性的印象”，即它“将采取措施遏制”一种名为“市场择时”的交易策略。诉状补充说，JCM知道这些关于“市场择时”的陈述是虚假的；这些陈述是重要的；市场在对该证券及相关证券定价时将依赖于这些陈述；当真相（即JCM确实允许在JIF基金中进行“市场择时”交易）曝光时，相关股票的价格将下跌；原告因虚假陈述遭受了重大的经济损失。[44]
The majority finds the complaint fatally flawed, however, because (1) Rule 10b–5 says that no “person” shall “directly or indirectly ... make any untrue statement of a material fact,” (2) the statements at issue appeared in the Janus Fund's prospectuses, and (3) only “the person or entity with ultimate authority over the statement, including its content and whether and how to communicate it,” can “make” a false statement.
然而，多数法官认为该诉状存在严重缺陷，原因是（1）第10b-5号规则规定“任何人”都不得“直接或间接地……就重大事实作出虚假陈述”；（2）有争议的陈述出现在JIF基金的招股说明书中；（3）只有“对该陈述具有最终控制权（该控制权包括对陈述内容，陈述是否应传达，以及陈述以何种方式传达）的“人或实体”才能“作出”虚假陈述。
But where can the majority find legal support for the rule that it enunciates? The English language does not impose upon the word “make” boundaries of the kind the majority finds determinative. Every day, hosts of corporate officials make statements with content that more senior officials or the board of directors have “ultimate authority” to control. So do cabinet officials make statements about matters that the Constitution places within the ultimate authority of the President. So do thousands, perhaps millions, of other employees make statements that, as to content, form, or timing, are subject to the control of another.
然而，多数法官在哪里可以找到他们所阐明的规则的法律论据呢？英语本身并未对“作出”一词施加多数法官认为的决定性的限制。每天，大量公司行政人员发表陈述的内容都可能受限于高管或董事会“最终控制权”的控制。内阁官员也可能就宪法赋予总统“最终控制权”的事项发表陈述。成千上万，甚至也许是数百万其他雇员也可能会就内容、形式或时间受到他人控制的事项发表陈述。
Nothing in the English language prevents one from saying that several different individuals, separately or together, “make” a statement that each has a hand in producing. For example, as a matter of English, one can say that a national political party has made a statement even if the only written communication consists of uniform press releases issued in the name of local party branches; one can say that one foreign nation has made a statement even when the officials of a different nation (subject to its influence) speak about the matter; and one can say that the President has made a statement even if his press officer issues a communication, sometimes in the press officer's own name. Practical matters related to context, including control, participation, and relevant audience, help determine who “makes” a statement and to whom that statement may properly be “attributed,” at least as far as ordinary English is concerned.
在英语语言中，并没有阻止几个不同的个体，单独或共同，“作出”一个每个人均参与的陈述的可能性。例如，从英语的角度来看，我们可以说一个全国性政党发表了一项陈述，即使唯一的书面通讯只是以其地方分支的名义发布的统一新闻稿；我们可以说一个外国国家发表了一项陈述，即使只是受制于国家影响下的官员对某事进行了谈论；我们可以说总统发表了一项陈述，即使该通讯有时是总统的新闻发言人以自己的名义发布的。至少就通用英语而言，与语境相关的实际问题，包括控制权、参与者和相关受众，有助于确定谁“作出”了一项陈述，以及这项陈述可以正当地“归属”给谁。
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Neither can the majority find support in any relevant precedent. The majority says that its rule “follows from Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U.S. 164, 114 S.Ct. 1439, 128 L.Ed.2d 119 (1994),” in which the Court “held that Rule 10b–5’s private right of action does not include suits against aiders and abettors.” But Central Bank concerns a different matter. And it no more requires the majority’s rule than free air travel for small children requires free air travel for adults.
同样，多数法官在任何相关的先例中也找不到支持。多数法官表示，其规则源自丹佛中央银行案。在该案中，法院“裁定第10b-5号规则下的私人诉讼不包括对帮助者和共谋者的起诉。”但是，丹佛中央银行案涉及的是与本案不同的问题。多数法官提出的规则与该案中毫无关联，就像为儿童提供免费机票不代表需要为成人提供免费机票一样。
Central Bank is a case about secondary liability, liability attaching, not to an individual making a false statement, but to an individual helping someone else do so. Central Bank involved a bond issuer accused of having made materially false statements, which overstated the values of property that backed the bonds. Central Bank also involved a defendant that was a bank, serving as indenture trustee, which was supposed to check the bond issuer's valuations. The plaintiffs claimed that the bank delayed its valuation checks and thereby helped the issuer make its false statements credible. The question before the Court concerned the bank's liability—a secondary liability for “aiding and abetting” the bond issuer, who (on the theory set forth) was primarily liable.
丹佛中央银行案是一起关于次要责任的案件，次要责任不是由“作出”虚假陈述的个人负担，而是由帮助他人这样做的个人负担。丹佛中央银行案涉及一家被指控作出实质性虚假陈述的债券发行人，这些陈述夸大了相关债券的财产价值。丹佛中央银行案还涉及一家担任债券信托管理人的银行被告，其职责是检查债券发行人的估值。原告声称该银行推迟了其估值检查，从而帮助发行人使其虚假陈述更具可信度。法院面临的问题是银行的责任，即“协助和共谋”债券发行人的次要责任，而债券发行人（根据所提出的理论）是主要责任方。
The Court made this clear. The question presented was “whether private civil liability under § 10(b) extends ... to those who do not engage in the manipulative or deceptive practice, but who aid and abet the violation.” The Court wrote that “aiding and abetting liability reaches persons who do not engage in the proscribed activities at all, but who give a degree of aid to those who do.” The Court described civil law “aiding and abetting” as “‘know[ing] that the other’s conduct constitutes a breach of duty and giv[ing] substantial assistance or encouragement to the other ....’”And it reviewed a Court of Appeals decision that had defined the elements of aiding and abetting as “(1) a primary violation of § 10(b); (2) recklessness by the aider and abettor as to the existence of the primary violation; and (3) substantial assistance given to the primary violator by the aider and abettor.” Faced with this question, the Court answered that § 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 do not provide for this kind of “aiding and abetting” liability in private suits.
法院明确了这一点。（原告）所提出的问题是“第10b-5号规则规定的私人民事责任是否延伸至那些没有参与操纵性或欺骗性陈述作出过程，但协助和教唆该违法行为的人”。[45]法院写道，“协助和教唆责任适用于那些根本不从事被禁止活动，但对那些从事被禁止活动的人提供一定程度帮助的人。”[46]法院将民法中的“协助和教唆”描述为“‘明知对方的行为违反法定义务，仍向对方提供实质性协助或鼓励的行为……’”[47]。它审查了上诉法院的一项判决，该判决将协助和教唆的要素定义为“（1）对第10b-5号规则的主要违反；（2）帮助者、教唆者对于原违法行为存在的疏忽大意；（3）帮助者、教唆者对主违反法律者给予了实质性帮助。”[48]面对这个问题，法院的回答是，第10(b)条和第10b-5号规则并没有规定私人诉讼中的这种“协助和教唆”的责任。
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By way of contrast, the present case is about primary liability—about individuals who allegedly themselves “make” materially false statements, not about those who help others to do so. The question is whether Janus Management is primarily liable for violating the Act, not whether it simply helped others violate the Act. The Central Bank defendant concededly did not make the false statements in question (others did), while here the defendants allegedly did make those statements. And a rule (the majority's rule) absolving those who allegedly did make false statements does not “follow from” a rule (Central Bank 's rule) absolving those who concededly did not do so.
相比之下，本案涉及的是主要责任，涉及那些声称自己“作出”重大虚假陈述的人，而不是那些帮助别人这样做的人。本案问题是JIF是否因违反法案而承担主要责任，而不仅仅是它是否帮助其他人违反法律。可以肯定的是，丹佛中央银行案的被告明显没有作出涉案的虚假陈述，而是其他人作出了涉案的虚假陈述。而在本案中，JCM据称确实作出了这些陈述。多数法官拥护的规则免除的是那些据称确实作出了虚假陈述的人的责任，而丹佛中央银行案的规则免除的是那些明确没有这样做的人的责任。这两个规则之间是没有联系的。
The majority adds that to interpret the word “make” as including those “without ultimate control over the content of a statement” would “substantially undermine” Central Bank 's holding. Would it? The Court in Central Bank specifically wrote that its holding did “not mean that secondary actors in the securities markets are always free from liability under the securities Acts. Any person or entity, including a lawyer, accountant, or bank, who employs a manipulative device or makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under 10b–5, assuming all of the requirements for primary liability under Rule 10b–5 are met.”
多数法官还补充说，将“作为”一词解释为包括那些“对陈述内容没有最终控制权”的人会“严重削弱”丹佛中央银行案的判决。这是否属实？丹佛中央银行案的判决明确写道，其判决“并不意味着证券市场的次级参与者始终免于证券法的责任。任何个人或实体，包括律师、会计师或银行，如果采用操纵手段或作出投资者或证券卖方所依赖的重大虚假陈述（或遗漏），都可能作为第10b-5号规则下的主要违规者而承担责任，前提是第10b-5号规则下的主要违规者责任的所有要求已得到满足。[49]
Thus, as far as Central Bank is concerned, depending upon the circumstances, board members, senior firm officials, officials tasked to develop a marketing document, large investors, or others (taken together or separately) all might “make” materially false statements subjecting themselves to primary liability. The majority’s rule does not protect, it extends, Central Bank ’s holding of no-liability into new territory that Central Bank explicitly placed outside that holding. And by ignoring the language in which Central Bank did so, the majority’s rule itself undermines Central Bank. Where is the legal support for the majority’s “drawing a clean line,” that so seriously conflicts with Central Bank? Indeed, where is the legal support for the majority's suggestion that plaintiffs must show some kind of “attribution” of a statement to a defendant, if it means plaintiffs must show, not only that the defendant “ma[d]e” the statement, but something more?
因此，就丹佛中央银行案而言，根据具体情况，董事会成员、公司高级官员、负责制定营销文件的官员、大额投资者或其他人都可能单独或共同“作出”重大虚假陈述，从而使自己承担主要违规者责任。多数法官的裁决并不是在保护丹佛中央银行案的判决，而是在将丹佛中央银行案的判决扩展至该决定明确排除的新领域。通过忽视丹佛中央银行案限制判决范围的语言，多数法官的裁决本身就破坏了丹佛中央银行案。与丹佛中央银行案严重冲突的多数法官的“规则界定”的法律支持何在?事实上，如果原告的证明负担不仅包括被告“作出”了陈述，还包括其他的东西，那么多数法官关于原告必须证明陈述在某种程度上可以“归于”被告的建议的法律支持何在呢?
The majority also refers to Stoneridge, but that case offers it no help. In Stoneridge, firms that supplied electronic equipment to a cable television company agreed with the cable television company to enter into a series of fraudulent sales and purchases, for example, a sale at an unusually high price, thereby providing funds which the suppliers would use to buy advertising from the cable television company. These arrangements enabled the cable television company to fool its accountants (and ultimately the public) into believing that it had more revenue (for example, advertising revenue) than it really had. As part of the agreement, the companies exchanged letters and backdated contracts to conceal the fraud. Investors subsequently sued the cable television company, some of its officers, its auditors, and the equipment suppliers, as well, claiming that all of them had engaged in a scheme to defraud securities purchasers. In respect to most of the defendants, investors identified allegedly materially false statements contained in the cable television company’s financial statements or similar documents. But in respect to the equipment suppliers, investors claimed that the relevant deceptive conduct was in the letters, backdated contracts, and related oral conversations about the scheme. The investors argued that the equipment suppliers, “by participating in the transactions,” violated § 10(b) and Rule 10b–5.
多数法官还提到了Stoneridge案，但该案对他们并没有帮助。在Stoneridge案中，为有线电视公司提供电子设备的公司同意与该有线电视公司达成协议，进行了一系列欺诈性的销售买卖，例如以异常高的价格销售，从而提供资金以便供应商用于购买该有线电视公司的广告。这些安排使有线电视公司能够欺骗其审计师（并最终欺骗公众），让其相信其收入（例如广告收入）比实际上更多。作为协议的一部分，两家公司交换了信件，并倒签了合同的日期，以掩盖其欺诈行为。随后投资者对该有线电视公司、部分高管、其审计师以及设备供应商提起诉讼，声称所有这些人都参与了欺诈证券购买者的计划。就大多数被告而言，投资者认定有线电视公司的财务报表或类似文件中存在涉嫌包含重大虚假陈述的文件。但对于设备供应商，投资者声称相关的欺诈行为出现在关于该计划的信函、倒签的合同和相关口头交流中。投资者主张设备供应商“通过参与交易”违反了第10(b)条和第10b-5号规则。[50]
The Court held that the equipment suppliers could not be found liable for securities fraud in a private suit under § 10(b). But in doing so, it did not deny that the equipment suppliers had made the false statements contained in the letters, contracts, and conversations. Rather, the Court said the issue in the case was whether “any deceptive statement or act respondents made was not actionable because it did not have the requisite proximate relation to the investors’ harm.” And it held that these deceptive statements or actions could not provide a basis for liability because the investors could not prove sufficient reliance upon the particular false statements that the equipment suppliers had made.
法院判决在第10(b)条下的私人诉讼中，不能认定设备供应商对证券欺诈负有责任。但法院并没有否认设备供应商在信函、合同和对话中作出了虚假陈述。[51]相反，法院表示案件的问题在于“被告所作的任何欺诈性陈述或行为之所以不能受到起诉，是因为它与投资者的损害没有必要的直接关系。”[52]法院认为这些欺诈性陈述或行为不能构成责任的依据，因为投资者无法证明对设备供应商所作出的特定虚假陈述的充分依赖。
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The Court pointed out that the equipment suppliers “had no duty to disclose; and their deceptive acts were not communicated to the public.” And the Court went on to say that “as a result,” the investors “cannot show reliance upon any” of the equipment suppliers' actions, “except in an indirect chain that we find too remote for liability.” Ibid. The Court concluded:
法院指出，设备供应商“没有披露的义务；并且他们的欺诈行为也没有传达给公众。”[53]因此，除非是在法院认为对责任联系过于苛求的间接因果链条追溯中，投资者无法证明对设备供应商的任何行为的依赖。”[54]法院总结道：
“[The equipment suppliers’] deceptive acts, which were not disclosed to the investing public, are too remote to satisfy the requirement of reliance. It was [the cable company], not [the equipment suppliers], that misled its auditor and filed fraudulent financial statements; nothing [the equipment suppliers] did made it necessary or inevitable for [the cable company] to record the transactions as it did.”
“设备供应商的欺诈行为并未向投资公众披露，其欺诈行为由于因果关系过于遥远因此不能满足依赖的要求。误导了其审计师并提交了欺诈性财务报表是有线公司，而非设备供应商；设备供应商所做的任何事情都不是有线公司记录这些交易所必要或不可避免的。”[55]
Insofar as the equipment suppliers’ conduct was at issue, the fraudulent “arrangement ... took place in the marketplace for goods and services, not in the investment sphere.”
就设备供应商的行为而言，“这种欺诈性‘安排’发生在商品和服务的市场中，而不是在投资领域。”[56]
It is difficult for me to see how Stoneridge “support[s]” the majority’s rule. No one in Stoneridge disputed the making of the relevant statements, the fraudulent contracts and the like. And no one in Stoneridge contended that the equipment suppliers were, in fact, the makers of the cable company's misstatements. Rather, Stoneridge was concerned with whether the equipment suppliers’ separate statements were sufficiently disclosed in the securities marketplace so as to be the basis for investor reliance. They were not. But this is a different inquiry than whether statements acknowledged to have been disclosed in the securities marketplace and ripe for reliance can be said to have been “ma[d]e” by one or another actor. How then does Stoneridge support the majority's new rule?
我很难看出Stoneridge案如何“支持”了多数法官的裁决。在Stoneridge案中，没有人质疑有关声明、欺诈合同等的“作出”。也没有人认为设备供应商实际上是有线公司虚假陈述的作出者。相反，Stoneridge案涉及的是设备供应商的单独陈述是否在证券市场中得到了充分披露，以成为投资者依赖的依据。这些陈述并没有的到充分披露。但这与已经被确认在证券市场中披露并可能被依赖的陈述是否为一个或另一个行为者“作出”的问题不同。那Stoneridge案怎么能够支持多数法官的新规则呢？
The majority adds that its rule is necessary to avoid “a theory of liability similar to—but broader in application than”— § 20(a)’s liability, for “ ‘[e]very person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable’ for violations of the securities laws.” But that is not so. This Court has explained that the possibility of an express remedy under the securities laws does not preclude a claim under § 10(b).
多数法官的意见补充说，其规定是为了避免“与第20(a)条规定的责任相似但适用范围更广”的责任理论。该理论对“直接或间接控制任何违反证券法者的人”施加了责任。但事实并非如此。法院已经释明了，证券法规定的明示救济的可能性并不排除根据第10(b)条提出的索赔。[57]
More importantly, a person who is liable under § 20(a) controls another “person” who is “liable” for a securities violation. We here examine whether a person is primarily liable whether they do, or they do not, control another person who is liable. That is to say, here, the liability of some “other person” is not at issue.
更重要的是，根据第20(a)条承担责任者控制着另一名对证券违规行为负有责任的人。[58]在本案中，我们要检验的是一个人是否应承担主要责任，而不管他们是否控制另一个对此负有责任的人。换句话说，本案不涉及“他人”的责任。
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And there is at least one significant category of cases that § 10(b) may address that derivative forms of liability, such as under § 20(a), cannot, namely, cases in which one actor exploits another as an innocent intermediary for its misstatements. Here, it may well be that the Fund's board of trustees knew nothing about the falsity of the prospectuses. And if so, § 20(a) would not apply.
至少有一类重要的案件是第10(b)条可以处理而衍生责任形式（即第20(a)条）无法处理的，即一个行为人利用另一个行为人作为无辜的中间人进行虚假陈述的案件。同时，基金董事会很可能对招股说明书的虚假性一无所知。[59]如果是这样，第20(a)条就不适用了。
The possibility of guilty management and innocent board is the 13th stroke of the new rule’s clock. What is to happen when guilty management writes a prospectus (for the board) containing materially false statements and fools both board and public into believing they are true? Apparently under the majority's rule, in such circumstances no one could be found to have “ma[d]e” a materially false statement—even though under the common law the managers would likely have been guilty or liable (in analogous circumstances) for doing so as principals (and not as aiders and abettors).
管理层应承担责任而董事会无需承担责任的可能性是对新规则的质疑。当应承担责任的管理层（为董事会）撰写包含重大虚假陈述的招股说明书并愚弄董事会和公众相信这些陈述是真实时，会发生什么？显然，根据多数法官的裁决，在这种情况下，没有人会被发现“作出”了重大虚假陈述——即使根据普通法，管理者可能会因为这样做而以主要违法者（而非帮助者和教唆者）有罪或承担责任。[60]
Indeed, under the majority's rule it seems unlikely that the SEC itself in such circumstances could exercise the authority Congress has granted it to pursue primary violators who “make” false statements or the authority that Congress has specifically provided to prosecute aiders and abettors to securities violations. That is because the managers, not having “ma[d]e” the statement, would not be liable as principals and there would be no other primary violator they might have tried to “aid” or “abet.”
实际上，根据多数法官的裁决，在这种情况下，SEC本身似乎不太可能行使国会赋予它的追究“作出”虚假陈述的主要违规者或追究证券违规的共谋者和教唆者的权力。[61]这是因为管理层并没有“作出”该陈述，因此他们将不会作为主要违规者承担责任，也不可能被作为“帮助者”或“教唆者”承担责任。[62]
If the majority believes, as its footnote hints, that § 20(b) could provide a basis for liability in this case, ante, at 2304, n. 10, then it should remand the case for possible amendment of the complaint. “There is a dearth of authority construing Section 20(b),” which has been thought largely “superfluous in 10b–5 cases.” Hence respondent, who reasonably thought that it referred to the proper securities law provision, is faultless for failing to mention § 20(b) as well.
如果多数法官认为，正如其意见的脚注所暗示的那样，第20(b)条可能为此案提供责任依据，那么它应该将案件发回，以便FDT可能修改诉状。有人认为，“在涉及第10-5号规则的案件中，对第20(b)条的解释几乎是多余的。”[63]因此，FDT有理由认为其提到了适当的证券法条款，其在诉状中没有提及第20(b)也是无可指责的。
In sum, I can find nothing in § 10(b) or in Rule 10b–5, its language, its history, or in precedent suggesting that Congress, in enacting the securities laws, intended a loophole of the kind that the majority’s rule may well create.
总的来说，我在第10(b)条或第10b-5号规则中，无论是在其措辞、历史，还是在先例方面都找不到任何迹象表明，多数法官的裁决可能会创造的那种漏洞是国会在制定证券法时已预料到且有意为之的。
Rejecting the majority’s rule, of course, does not decide the question before us. We must still determine whether, in light of the complaint's allegations, Janus Management could have “ma[d]e” the false statements in the prospectuses at issue. In my view, the answer to this question is “Yes.” The specific relationships alleged among Janus Management, the Janus Fund, and the prospectus statements warrant the conclusion that Janus Management did “make” those statements.
当然，拒绝接受多数法官的裁决不能解决我们面临的问题。我们仍然必须确定，根据诉状的指控，JIF是否可能“作出”了相关招股说明书中的虚假陈述。在我看来，这个问题的答案是“是”。JIF、Janus系列基金和招股说明书陈述之间所指控的具体关系支持了这一结论，即JIF确实“作出”了这些陈述。
In part, my conclusion reflects the fact that this Court and lower courts have made clear that at least sometimes corporate officials and others can be held liable under Rule 10b–5 for having “ma[d]e” a materially false statement even when that statement appears in a document (or is made by a third person) that the officials do not legally control. In Herman & MacLean, for example, this Court pointed out that “certain individuals who play a part in preparing the registration statement,” including corporate officers, lawyers, and accountants, may be primarily liable even where “they are not named as having prepared or certified” the registration statement. And as I have already pointed out, this Court wrote in Central Bank that a “lawyer, accountant, or bank, who ... makes a material misstatement (or omission) on which a purchaser or seller of securities relies may be liable as a primary violator under 10b–5, assuming all of the requirements for primary liability under Rule 10b–5 are met.”
在某种程度上，我的结论反映了这样一个事实，即法院和下级法院已经明确表示，至少有时公司官员和其他人可以根据第10b-5号规则因“作出”重大虚假陈述而承担责任，即使该陈述出现在官员无法合法控制（或由第三方制作）的文件中。例如，在Herman & MacLean一案中，法院指出，“在准备注册陈述中起作用的某些个人”，包括公司官员、律师和会计师，即使在“他们没有被指定准备或认证”注册陈述的情况下，也可能承担主要责任。[64]正如我已经指出的那样，（最高）法院在丹佛中央银行案中写道，“律师、会计师或银行……作出重大虚假陈述（或遗漏），证券的买方或卖方可能根据第10b-5号规则承担主要违规者的责任，假定第10b-5号规则中施加主要责任的所有要求已得到了满足。”[65]
Given the statements in our opinions, it is not surprising that lower courts have found primary liability for actors without “ultimate authority” over issued statements. One court, for example, concluded that an accountant could be primarily liable for having “ma[d]e” false statements, where he issued fraudulent opinion and certification letters reproduced in prospectuses, annual reports, and other corporate materials for which he was not ultimately responsible. In a later case postdating Stoneridge, that court reaffirmed that an outside consultant could be primarily liable for having “ma[d]e” false statements, where he drafted fraudulent quarterly and annual filing statements later reviewed and certified by the firm's auditor, officers, and counsel. And another court found that a corporation's chief financial officer could be held primarily liable as having “ma[d]e” misstatements that appeared in a form 10–K that she prepared but did not sign or file.
鉴于我们意见中的观点，下级法院对没有对发布陈述拥有“最终控制权”的行为者施加主要责任，这并不令人意外。例如，一家法院得出结论，一名审计师可能对“作出”虚假陈述承担主要责任，因为他在招股说明书、年度报告和其他公司资料中发布了欺诈性意见和证明信，而他本人对这些内容并不负有最终责任。[66]在Stoneridge案之后的一个案件中，法院重申，一名外部顾问可能对“作出”虚假陈述负主要责任，他起草了欺诈性的季度和年度申报报表，该报表后来由公司的审计师、高管和律师进行审查和认证。[67]另一家法院裁定，一家公司的首席财务官可能因在她准备但未签署或提交的10-K表格中出现“重大”虚假陈述而承担主要责任。[68]
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One can also easily find lower court cases explaining that corporate officials may be liable for having “ma[d]e” false statements where those officials use innocent persons as conduits through which the false statements reach the public (without necessarily attributing the false statements to the officials).
我们也可以很容易地找到下级法院的判例，解释公司官员可能要为“作出”虚假陈述而承担责任，如果这些官员利用无辜者作为渠道从而将虚假陈述传播给公众（且这些虚假陈述不一定将归咎于官员）。
My conclusion also reflects the particular circumstances that the complaint alleges. The complaint states that “Janus Management, as investment advisor to the funds, is responsible for the day-to-day management of its investment portfolio and other business affairs of the funds. Janus Management furnishes advice and recommendations concerning the funds' investments, as well as administrative, compliance and accounting services for the funds.” Each of the Fund's 17 officers was a vice president of Janus Management. The Fund has “no assets separate and apart from those they hold for shareholders.” Janus Management disseminated the fund prospectuses through its parent company's Web site. Complaint ¶ 38, App. to Pet. for Cert. 72a. Janus Management employees drafted and reviewed the Fund prospectuses, including language about “market timing.” And Janus Management may well have kept the trustees in the dark about the true “market timing” facts.
我的结论还反映了诉状所指称的具体情况。诉状称，“作为基金的投资顾问，JCM负责对其投资组合和基金的其他业务事务进行日常管理。JCM为基金的投资提供建议和推荐，同时为基金提供行政、合规和会计服务。”基金的17名高管中，每一位都是JCM的副总裁。该基金“除了为股东所有的资产外，自身没有其他资产”。[69]JCM通过其母公司JCG的网站传播基金的招股说明书。JCM的员工起草并审查了基金的招股说明书，包括其中有关“市场择时交易”的用语。[70]而且JCM可能对董事会隐瞒了真实的“市场择时交易”相关的事实。[71]
Given these circumstances, as long as some managers, sometimes, can be held to have “ma[d]e” a materially false statement, Janus Management can be held to have done so on the facts alleged here. The relationship between Janus Management and the Fund could hardly have been closer. Janus Management's involvement in preparing and writing the relevant statements could hardly have been greater. And there is a serious suggestion that the board itself knew little or nothing about the falsity of what was said. Unless we adopt a formal rule (as the majority here has done) that would arbitrarily exclude from the scope of the word “make” those who manage a firm—even when those managers perpetrate a fraud through an unknowing intermediary—the management company at issue here falls within that scope. We should hold the allegations in the complaint in this respect legally sufficient.
鉴于这些情况，只要某些经理有时可以被认为“作出”了重大虚假陈述，JCM就可以根据此处指控的事实被认定为“作出”了重大虚假陈述。JCM与该基金之间的关系非常紧密，并且其在准备和撰写相关报表方面的参与程度也非常之高。存在一个严重的迹象表明，JIF董事会本身对所称内容的虚假性知之甚少乃至毫不知情。除非我们采用一种正式的规则（正如本案多数意见所做的那样)，武断地将那些管理公司的人排除在“作为”这个词的范围之外——即使这些管理人员通过不知情的中间人进行了欺诈行为——否则本案的JCM应属于这个范围。因此，我们应该认为FDT的诉状中的指控在这方面是充分的。
With respect, I dissent.
恕我直言，我不同意本案的多数意见。
脚注
[1] See 54 Stat. 806, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a–10(a); see also § 80a–2(a)(19) (2006 ed. and Supp. IV) (defining “interested person”).
[2] Market timing is a trading strategy that exploits time delay in mutual funds' daily valuation system. The price for buying or selling shares of a mutual fund is ordinarily determined by the next net asset value (NAV) calculation after the order is placed. The NAV calculation usually happens once a day, at the close of the major U.S. markets. Because of certain time delays, however, the values used in these calculations do not always accurately reflect the true value of the underlying assets. For example, a fund may value its foreign securities based on the price at the close of the foreign market, which may have occurred several hours before the calculation. But events might have taken place after the close of the foreign market that could be expected to affect their price. If the event were expected to increase the price of the foreign securities, a market-timing investor could buy shares of a mutual fund at the artificially low NAV and sell the next day when the NAV corrects itself upward. See Disclosure Regarding Market Timing and Selective Disclosure of Portfolio Holdings, 68 Fed.Reg. 70402 (proposed Dec. 17, 2003).
市场择时是一种利用共同基金每日估值系统中的时间延迟的交易策略。买卖共同基金股票的价格通常由下单后的下一个资产净值（NAV）计算决定。资产净值的计算通常每天在美国主要股市收盘时进行一次。然而，由于某些时间延迟，这些计算中使用的值并不总是准确地反映基础资产的真实价值。例如，一只基金可能根据国外市场收盘时的价格对其外国证券进行估值，该估值行为可能发生在计算前几个小时。但外国市场收盘后可能发生的事件很可能会对证券的价格造成影响。如果预计这一事件会提高外国证券的价格，市场择时投资者可以在人为压低资产净值的情况下买入共同基金的股票，并在资产净值自我修正后的第二天卖出。参见《关于市场时机和选择性披露投资组合持股情况的信息披露》，（发布于2003年12月17日）。
[3] See §§ 77b(a)(10), 77e(b)(2), 80a–8(b), 80a–2(a)(31), 80a–29(a)–(b) (2006 ed.).
[4] In 2004, JCG and JCM settled these allegations and agreed to reduce their fees by $125 million and pay $50 million in civil penalties and $50 million in disgorgement to the mutual fund investors.
2004年，JCG和JCM就这些指控达成和解协议，同意对共同基金投资者们减免1.25亿美元的费用，支付5,000万美元的民事罚款，并向共同基金投资者返还5,000万美元的不当得利。
[5] See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 891, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
[6] The elements of a private action under Rule 10b–5 are “(1) a material misrepresentation or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation.” Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific–Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157, 128 S.Ct. 761, 169 L.Ed.2d 627 (2008).
根据第10b-5号规则，私人诉讼的要素是“（1）被告进行了重大失实陈述或遗漏陈述行为；（2）被告的行为是故意为之的；（3）虚假陈述或遗漏陈述与证券买卖之间存在关联；（4）投资人依赖虚假陈述或者遗漏陈述；（5）投资者造成了经济损失；（6）投资者的损失原因是虚假陈述或遗漏陈述。”Stoneridge案，552 U.S. 148, 157, 128 S.Ct. 761, 169 L.Ed.2d 627 (2008)。
[7] In re Mutual Funds Inv. Litigation, 487 F.Supp.2d 618, 620 (D.Md.2007).
[8] In re Mutual Funds Inv. Litigation, 566 F.3d 111, 121 (2009).
[9] Id., at 127.
[10] Id., at 128, 129–130.
[11] 561 U.S. 1024, 130 S.Ct. 3499, 177 L.Ed.2d 1088 (2010).
[12] 17 CFR §240.10b-5(b).
[13] Rule 10b–5 makes it “unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange, ... [t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading ... .”
第10b–5号规则规定，“任何人，直接或间接地，通过使用任何州际商业方法或工具，或使用邮政，或使用任何全国性证券交易所的任何设施，……作出关于重大事实的虚假陈述，或遗漏在陈述作出之时的情况下为保证陈述不致产生误导的重要事实……均属非法行为。”
[14] Although First Derivative argued below that JCG violated Rule 10b–5 by making the statements in the prospectuses, it now seeks to hold JCG liable solely as a control person of JCM under § 20(a). The only question we must answer, therefore, is whether JCM made the misstatements. Whether First Derivative has stated a claim against JCG as a control person depends on whether it has stated a claim against JCM.
尽管FDT在下文中也辩称，JCG在招股说明书中作出了陈述从而违反了第10b-5号规则，但FDT现在仅寻求根据第20(a)条要求JCG作为JCM的控制人承担责任。因此，唯一需要最高法院回答的问题是，JCM是否作出了虚假陈述。FDT是否能对作为JCM控制人的JCG提出索赔，取决于其是否能够对JCM提出索赔。
[15] 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
[16] Superintendent of Ins. of N.Y. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13, n. 9, 92 S.Ct. 165, 30 L.Ed.2d 128 (1971).
[17] Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific–Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 165, 128 S.Ct. 761, 169 L.Ed.2d 627 (2008).
[18] Id., at 167, 128 S.Ct. 761.
[19] Oxford English Dictionary 66 (def.59) (1933) (hereinafter OED); accord, Webster’s New International Dictionary 1485 (def.43) (2d ed. 1934) (“Make followed by a noun with the indefinite article is often nearly equivalent to the verb intransitive corresponding to that noun”).
《牛津英语词典》第6卷，第66页（1933年）（以下简称OED）；参见《韦伯斯特新国际词典》，第1485页（第2版，1934年）（“‘作出’后接带不定冠词的名词通常几乎等同于对应该名词的不及物动词”）。
[20] See 6 OED 66 (def.59).
参见《牛津英语词典》第6卷，第66页。
[21] Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U.S. 164, 114 S.Ct. 1439, 128 L.Ed.2d 119 (1994).
[22] See id., at 180, 114 S.Ct. 1439.
[23] See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e).
[24] The dissent correctly notes that Central Bank  involved secondary, not primary, liability. Post, at 2307 (opinion of BREYER, J.). But for Central Bank to have any meaning, there must be some distinction between those who are primarily liable (and thus may be pursued in private suits) and those who are secondarily liable (and thus may not be pursued in private suits).
反对意见正确地指出，丹佛中央银行案涉及的是次要责任，而不是主要责任。Post, at 2307 (opinion of BREYER, J.). 但要使丹佛中央银行案具有任何意义，就必须在主要责任人（因其是主要责任人所以可能在私人诉讼中被追究责任）和次要责任人（因其是次要责任人所以可能在私人诉讼中不被追究责任）之间有所区别。
We draw a clean line between the two—the maker is the person or entity with ultimate authority over a statement and others are not. In contrast, the dissent's only limit on primary liability is not much of a limit at all. It would allow for primary liability whenever “[t]he specific relationships alleged ... warrant [that] conclusion”—whatever that may mean. Post, at 2311.
我们在这两者之间划了一条清晰的界限——作出者是对言论拥有最终控制权的人或实体，而其他人则不是。相比之下，反对意见对主要责任的唯一限制根本算不上什么限制。只要所指控的具体关系……使得[此种]结论成立，不管这意味着什么，任何情况下都能追究主要责任。Post, at 2311.
[25] 552 U.S., at 152–153, 128 S.Ct. 761.
[26] Id., at 166–167, 128 S.Ct. 761.
[27] Id., at 161, 128 S.Ct. 761.
[28] We agree that “no one in Stoneridge contended that the equipment suppliers were, in fact, the makers of the cable company’s misstatements.” Post, at 2309. If Stoneridge had addressed whether the equipment suppliers were “makers,” today’s decision would be unnecessary. The point is that Stoneridge’s analysis suggests that they were not.
我们同意“在Stoneridge案中，无人主张设备供应商实际上是有线电视公司的虚假陈述的作出者。” Post, at 2309. 如果Stoneridge案曾就设备供应商是否是虚假陈述的“作出者”这一问题进行了讨论，今日之决定将变得毫无必要。但关键是Stoneridge案的分析表明他们未就该问题进行过讨论。
[29] Id., at 167, 128 S.Ct. 761.
[30] Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 14–15 (citing Webster’s New International Dictionary 1485 (2d ed.1958) (defining “make” as “[t]o cause to exist, appear, or occur”)).
美国政府作为法庭之友提交的法庭文件，第14-15页，引用《韦氏新国际词典》第1485页（第二版，1958年）中对“作出（make）”一词的定义，即“使存在，出现或发生”。
[31] Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 13.
美国政府作为法庭之友提交的法庭文件，第13页。
[32] Because we do not find the meaning of “make” in Rule 10b–5 to be ambiguous, we need not consider the Government's assertion that we should defer to the SEC's interpretation of the word elsewhere. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 13 (citing Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae in Pacific Inv. Mgmt. Co. LLC v. Mayer Brown LLP, No. 09–1619(CA2), p. 7); see Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 588, 120 S.Ct. 1655, 146 L.Ed.2d 621 (2000). We note, however, that we have previously expressed skepticism over the degree to which the SEC should receive deference regarding the private right of action. See Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 41, n. 27, 97 S.Ct. 926, 51 L.Ed.2d 124 (1977) (noting that the SEC's presumed expertise “is of limited value” when analyzing “whether a cause of action should be implied by judicial interpretation in favor of a particular class of litigants”). This also is not the first time this Court has disagreed with the SEC's broad view of § 10(b) or Rule 10b-5. See, e.g., Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U.S. 164, 188–191, 114 S.Ct. 1439, 128 L.Ed.2d 119 (1994); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 666, n. 27, 103 S.Ct. 3255, 77 L.Ed.2d 911 (1983); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 207, 96 S.Ct. 1375, 47 L.Ed.2d 668 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 746, n. 10, 95 S.Ct. 1917, 44 L.Ed.2d 539 (1975).
由于我们认为第10b-5号规则中“作出”一词的含义并不模糊，因此我们无需考虑政府的主张，即我们应该遵循SEC在其他地方对该词的解释。美国政府作为法庭之友提交的法庭文件，第13页（引用SEC作为法庭之友在Pacific Inv. Mgmt. Co. LLC v. Mayer Brown LLP中提交的法律文件），参见Christensen v. Harris County案。然而，值得注意的是，我们此前曾对SEC在私人诉权方面应该获得多大程度的推定权表示怀疑，参见Pacific Inv. Mgmt. Co. LLC v. Mayer Brown LLP案（指出在分析“是否应通过司法解释得出隐含的有利于特定诉讼群体的隐含私人诉权时”，假定的SEC的专业知识“价值有限”）。这也不是本院第一次在第10(b)条或第10b-5号规则的广泛观点上与SEC意见不一致。参见Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N. A., 511 U.S. 164, 188–191, 114 S.Ct. 1439, 128 L.Ed.2d 119 (1994); Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 666, n. 27, 103 S.Ct. 3255, 77 L.Ed.2d 911 (1983); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 207, 96 S.Ct. 1375, 47 L.Ed.2d 668 (1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 746, n. 10, 95 S.Ct. 1917, 44 L.Ed.2d 539 (1975).
[33] 552 U.S., at 161, 128 S.Ct. 761.
[34] See Jones v. Harris Associates L. P., 559 U.S. 335, 338, 130 S.Ct. 1418, 1422–1423, 176 L.Ed.2d 265 (2010).
参见Jones v. Harris Associates L. P., 559 U.S. 335, 338, 130 S.Ct. 1418, 1422–1423, 176 L.Ed.2d 265 (2010)。
[35] 15 U.S.C. § 80a–10 (2006 ed.).
[36] Nor does First Derivative contend that any statements made by JCM to Janus Investment Fund were “public statements” for the purposes of Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 227–228, 108 S.Ct. 978, 99 L.Ed.2d 194 (1988). We do not address whether and in what circumstances statements would qualify as “public.” Cf. post, at 2311 – 2312 (citing cases involving liability for statements made to analysts); In re Aetna, Inc. Securities Litigation, 617 F.3d 272, 275–277 (C.A.3 2010) (involving allegations that defendants “publicly touted” falsities on analyst conference calls).
FDT也没有主张JCM向JIF发表的任何陈述符合Basic Inc. v. Levinson案中关于“公开陈述”的要求，参见Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 227–228, 108 S.Ct. 978, 99 L.Ed.2d 194 (1988)。我们不讨论陈述是否以及在何种情况下可被视为“公开”。参见 post, at 2311 - 2312 (cf. post, at 2311 - 2312）（引用了涉及对分析师的陈述承担责任的案例）；In re Aetna, Inc. Securities Litigation, 617 F.3d 272, 275–277 (C.A.3 2010)（涉及被告在分析师电话会议上“公开兜售”的虚假陈述的指控）。
[37] § 78t(a) (2006 ed., Supp. IV).
[38] We do not address whether Congress created liability for entities that act through innocent intermediaries in 15 U.S.C. § 78t(b). See Tr. of Oral Arg. 6, 61.
我们未讨论国会是否在《美国法典》第78t(b)条中对通过无辜中介行事的实体设定了责任。15 U.S.C. § 78t(b)。参见Tr. of Oral Arg.，第61页。
[39] §§ 77e(b)(2), 80a–8(b), 80a–29(a)–(b); see also 17 CFR § 230.497 (imposing requirements on “investment companies”).§§ 77e(b)(2), 80a–8(b), 80a–29(a)–(b); 另参见17 CFR § 230. 497（对“投资公司”施加要求）。
[40] See JIF Group1 Standalone Prospectuses (Feb. 25, 2002), online at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/ 277751 / 000027775102000049 / 0000277751–02–000049.txt (as visited June 10, 2011, and available in Clerk of Court’s case file) (recording the “Filer” of the Janus Mercury Fund prospectus as “Janus Investment Fund”).
参见JIF第一组独立招股说明书（2002年2月25日），网址为http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/277751/000027775102000049/0000277751-02-000049.txt（于2011年6月10日访问，并在法院案卷中提供）（记录Janus Mercury Fund招股说明书的“提交者”为JIF）。
[41] First Derivative suggests that “indirectly” in Rule 10b–5 may broaden the meaning of “make.” We disagree. The phrase “directly or indirectly” is set off by itself in Rule 10b–5 and modifies not just “to make,” but also “to employ” and “to engage.” We think the phrase merely clarifies that as long as a statement is made, it does not matter whether the statement was communicated directly or indirectly to the recipient. A different understanding of “indirectly” would, like a broad definition of “make,” threaten to erase the line between primary violators and aiders and abettors established by Central Bank.
FDT暗示在第10b–5号规则中，“间接”一词可能扩大了“作出”的含义。我们不同意此观点。短语“直接或间接”在第10b–5号规则中独立设置，其修饰的词语不仅是“作出”，还包括“使用”和“从事”。我们认为，这一短语只是澄清，只要作出了陈述，陈述以直接还是间接传达给接收者的方式对责任认定无关紧要。对“间接”一词的不同理解，就像对“作出”一词的广义定义一样，可能会模糊丹佛中央银行案中对主要违法者与帮助者和教唆者之间的界限。
In this case, we need not define precisely what it means to communicate a “made” statement indirectly because none of the statements in the prospectuses were attributed, explicitly or implicitly, to JCM. Without attribution, there is no indication that Janus Investment Fund was quoting or otherwise repeating a statement originally “made” by JCM. Cf. Anixter v. Home–Stake Production Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1220, and n. 4 (C.A.10 1996) (quoting a signed “ ‘Auditor's Report’ ” included in a prospectus); Basic, supra, at 227, n. 4, 108 S.Ct. 978 (quoting a news item reporting a statement by Basic's president). More may be required to find that a person or entity made a statement indirectly, but attribution is necessary.
在这种情况下，我们不需要精确定义“间接”传达“作出”的陈述的确切含义，因为招股说明书中的任何陈述都没有明示或暗示归因于JCM。没有归因，就没有迹象表明JIF是在引用或以其他方式重复最初由JCM“作出”的陈述。参见Anixter v. Home–Stake Production Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1220, and n. 4 (C.A.10 1996)（引用包含在招股说明书中的签署的“审计师报告”）；Basic, supra, at 227, n. 4, 108 S.Ct. 978（引用新闻报道中Basic公司总裁的陈述）。要发现一个人或实体间接地作出了陈述，可能需要更多的证据，但归因总是必要的。
[42] That JCM provided access to Janus Investment Fund's prospectuses on its Web site is also not a basis for liability. Merely hosting a document on a Web site does not indicate that the hosting entity adopts the document as its own statement or exercises control over its content. Cf. United States v. Ware, 577 F.3d 442, 448 (C.A.2 2009) (involving the issuance of false press releases through innocent companies). In doing so, we do not think JCM made any of the statements in Janus Investment Fund's prospectuses for purposes of Rule 10b–5 liability, just as we do not think that the SEC “makes” the statements in the many prospectuses available on its Web site.
JCM在其网站上提供JIF招股说明书的访问权也不构成责任的依据。仅仅在网站上承载该文件并不意味着承载实体将该文件视为自己的陈述或对其内容行使控制权。参见United States v. Ware, 577 F.3d 442, 448 (C.A.2 2009)（涉及通过无辜公司发布虚假新闻稿）。鉴于此，我们认为JCM并未“作出”第10b–5号规则规范的JIF招股说明书中的任何陈述，正如我们不认为SEC在其网站上提供许多招股说明书的行为可以被视为“作出”陈述的行为一样。
[43] 17 CFR § 240.10b–5(b) (2010) (emphasis added). See also 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006 ed., Supp. IV) (§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
[44] Cf. Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific–Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157, 128 S.Ct. 761, 169 L.Ed.2d 627 (2008) (identifying the elements of “a typical § 10(b) private action”).
对比Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v. Scientific–Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157, 128 S.Ct. 761, 169 L.Ed.2d 627 (2008) (确定了第10b-5规则下典型的私人诉讼的要素) 。
[45] 511 U.S., at 167, 114 S.Ct. 1439 (emphasis added).
[46] Id., at 176, 114 S.Ct. 1439 (emphasis added).
[47] Id., at 181, 114 S.Ct. 1439 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876(b) (1977); emphasis added).
[48] 511 U.S., at 168, 114 S.Ct. 1439 (emphasis added).
[49] 511 U.S., at 191, 114 S.Ct. 1439 (some emphasis added).
[50] Stoneridge, 552 U.S., at 155, 128 S.Ct. 761.
[51] Id., at 158–159, 128 S.Ct. 761.
[52] Ibid. (emphasis added).
[53] Id., at 159, 128 S.Ct. 761.
[54] Id.
[55] Id., at 161, 128 S.Ct. 761.
[56] Id., at 166, 128 S.Ct. 761.
[57] Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 388, 103 S.Ct. 683, 74 L.Ed.2d 548 (1983).
[58] Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 253, n. 2, 130 S.Ct. 2869, 2876, n. 2, 177 L.Ed.2d 535 (2010).
[59] See, e.g., In re Lammert, Release No. 348, 93 S.E.C. Docket 5676, 5700 (2008) (Janus Management was aware of market timing in the Janus Fund no later than 2002, but “[t]his knowledge was never shared with the Board”).
[60] See, e.g., 2 W. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 13.1(a) (2d ed.2003); 1 M. Hale, Pleas of the Crown 617 (1736); Perkins, Parties to Crime, 89 U. Pa. L.Rev. 581, 583 (1941) (one is guilty as a principal when one uses an innocent third party to commit a crime); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 533 (1976). Cf. United States v. Giles, 300 U.S. 41, 48–49, 57 S.Ct. 340, 81 L.Ed. 493 (1937).
[61] See § 104, 109 Stat. 757 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e)) (granting SEC authority to prosecute aiders and abettors).
[62] Id.; SEC v. DiBella, 587 F.3d 553, 566 (C.A.2 2009) (prosecution for aiding and abetting requires primary violation to which offender gave “substantial assistance” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
[63] 5B A. Jacobs, Disclosure and Remedies Under the Securities Law § 11–8, p. 11–72 (2011).
[64] 459 U.S., at 386, n. 22, 103 S.Ct. 683.
[65] 511 U.S., at 191, 114 S.Ct. 1439 (some emphasis added).
[66] Anixter v. Home–Stake Production Co., 77 F.3d 1215, 1225–1227 (C.A.10 1996).
[67] SEC v. Wolfson, 539 F.3d 1249, 1261 (C.A.10 2008).
[68] McConville v. SEC, 465 F.3d 780, 787 (C.A.7 2006).
[69] In re Mutual Funds Inv. Litigation, 384 F.Supp.2d 845, 853, n. 3 (Md.2005).
[70] Complaint ¶ 31, id., at 69a; In re Mutual Funds Inv. Litigation, 590 F.Supp.2d 741, 747 (Md.2008).
[71] Complaint ¶ 51, App. to Pet. for Cert. 80a; In re Lammert, 93 S.E.C. Docket, at 5700.
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