法律翻译 |《法与经济学杂志》第60卷第2期

译者 | 孙沛南开大学

一审 | 郝林桦西南政法大学

二审 | 骆佩贤布里斯托大学

编辑 | 于佳中国社会科学院大学

仲飞宇西安外国语大学

责编 | 扎恩哈尔·阿黑哈提新疆农业大学

《法与经济学杂志》第60卷第2期

The Journal of Law and Economics

Volume 60, Number 2 | 2017

Judges, Juveniles, and In-Group Bias

法官、青少年和内群体偏好

Briggs Depew, Ozkan Eren, and

Naci Mocan

We investigate the existence of in-group bias (preferential treatment of one’s own group) in court decisions. Using the universe of juvenile-court cases in a US state between 1996 and 2012 and exploiting random assignment of juvenile defendants to judges, we find evidence for negative racial in-group bias in judicial decisions. All else being equal, black (white) juveniles who are randomly assigned to black (white) judges are more likely to be placed in custody, as opposed to being placed on probation, and they receive longer sentences. Although observed in experimental settings, this is the first empirical evidence of negative in-group bias based on a randomization design outside the lab. We provide explanations for this finding. First, judges may have an in-group bias regarding the well-being of memers of their own race. Second, being a member of an in-group may provide useful inside information about the future behavior of another member of the group. Third, judges could be overcorrecting.

本文研究了法院判决是否存在内群体偏好（即对自己群体的偏袒）。以1996年至2012年间美国路易斯安那州少年法庭的判决为研究样本，并基于案件随机分配制度，研究了少年法庭中种族内群体偏好程度。研究结果表明，司法判决中存在负相关的内群体偏好，即在其他条件相同的情况下，法官倾向对与其种族相同的少年犯判处更为严厉的刑罚。本文是首篇基于实验环境外的实证数据得到负相关的内群体偏好证据的研究。对这一发现作出解释如下：第一，法官可能对对被侵害法益有种族内群体偏好；第二，法官对同种族少年犯的未来行为具有内部信息优势；第三，法官对种族内群体偏好矫枉过正。

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Whistle-Blowers on the Board?

The Role of Independent Directors

in Cartel Prosecutions

董事会中的吹哨人？

独立董事在卡特尔诉讼中的作用

Murillo Campello, Daniel Ferrés, and

Gaizka Ormazabal

Market reactions to news of cartel prosecutions are muted when indicted firms have a high proportion of independent directors on their boards. Independent directors serving on cartel-indicted firms are penalized by losing board seats and vote support at other firms where they serve. Notably, firms with more independent directors are more likely to cooperate with prosecutors through leniency programs. They are also more likely to dismiss chief executive officers after cartel indictments. Our study shows that cartel prosecution imposes significant, market-based personal costs on independent directors and that they take actions to mitigate those costs. In the last part of our analysis, we provide evidence of the proactive role played by independent directors in cooperating with antitrust authorities and in punishing managers involved in price-fixing schemes.

本文研究了独立董事在卡特尔诉讼中的作用。研究表明，独立董事比例较高的公司被卡特尔起诉时的市场反应相对平淡，即价值损失相对较小。在公司被卡特尔起诉后，独立董事将会受到制裁，丧失在其他公司的董事席位与投票支持。值得注意的是，在卡特尔起诉期间，独立董事比例较高的公司更有可能通过宽大处理计划与检察官合作，也更有可能在卡特尔诉讼后解雇首席执行官。这些研究结果表明，卡特尔诉讼给独立董事带来了基于市场的巨大个人成本，因而他们会采取措施降低这些成本。研究表明，独立董事在与反垄断机构合作以及惩罚参与卡特尔的公司管理人员方面发挥了积极作用。

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The Deterrent Effect of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Enforcement Intensity on Illegal Insider Trading:

Evidence from Run-up

before News Events

证券交易委员会执法力度

对非法内幕交易的威慑效应：

来自新闻事件前涨停板的证据

Diane Del Guercio, Elizabeth R. Odders-White, and Mark J. Ready

We examine whether public enforcement of US insider-trading laws affects price discovery. Examining insider-trading civil cases filed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) from 2003 to 2011, we find that the price impact on insider-trading days is much smaller than the effect documented for the 1980s, consistent with increased fear of prosecution. Moreover, we find that preannouncement anticipatory run-up in comprehensive samples of takeover bids and earnings announcements is negatively related to resource-based measures of public enforcement intensity, which suggests that aggressive SEC enforcement deters illegal activity. In addition, we find that quoted bid-ask spreads are negatively related to the SEC’s enforcement intensity, which suggests that greater enforcement improves liquidity. Moreover, the negative and significant relation between run-up and the SEC’s enforcement intensity persists after controlling for quoted spreads.

本文研究了美国内幕交易法的公开执行是否会影响价格发现。以2003年至2011年间美国证券交易委员会提交的内幕交易民事案件为研究样本，得出研究结果如下: 总体而言，内幕交易对价格的影响远小于20世纪80年代，这与诉讼恐惧的增长趋势相符。其一，在收购要约和盈利公告的综合样本中，公告前阶段价格的预期上涨与基于资源的公共执法力度呈负相关，这表明证券交易委员会的积极执法能遏制非法内幕交易。其二，报价买卖价差与证监会的执法力度呈负相关，这表明加大执法力度可以提高流动性。其三，在控制了报价价差之后，涨幅与证券交易委员会执法力度之间的显著负相关关系仍然显著。

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Can Restricting Property Use

Be Value Enhancing?

Evidence from Short-Term

Rental Regulation

房产使用监管能否提升房产价值？

来自私宅短租监管的证据

Jin-Hyuk Kim, Tin Cheuk Leung, and

Liad Wagman

Short-term rentals, private residences where tourists stay, have become ubiquitous over the past decade. Many communities are divided over the trade-offs between a property owner’s rights and nuisance problems created by transient populations in residential neighborhoods. This paper empirically examines the effects of regulation restricting short-term rentals on property sales prices, using a unique data set and policy experiment from Anna Maria Island, Florida. We show that nonresident ownership of properties on the island decreased following the rental regulation and that the regulation decreased property values except in areas where the density of non-resident-owned properties in a neighborhood was quite high.

在过去十年间，私宅短租（将私人住宅短期出租给旅行游客）已变得无处不在。许多社区在权衡业主权利与住宅区流动人口造成的扰民问题之间存在分歧。本文借鉴了在佛罗里达州安娜玛丽亚岛进行的一项独特的政策实验与其数据，进行了限制私宅短租的监管政策对房产销售价格影响的实证研究。研究表明，在实施私宅短租监管之后，岛上非居民住房所有权有所减少。除了居民住房比例非常高的社区外，私宅短租监管会降低房产的价格。

（图片来源于网络）

The Economics of the Right

to Be Forgotten

被遗忘权的经济学研究

Byung-Cheol Kim and Jin Yeub Kim

Scholars and practitioners debate whether to expand the scope of the right to be forgotten—the right to have certain links removed from search results—to encompass global search results. The debate centers on the assumption that the expansion will increase the incidence of link removal, which reinforces privacy while hampering free speech. We develop a game-theoretic model to show that the expansion of the right to be forgotten can reduce the incidence of link removal. We also show that the expansion does not necessarily enhance the welfare of individuals who request removal and that it can either improve or reduce societal welfare. Our analysis has implications for understanding the impact of the global expansion of the right to be forgotten on privacy and free speech.

关于是否应该将被遗忘权（即从搜索结果中删除某些链接的权利）的范围扩大至全球范围的检索结果，在学术界与实务界颇具争议。争论焦点在于这样一种假设，即扩大被遗忘权范围将增加链接删除率，这在加强隐私保护的同时妨碍了言论自由。本文建立了一个博弈论模型，证明扩大被遗忘权范围可以减少链接删除率。研究表明，被遗忘权范围的扩张未必会增加主张权利者的福祉，而且而是既可能增加社会福祉，也可能降低社会福祉。本文的分析有助于理解被遗忘权的全球扩张对隐私保护与言论自由的影响。

（图片来源于网络）

Less Cash, Less Crime:

Evidence from the Electronic Benefit Transfer Program

减少现金，减少犯罪：

来自电子福利转移计划的证据

Richard Wright, Erdal Tekin,

Volkan Topalli, Chandler McClellan,

Timothy Dickinson, and Richard Rosenfeld

It has been long recognized that cash plays a critical role in fueling street crime because of its liquidity and transactional anonymity. In this paper, we investigate whether the reduction in the circulation of cash on the streets associated with electronic benefit transfer (EBT) program implementation had an effect on crime. To address this question, we exploit the variation in the timing of EBT implementation across Missouri counties and counties in the states bordering Missouri. According to our results, the EBT program had a negative and significant effect on the overall crime rate and specifically for burglary, assault, and larceny. The point estimates indicate that the overall crime rate decreased by 9.2 percent in response to the EBT program. Interestingly, the significant drop in crime in the United States over several decades coincided with a period of steady decline in the proportion of financial transactions involving cash.

由于流动性和交易匿名性，现金是助长街头犯罪的重要因素。本文研究了随着电子福利转移计划的实施，街头现金流通的减少是否会对犯罪产生影响。本文以实施电子福利转移计划存在时间差异的密苏里州各县以及与密苏里州接壤的各州为研究样本。研究结果表明，电子福利转移计划显著降低了总体犯罪率，其中以入室盗窃、袭击和盗窃犯罪率为尤。点估计表明，电子福利转移计划实施后的几十年来，美国总体犯罪率下降了9.2%，与此同时，涉及现金的金融交易比例也在稳步下降。

（图片来源于网络）

原文链接：

https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/toc/jle/2017/60/2

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经济学

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杂志

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