译者 |舒方正 华南师范大学LL.B.
一审 |富   扬 北京师范大学法律硕士
二审 |李梓源 英国布里斯托大学LL.M.
编辑 |仲飞宇 西安外国语大学本科
         于   杰 上海对外经贸大学本科
责编 |扎恩哈尔·阿黑哈提 新疆农业大学本科
Columbia Business Law Review,
Volume 2020, Number 3
《哥大商法评论》第2020年第3期
1
Abstract
Long-Term Bias and Director Primacy
长期偏见和董事优先地位
Published Jan 23, 2021
DOI: https://doi.org/10.52214/cblr.v2020i3.7807
作者：Stephen M. Bainbridge
In an important recent contribution to the short-termism debate, Professors Michal Barzuza and Eric Talley challenge what they call an “emerging consensus in certain legal, business, and scholarly communities …that corporate managers are pressured unduly into chasing short-term gains at the expense of superior long-term prospects.” See Michal Barzuza & Eric Talley, Long-Term Bias, 2020 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 104. Instead, Barzuza and Talley contend that “corporate managers often fall prey to long-term bias—excessive optimism about their own long-term projects.” 
米卡尔·巴祖扎（Michal Barzuza）和埃里克·塔利（Eric Talley）教授近期对短期主义的辩论做出重要贡献，他们质疑了被称之为“在特定法律、商业和学术界中正在形成的共识”。这种共识是：公司管理者受到过大压力，不得不追求短期利益而牺牲长远的美好前景。（参见米卡尔·巴祖扎和埃里克·塔利，《长期偏见》，2020年哥大商法评论104页）与之相反的是，Barzuza和Talley认为“公司管理者常常深陷于长期偏见的困扰，对自己长期项目过度乐观。”
This article is an invited comment on Barzuza and Talley’s article. Subject to various quibbles raised herein, I broadly concur with Barzuza and Talley’s argument that corporate directors and officers can be biased towards long-term projects and, accordingly, may reject short-term projects offering higher returns.
本文是对Barzuza和Talley文章的特邀评论。除了本文提出的各种异议外，我大致同意他们二人的论点，即公司董事和高级管理人员可能偏向于长期项目，因此可能拒绝提供更高回报的短期项目。
（图片来源于网络）
But what law reforms follow logically from their conclusion, if any? With respect to judicial review, I want to differ with Barzuza and Talley on three points. First, I believe Barzuza and Talley overstate the risk of judicial intervention. Second, they fail adequately to distinguish between directors and managers, even though that distinction is central to the application of Delaware law. Third, I believe their analysis implies that judges should retain the deference to director decisionmaking inherent in doctrines such as the business judgment rule and intermediate review.
但是，依照他们结论的逻辑，法律要做出哪些改革呢？关于司法审查，我与Barzuza和Talley在三个方面存在分歧。首先，我认为他们夸大了司法干预的风险。其次，他们未能适当地区分董事和管理人员，而这种区分对于适用特拉华州法律至关重要。第三，我认为他们的分析意味着法官应保留商业判断规则和中间审查等理论中固有的对董事决策的顺从。
With respect to encouraging shareholder activism, I argue that the responsibility for policing managerial hyperopia (or myopia, for that matter) should be assigned to the board of directors, not the shareholders. Heterogenous shareholders lack the proper incentives and knowledge to properly police management.
关于鼓励股东积极性，我认为监督管理层过度远视（或过度短视）的责任应该分配给董事会，而不是股东。异质股东缺乏适当的动力和知识来正确监管管理层。
2
Abstract
Long-Term Bias, Incentives, and 
Agency Costs
长期偏见、激励机制和机构成本
Published Jan 23, 2021
DOI: https://doi.org/10.52214/cblr.v2020i3.7808
作者：Kobi Kastiel
The problem of managerial short-termism has long preoccupied policymakers, researchers, and practitioners. These groups have given much less attention, however, to the converse problem of managerial long-termism. Michal Barzuza and Eric Talley fill this gap in their pioneering article, Long-Term Bias. Relying on the behavioral finance and psychology literatures, the authors provide a novel and thought-provoking analysis of managerial long-term bias, which may be just as detrimental as the more widely condemned short-term bias. 
管理短期主义的问题长期以来一直困扰着政策制定者、研究人员和从业者。然而，这些群体对管理长期主义的问题给予的关注要少得多。米卡尔·巴祖扎（Michal Barzuza）和埃里克·塔利（Eric Talley）在他们的开创性文章《长期偏见》中填补了这一空白。作者依靠行为金融学和心理学文献，对管理长期偏见进行了新颖而发人深省的分析，认为这种偏见可能与更广受谴责的短期偏见一样有害。
This invited Comment to Barzuza and Talley’s article advances three claims. First, it argues that proper incentives— created by executive compensation, heightened risk of early termination, market responses and shareholder pressures— are likely to turn most managers more realistic and thus to mitigate their long-term biases.
这篇对 Barzuza 和 Talley 文章的特邀评论提出了三点主张。首先，文章认为高管薪酬、提前终止风险加剧、市场反应和股东压力等因素产生的适当激励可能会使大多数经理变得更加现实，从而减轻他们的长期偏见。
（图片来源于网络）
Second, it explains how, in reality, it could be almost impossible to distinguish between long-term bias and traditional agency theories of empire building and pet projects. Ultimately, both long-termist and self-interested managers systematically harm shareholders; both choose to ignore shareholder interests and waste free cash flow on inferior business investments. This also explains why the cure to both long-term bias and agency costs is similar: reducing the relative insulation of the board from shareholders’ disciplinary power.
其次，它解释了在现实中如何几乎不可能区分长期偏见与传统代理理论中的企业规模扩张和个人偏好计划。归根结底，长期主义者和自利型经理人都会系统性地损害股东利益：他们都会选择忽视股东利益，将自由现金流浪费在劣质的商业投资上。这也解释了为什么长期偏见和代理成本的救济方法是相似的：减少董事会与股东惩戒权的相对隔离。
Finally, this Comment expresses strong support for most of Barzuza and Talley’s normative conclusions, with one important exception: their acceptance of the use of dual-class stock. With a perpetual lock on control and a limited equity stake, corporate leaders will be immune to any “institutional brake” on all forms of long-termist overinvestment. If anything, the analysis of Barzuza and Talley provides an additional strong justification to oppose the use of perpetual dual-class stock.
最后，本文对Barzuza和Talley的大部分规范性结论表示强烈支持，但有一个重要例外：他们接受使用双重股权结构（本文不赞成）。由于控制权的永久锁定和有限的股权，公司领导者将不受任何 “制度性约束 ”的影响，从而避免各种形式的长期过度投资。事实上，Barzuza和Talley的分析为反对使用永久双重股权结构额外提供了有力的理由。
3
Abstract
Codetermination: A Poor Fit for 
U.S. Corporations
共同决策不适合美国公司
Published Jan 23, 2021
DOI: https://doi.org/10.52214/cblr.v2020i3.7809
作者：Jens Dammann
Horst Eidenmüller
The idea that a corporation’s employees should elect some of the corporation’s board members, a system known as codetermination, has moved to the forefront of U.S. corporate law policy. Elizabeth Warren’s Accountable Capitalism Act calls for employees of large firms to elect forty percent of all board members. Bernie Sanders’s Corporate Accountability and Democracy Plan goes even further and states that workers should elect forty-five percent of board members.
公司员工应选举公司董事会部分成员的观点，即所谓的共同决策制度，已成为美国公司法律政策的前沿。伊丽莎白-沃伦（Elizabeth Warren）的《负责任的资本主义法案》（Accountable Capitalism Act）呼吁大型企业的员工选举董事会40%的成员。伯尼-桑德斯（Bernie Sanders）的 “企业责任与民主计划”（Corporate Accountability and Democracy Plan）则更进一步，规定工人应选举 45% 的董事会成员。
（图片来源于网络）
Both Warren’s and Sanders’s plans are broadly similar to the German law on codetermination, which for many decades has allowed employees of large German corporations to elect up to half of all board members. It is therefore unsurprising that Senator Sanders points to Germany’s successful economic development as evidence that economic progress and mandatory codetermination can go hand in hand.
沃伦和桑德斯的计划与德国的共同决策法大体相似，几十年来，该法一直允许德国大型企业的员工选举最多一半的董事会成员。因此，参议员桑德斯将德国成功的经济发展作为经济进步与强制性共同决策可以并行不悖的证据，也就不足为奇了。
However, this Article argues that codetermination promises to be a poor fit for U.S. corporations. While Germany arguably reaps significant benefits from codetermination, legal, social, and institutional differences between Germany and the United States make it highly unlikely that the United States would be able to replicate those benefits. Furthermore, the costs of codetermination probably would be much higher in the United States than they are in Germany.
然而，本文认为共同决策制度并不适合美国公司。虽然德国可能从共同决策制度中获得了巨大利益，但德国与美国在法律、社会和制度上的差异使得美国极有可能无法复制这些利益。此外，共同决策的成本在美国可能比在德国高得多。
4
Abstract
Copyright and Joint Authorship as 
a Disruption of 
the Video Game Streaming Industry
版权和合作作者
对电子游戏直播产业的影响
Published Jan 23, 2021
DOI: https://doi.org/10.52214/cblr.v2020i3.7815
作者：John Holden
Mike Schuster
Video game streaming on sites like YouTube and Twitch is now a billion-dollar industry. Top streaming personalities make tens of millions of dollars annually, as viewership of video game play continues to expand. While video game companies’ control over intellectual property embodied in video games is largely accepted, streamers’ rights in their recorded gameplay have yet to be settled.
在YouTube和Twitch等网站上，视频游戏直播现在已成为一个价值十亿美元的产业。随着视频游戏直播的观众数量不断增加，顶级直播主播每年能赚取数千万美元。虽然视频游戏公司对视频游戏中知识产权的控制被广泛接受，但直播主播对自己录制下来的游戏录像的权利尚未明确。
Game companies likely maintain the right to stop unauthorized streaming of gameplay, but most do not exercise that right, as streaming represents free advertising. This raises the related question of what rights streamers have against unauthorized use of their gameplay. It also raises the question, unexplored in the literature, of what rights gameplayers maintain when competitors in their online games stream their matches.
游戏公司可能保留了阻止未经授权的游戏直播的权利，但大多数公司并没有行使这一权利，因为直播代表着免费广告。这引出了一个相关的问题：主播拥有何种权利来阻止未经其授权使用其游戏直播视频的行为？这同样也引发了一个在文献中尚未探讨的问题，即当在线游戏的竞争对手直播他们的比赛时，游戏玩家拥有哪些权利。
（图片来源于网络）
We find that copyright can provide protection to streamers over the audiovisual recordings of their play, subject to contractual limitations imposed by game companies. Our analysis likewise establishes that gamers whose play is streamed by another party may qualify as joint authors of the streamed recording. This co-authorship could result in multi- millionaire streamers owing an accounting to other players appearing in their streams. The Article then explores the potential business implications associated with these findings and discusses potential strategies to protect the interests of game companies and streamers.
我们发现，版权可以为直播者提供对其游戏音像录制的保护，但受到游戏公司合同条款的限制。我们的分析同样表明，参与其他玩家游戏直播中的游戏玩家有资格作为共同作者。这种合作作者的权利可能导致游戏直播大亨们对在其直播中出现的其他玩家承担责任。然后，本文探讨了与这些发现相关的潜在商业影响，并讨论了保护游戏公司和游戏直播者利益的潜在策略。
5
Abstract
An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of 
Legal Sports Betting 
On Consumer Credit Health
合法体育博彩对消费者信用健康影响的实证分析
Published Jan 23, 2021
DOI: https://doi.org/10.52214/cblr.v2020i3.7812
作者：Matthew Q. Clarida
The Supreme Court’s May 2018 decision in Murphy v. NCAA removed the federal prohibition against sports betting and invited states to regulate the practice for themselves. This has launched a national debate. Advocates in favor of legal sports betting champion increased tax revenues, business for struggling casinos and racetracks, and regulation of a practice that has flourished in the shadows. Detractors warn of the social ills commonly associated with gambling, including crime, addiction, and financial waste.
2018年5月，美国最高法院在墨菲诉美国全国大学生体育协会一案中的裁决废除了联邦对体育博彩的禁令，并鼓励各州自行对体育博彩进行监管。这一裁决引发了全国性的辩论。支持合法体育博彩的人士主张增加税收、为陷入困境的赌场和赛马场带来生意，并对在暗地里发展的行业进行监管。而反对者则警告称，赌博常常与社会问题相伴，包括犯罪、成瘾和财务浪费等。
（图片来源于网络）
This Note provides the first empirical analysis of the impact of legal sports betting on consumer credit health. Making use of the staggered sequencing of state legalization, I find that legal sports betting accounts for a small but statistically significant increase in mortgage delinquency rates. I submit that this finding justifies caution as policymakers explore legal sports betting opportunities.
本文是对合法体育博彩对消费者信用健康影响的首次实证分析。利用各州逐步实施合法化的顺序，本文发现合法体育博彩导致抵押贷款违约率出现小幅但统计上显著的增长。本文认为这一发现提醒政策制定者在探索合法体育博彩机会时需要谨慎。
6
Abstract
Walmart and Guns: A Case Study in Modern Corporate Governance
沃尔玛与枪支：现代公司治理案例研究
Published Jan 23, 2021
DOI: https://doi.org/10.52214/cblr.v2020i3.7813
作者：Clare Curran
In August 2019, the Business Roundtable issued a new Statement on the Purpose of a Corporation. The statement, signed by 181 CEOs, including Doug McMillon of Walmart, declared that corporations should seek to serve the interests of all stakeholders—a marked departure from the Roundtable’s prior embrace of shareholder primacy. This shift in position reinvigorated debate among business and legal scholars about the proper purpose of a corporation.
2019年8月，商业圆桌会议发布了一份新的《公司宗旨声明》。该声明由包括沃尔玛的道格-麦克米伦（Doug McMillon）在内的 181 位首席执行官签署，宣称公司应努力为所有利益相关者的利益服务——这与圆桌会议之前拥护股东至上的立场明显不同。这一立场的转变重新激发了商界和法律学者关于正确公司宗旨的争论。
（图片来源于网络）
Using Walmart as a case study, this Note argues that corporations are indeed adopting a more flexible and responsive conception of corporate purpose. This Note begins with a discussion of corporate governance theories, detailing four distinct visions of corporate purpose and control. It then examines Walmart’s decisionmaking process regarding ammunition and firearm sales in the wake of a tragic mass shooting at one of its stores. Finally, it concludes by reconciling Walmart’s conduct with the prevailing theories of corporate governance, ultimately finding team production theory— which calls for the balancing stakeholder interests—to be most applicable.
以沃尔玛为例，本文认为该公司事实上正在适用一种更灵活、更响应性的公司宗旨概念。本文首先讨论了公司治理理论，详细介绍了四种不同的公司宗旨和控制观念。同时，本文分析了沃尔玛在一家门店发生悲剧性大规模枪击事件后对弹药和枪支销售的决策过程。最后，本文将沃尔玛的行为与盛行的公司治理理论相协调，最终发现要求平衡利益相关者的利益的团队生产理论最为适用。
7
Abstract
People Analytics and 
Individual Autonomy: 
Employing Predictive Algorithms 
as Omniscient Gatekeepers 
in the Digital Age Workplace
人力资本分析与个人自主：
将预测算法作为数字时代
工作场所的全能守门人
Published Jan 23, 2021
DOI: https://doi.org/10.52214/cblr.v2020i3.7814
作者：Erica Pedersen
People Analytics is a powerful tool with immense promise for enhancing organizational insights. However, this Note argues that employers’ unfettered use of opaque predictive algorithms, which are trained on behavioral data to profile workers and guide employment outcomes, represents a significant threat to individual autonomy. Part II explores the emergence of People Analytics as a continuation and merger of historical approaches to scientific management in the American workplace. Part III contrasts the organizational benefits of predictive analytics against the uniquely intrusive, non-transparent, and sometimes arbitrary manner in which they are currently deployed against workers. Part IV discusses how People Analytics may hasten the erosion of employees’ normative rights in the workplace. It then discusses the insufficiency of existing regulatory and common law mechanisms to protect workers from arbitrary or discriminatory decisionmaking based on algorithmic profiling. Finally, Part V reviews some proposed solutions, emphasizing the importance of employee voice and the need for proactive regulations to enforce algorithmic transparency and protect individuals’ rights to privacy and autonomy.
人力资本分析是一个强大的工具，在增强组织洞察力方面具有巨大的潜力。然而，本文认为雇主不受约束地使用不透明的预测算法，通过对行为数据的训练来剖析员工并指导就业结果，是对个人自主权的重大威胁。第二部分探讨了人力资本分析的出现，它是美国职场历史方法与科学管理的延续与融合。第三部分对比了预测性分析对组织的益处和目前对职工采用的独特的侵入性、不透明、有时甚至是武断的方式。第四部分讨论了人力资本分析如何加速侵害员工在职场规范性权利，随后讨论了现有监管和普通法机制不足以保护工人免受基于算法剖析的任意或歧视性决策的影响。最后，第五部分审查了一些人所建议的解决方案，强调员工话语权的重要性以及制定积极主动的法规来提高算法透明度和保护个人隐私的必要性。
（图片来源于网络）
继续阅读
阅读原文