奎因哲学词条：同一性

奎因哲学词条：预言

（《奎因短文集：一本不拘泥于分类学标准的哲学词典》，译者：翟玉章）

Identity

同一性

【同一性是一种关系，适用于第一个和第二个对象相同的对象对，如<奎因，奎因>、<弗雷格、弗雷格>，等等。既不微不足道又不荒谬的同一性陈述。赫拉克里特悖论（“人不能两次踏进同一条河流”）及其解决。“万物非主惟有真主”中的同一性。】

本文提到的词条：同一性、使用与提及

The term is used loosely. We speak of identical twins. We say that you and I drive identical station wagons. But for all the looseness of common usage, the term in its strict sense is as tight as a term can be. A thing is identical with itself and with nothing else, not even its identical twin.

这个词的用法并不严格。我们会谈到同卵双胞胎（identical twins）[1]。我们会说你和我驾驶的是同一种旅行车（identical station wagons）。不过，尽管这个词的日常用法并不严格，但它在狭义上的用法却是非常严格的：一个事物只与自身相同，而不与任何别的东西相同，甚至也不与自己的同卵双胞胎相同。

GOOGLE:The word is used loosely. We'll talk about identical twins. We would say that you and I drive identical station wagons. But while the word's everyday usage is loose, its usage in the narrow sense is very strict: a thing is identical only with itself and not with anything else, not even its identical twin.

David Hume was puzzled. Identity seems like a relation, but it does not relate things pairwise as a relation should; things are identical only to themselves. How then does identity differ from a mere property? Moreover, it applies to everything. How then does it differ from the mere property of existence, the property enjoyed by everything?

大卫·休谟感到很困惑：同一性看上去像一个关系，但它并不像关系应该的那样联系成对的事物；一个事物只与它自身同一。同一性与单纯的性质有什么不同呢？此外，同一性适用于任何事物，但存在性这一性质也适用于任何事物。如果同一性是性质，那么它与存在性这一性质有什么不同呢？

GOOGEL: David Hume was puzzled: identity looks like a relation, but it does not connect pairs of things as a relation should; a thing is identical only with itself. What is the difference between identity and a mere property? Furthermore, identity applies to everything, but the property of existence also applies to everything. If identity is a property, how is it different from the property of existence?

{90}It is hard to project oneself into the confusions of even so gifted a mind as Hume's, after those confusions have given way to the progress of science. A relation is now clearly conceived as consisting of pairs of objects; the uncle relation comprises all the uncle-nephew and uncle-niece pairs. The identity relation comprises all and only the repetitious pairs,＜x, x＞;＜x, x＞is still not to be confused with x.

我们很难想像，像休谟这样天资聪颖的人会有这样的混淆，那是因为这些混淆已经随着科学的进步而被克服了。以下所说现在已经很清楚了。关系由对象对所组成，例如叔叔关系包括所有叔叔—侄子对和叔叔—侄女对。同一性这种关系包括所有像＜x, x＞这样的对象对，也只包括这样的对象对。虽然＜x, x＞中的第一个对象和第二个对象是同一个对象x，但＜x, x＞不应与x相混淆。

GOOGLE: It is difficult for us to imagine that a talented person like Hume would have such confusions, but that is because these confusions have been overcome with the progress of science. What follows is now clear. A relationship consists of pairs of objects. For example, the uncle relation includes all pairs of uncle-nephew or uncle-niece. The identity relation consists of all and only pairs of objects like <x, x>. Although the first and the second object in <x, x> is the same object x, <x, x> should not be confused with x.

On confusions over identity see also USE VERSUS MENTION. And there are the makings offurther confusion in the following reflection: evidently to say of anything that it is identical with itself is trivial, and to say that it is identical with anything else is absurd. What then is the use of identity? Wittgenstein put this question.

我们在使用与提及中看到，对这两者的混淆在同一性话题上也有表现。下面的反思可能会造成进一步的混乱。说任何事物与它自身是同一的，这是微不足道的，而说它与别的事物是同一的，则是荒谬的。既然如此，同一性这个概念有什么用呢？维特根斯坦提出了这个问题[2]。

GOOGLE: We saw in USE VERSUS MENTION that the confusion between the two also manifests itself in the topic of identity. The following reflection may cause further confusion. It is trivial to say that anything is identical with itself, and it is absurd to say that it is identical with anything else. What then is the use of the concept of identity? Wittgenstein raised this question.

Genuine questions of identity can arise because we may refer to something in two ways and leave someone wondering whether we referred to the same thing. Thus I mention Simon, someone mentions Peter, and we explain that Simon is Peter; they are identical. It is neither trivial to say so nor absurd to doubt it.

有意义的同一性问题出现于这样的场合：我们以两种方式提到了某个事物，但人们不一定知道我们提到的是同一个事物。比如，我提到西门，某人提到彼得，我们解释说西门就是彼得；它们是同一个事物。说它们是同一个事物并不是微不足道的，而怀疑它们不是同一个事物也并不荒谬。[3]

GOOGLE: The significant question of identity arises when we refer to something in two ways, but people don't necessarily know that we refer to the same thing. For example, I mention Simon and someone mentions Peter, and we explain that Simon is Peter; they are identical. It is neither trivial to say so and nor absurd to suspect it.

There is little need to give a man two names, nor much interest in developing an identity concept solely for that contingency. What is more important is reference to something not by two names but by two descriptions, or by a name and a description. We need to be able to identify Ralph with the man who mows the lawn, and his house with the one nearest the station. Identities such as these permeate our daily discourse.

给一个人取两个名字的机会是罕见的，为了这样的罕见机会而发展一种同一性概念也没有什么价值。更常见的是，我们用来提到某个事物的两种方式都是通过摹状词，或一种是通过名字而另一种是通过摹状词。我们希望能够说拉尔夫就是那个修剪草坪的人，他的房子就是那个距离车站最近的房子。我们的日常交流中充满了像诸如此类的同一性语句。

GOOGLE:The opportunity to give a man two names is rare, and there is little value in developing a concept of identity for such a rare opportunity. More commonly, the two ways we use to refer to something are by descriptions, or one by a name and the other by a description. We want to be able to say that Ralph is identical with the man who mows the lawn and that his house is identical with the one closest to the station. Our daily communications are filled with identity statements like these.

A philosophical riddle was propounded in antiquity about the identification, early and late, of a ship belonging to Theseus: was it the same ship despite successive replacement, over the years, of all its parts? The same riddle is familiar from Heracleitus in application to a river: you cannot step into the same one twice, he claimed, for its substance is continually renewed. For that matter, is Ralph as of now the same man that was mowing the grass eight years ago, if, as the saying goes, our {91} bodily substance fully renews itself in the course ofseven years? Are you indeed still you after all this time?

古时候曾有过一个关于特修斯船的身份识别谜题：如果特修斯船的所有零部件在若干年间都先后被更换了，那么它始终是同一艘船吗？赫拉克里特也有相同的谜题，只不过说的是河流。据他说，人不能两次踏进同一条河流，因为它的物质在不断地更新。同样地，如果像人们通常所认为的那样，组成我们身体的物质每７年就会完全更新，那么拉尔夫和８年前割草的那个人还是同一个人吗？过了这么久，你还是你吗？

GOOGLE: In ancient times, there was a puzzle about the identification of the Theseus’s ship: If all the parts of the ship were replaced over the years, would it still be the same ship early and late? Heraclitus had the same puzzle, but with a river. According to him, one cannot step into the same river twice because its substance is constantly being renewed. Likewise, if, as is commonly believed, the substance of our body is renewed completely every seven years, is Ralph still the same man who was mowing the grass eight years ago? After all this time, are you still you?

These three riddles -- one, really -- are wrongly reckoned as identity crises; they hinge not on the nature of identity, but on what we choose to count as a boat, a river, a person. Words are instruments, and their vagueness is tolerated where it does not impair their utility.

这三个谜题（其实只是一个）被误认为是关于同一性的难题。但它们与同一性无关，而只与把什么算作一艘船、一条河流、一个人有关。只要不影响交流，语词的模糊性是可以容忍的。

GOOGLE: These three puzzles (actually only one) have been misunderstood as puzzles about identity. They have nothing to do with identity, but only with what to count as a boat, a river, a person. Vagueness of words is tolerated as long as it does not impair communication.

The continuing identity of a person over the years is predicated not on his retention of substance, but on the continuity of replacement of substance, and the continuity of change in his shape, mass, and habits. Continuity also of his memory is expected, but occasionally a lapse in this quarter is taken in stride. How far back to place a person's beginning-whether at birth or conception or somewhere between -- is up for grabs, because the utility of the word 'person' has not hinged much on that detail until recent times.

一个人这么多年来还是同一个人，并不是因为他的物质得到了保持，而是因为他的物质更替的连续性，以及他的外形、质量和习惯变化的连续性。人们也会期望他的记忆具有连续性，但这方面的缺失有时不会被较真。至于人的起点从什么时候算起（落草，还是受孕，还是两者之间的某个时刻），这是可以商榷的，因为只是到了最近，“人”这个词的用法才与这方面的细节有了关系。

GOOGLE: The reason why a person remains the same person for so many years, is not because of his retention of substance, but because of the continuity of replacement of his substance, and the continuity of change in his shape, mass, and habits. One would also expect continuity in his memory, but lack of it is sometimes not taken seriously. As for when a person begins (birth, conception, or some moment in between), this is debatable, because it was not until recently that the use of the word "person" had anything to do with details in this respect.

A point that has seemed strangely in need of being driven home is that it is simply a question of the human use of the word 'person', whether the actual use or some use that is being proposed. It is not a question of discerning a hitherto undiscovered meaning of the word 'person'. Words, as Humpty Dumpty appreciated, are no more than what we make them.

“人”这个词的用法，无论是实际用法，还是某种拟议中的用法，都仅仅是人类的用法。这一澄清，尽管显得奇怪，但却是必要的。没有什么迄今为止未被发现的关于“人”这个词的用法。语词，正如矮胖子[4]所理解的那样，无非是人的创造。

GOOGLE: The usage of the word "man", whether it is an actual usage or some proposed usage, is merely a usage of human beings. This clarification, strange as it may seem, is necessary. There is no hitherto undiscovered use of the word "man." Words, as Humpty Dumpty understood them, are nothing more than human creations.

I have dwelt here on persons, but the case is the same with the river of Heracleitus and the boat of Theseus. The truth of an identity statement hinges on the general term involved or implied-'person', 'boat', 'river'. Ralph is the same person now as eight years ago, but his stages are distinct. When on the other hand the ornithologist says 'This is the same as that', pointing in two directions, it would be absurd to accuse him of meaning what he says. He means that the species of this bird is identical with the species of that one.

我刚才讨论的是人，但同样适用于赫拉克里特的河流和特修斯的船。同一性陈述的真理性和其中或明或暗地涉及到的概括词项（“人”、“船”、“河流”）有关。拉尔夫和8年前的那个人是同一个人，但他现在所处的阶段和8年前是不一样的。另一方面，当鸟类学家指着两个方向说“这只鸟和那只鸟是一样的”时，我们如果过于拘泥于字面，那将会很荒谬。他的真实意思是：这两个鸟所属的种类是一样的。

GOOGLE: I have just been discussing persons, but the same applies to Heraclitus's river and Theseus's ship. The truth of an identity statement depends on the general terms ("man," "boat," "river") explicitly or implicitly involved. Ralph is the same person as he was 8 years ago, but he is in a different stage now than he was 8 years ago. On the other hand, it would be absurd for us to be too literal when an ornithologist points in two directions and says, "This bird is the same as that bird." What he really means is: the two birds belong to the same species.

A vital use of identity lurks unobserved in much of our use of 'only' and 'else' and 'nothing but'. When I say that the hiding place is known to Ralph and only him, nobody else, I mean to say two things: that Ralph knows the hiding place and that {92} whoever knows the hiding place is identical with Ralph. To say that there is no God but Allah is to affirm, of whatever Gods there be, that Each, or He, is identical with Allah.

在我们使用“只有”（only）、“其他”（else）和“例外”（nothing but）的很多情况中，都埋伏着对同一性概念的不可或缺的使用。当我说藏身之处为拉尔夫所知，而且只为他所知，不为其他人所知时，我说了两件事：拉尔夫知道藏身之处，任何知道藏身之处的人等于拉尔夫。说万物非主，惟有真主[5]，就是说任何主等于真主。

GOOGLE: In many situations in which we use "only", "else" and "nothing but" lurk an indispensible use of the concept of identity. When I say that the hiding place is known to Ralph and only him and no one else, I am saying two things: Ralph knows the hiding place and anyone who knows the hiding place is identical with Ralph. To say that there is no god but Allah is to say that any god is identical with Allah.

[1]与同卵双胞胎（identical twins）相对的是异卵双胞胎（fraternal twins）。——译者注

[2]维特根斯坦的相关原文如下： Roughly speaking, to say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical with itself is to say nothing at all.（粗略地说，说两个事物具有同一性是荒谬的，而说一个事物与自身具有同一性则是什么也没有说。）见《逻辑哲学论》5.5303。——译者注

[3]对同样问题的思考曾使弗雷格提出语言表达式的含义和指称之间的区别。据弗雷格说，在“西门=彼得”为真的情况下，“西门=西门”和“西门=彼得”从指称的角度看是没有区别的，但它们从含义的角度看是有区别的。弗雷格所诉诸的含义，是一个隐晦的概念。奎因的解释很简单：两者之间的不同不在于它们有着不同的含义，而只在于它们使用了不同的语词。显然，语词的概念要比语词含义的概念清楚得多。——译者注

[4]矮胖子（Humpty Dumpty，音译“汉普蒂•邓普蒂”）是英国同名童谣中的形象。——译者注

[5] “万物非主惟有真主”语出古兰经汉译本。英文是“There is no god but Allah”，直译出来就是：不存在神，安拉例外。——译者注

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