奎因哲学词条：函数
奎因哲学词条：类型与标记
奎因哲学词条：变项
奎因哲学词条：谓词逻辑
奎因哲学词条：知识
奎因哲学词条：真理
奎因哲学词条：指称、实体化
奎因哲学词条：单独词项
（《奎因短文集：一本不拘泥于分类学标准的哲学词典》，译者：翟玉章）
Free Will
自由意志
【说一个人有自由意志，就是说他可以根据自己的意志来行事，而不是说他的意志本身是自由的，后一种说法是根本讲不通的。人有没有自由意志，与决定论是否成立，这两者是不相关的问题。但决定论的一种形态，即对“凡是要发生的事情总是要发生的”的主张，是不应引起争议的逻辑真理。人只应该为自己的自由行为负责。刑法服务社会的方式通过惩罚来抵消反社会的行为所带来的好处。借口罪犯神智不清为其脱罪，是一种正当的然而不充分的辩护策略。】
本文提到的词条：自由意志、必然性。
For hundreds of years it has been thought by some philosophers, and not by others, that determinism in the natural world is incompatible with freedom of the will. If everything that happens in the world is causally determined by what went on before, then one's actions, in particular, being events in the world, are causally determined from time immemorial（自古以来）, and there is no scope for freedom of action.
数百年来，一部分哲学家认为，自然界中的决定论是与自由意志不相容的。如果世界上所发生的每一件事情都是由此前发生的事情所因果地决定的，那么特别地，由于一个人的行为也是世界上的事件，所以也是由自古以来发生的事情所因果地决定的，没有行动自由的余地。
I count myself among the others. One is free, in the ordinary sense of the term, when one does as one likes or sees fit; and this is not altered by the fact, if fact it be, that what one likes or sees fithas had its causes.
我不属于这部分哲学家。根据“自由”这个词的通常用法，只要一个人可以按照他所喜欢的或他认为合适的方式行事，他就是自由的；至于他喜欢什么或他认为什么合适，也就是他的意志本身，无论是不是被引起的，都与他是否处于自由状态无关。
The notion that determinism precludes freedom is easily accounted for. If one's choices are determined by prior events, and ultimately by forces outside oneself, then how can one choose otherwise? Very well, one cannot. But freedom to choose to do otherwise than one likes or sees fit would be a sordid boon.
不难理解人们为什么会感到决定论妨碍自由。如果一个人的选择由先前的事情所决定，而且最终是由他身外的力量所决定的，那么他怎么可能做出不同的选择呢？很好，他确实不能有不同的选择。但这并不能阻止人们的非分之想（sordid boon[1]）：要是可以选择自己喜欢或认为合适的事情以外的事情，那该多好啊！
In reconciling freedom and determinism I do not affirm determinism. That is a separate question. What does determinism claim? Not just that what will be will be; that would be insufficiently controversial. Nor that a scientist could predict all of tomorrow's events on the strength of a full account of today's. That is excluded on two counts: the data would be unmanageably numerous, and furthermore the laws concerned would probably exceed, in part, the present stage of science. Or perhaps the claim is just that there are laws, some still undiscovered, which, taken in conjunction with a full account of today's events, mostly unknown to us, do logically imply tomorrow's events. But here the trouble is with 'law'. If any and every truth counts as a law, or even any and every general truth, then this version of determinism can be shown to boil down to the empty 'What will be will be'. If on the other hand some distinctive concept of law is intended, failure has long attended the efforts to define it. See NECESSITY.
我对自由和决定论的调和，并不意味着我赞成决定论。决定论是否成立，这是一个独立的问题。什么是决定论？这肯定不只是说：要发生的事情总是要发生的；这个说法并不足以引起分歧。决定论也不是下面的主张：科学家能够根据对今天所发生的事情的完整描述，来预测明天所要发生的所有事情。由于以下两个理由，这是做不到的：数据多得无法管理；此外，有些地方所要用到的规律，很可能会超出人们在现阶段的科学中所知道的。也许这个主张所要说的只是：存在着一些规律（其中有些还没有被发现）：它们连同对今天所发生的事情（大多数是我们所不知道的）的完整描述，将会蕴涵明天所发生的事情。但这里的麻烦在于“规律”一词。如果每一个真理（或每一个概括的真理[2]）都算做一个规律，那么这个版本的决定论，最终将沦为空洞的“要发生的事情总是要发生的”。至于制定独特的“规律”概念，这方面的努力已经有了一串长长的失败记录了。见必然性。
A robust sense might be made of determinism in terms of cause, where cause is construed simple-mindedly in terms of the flow of energy from cause to effect. Determinism in this sense says that all events have causes and are determined by them. Determinism in this causal sense is thrown into question by quantum mechanics.
原因的角度可以提供一种对决定论的健全理解。原因可以简单地解释为能量从中流出的地方，结果则是能量流入的地方。这种因果决定论所要说的是：所有事件都是有原因的而且被它们所决定。它遭到了量子力学的质疑。
The earnest and enduring concern with the issue of free will is due to the question of praise and blame. I agree that praise and blame should be reserved to free acts; a man is not to blame for bruising someone into whom he was pushed. But I hold that heroes, geniuses, and criminals deserve praise and blame, reward and punishment, for their acts ('free act' is really redundant) despite any causal chains in the way of brilliant tutelage（出色的指导）, early training, Vietnam traumata（越战创伤）, child abuse（儿童虐待）, or genes（基因）. We admire or deprecate（反对）a work of art or technology for its qualities, fully aware that they have extraneous（外在的，无关的） causes; and I claim the same for the hero, genius, and criminal. We may admire or deprecate the creator of the work of art or technology too, and just so we may admire or deprecate also the parent or mentor of the hero, genius, or criminal.
自由意志问题之所以得到持久的严肃关注，是因为它与赞扬和指责的正当性有关。我同意赞扬和指责应该保留给自由的行为；如果一个人被推到另一个人身上并导致后者被擦伤，那么他是不应该受到指责的。但是我认为英雄、天才和罪犯应该因其行为（把这里的“行为”一词替换以“自由行为”是多此一举的）而受到赞扬和指责、奖励和惩罚。这种褒贬与他行为背后的因果链（出色的指导、早期训练、越战创伤、儿童虐待或基因）是无关的。我们会因一件艺术作品或一项技术本身的品质而钦佩或贬低它，即使我们完全知道被褒贬的品质有着外在的原因。同样地，我主张这也适用于对英雄、天才和罪犯的钦佩或贬低。我们也可能钦佩或贬低一件艺术品或一项技术的创造者；同样地，我们也可能钦佩或贬低英雄、天才或罪犯的父母或导师。
A penal code serves society by so adjusting the individual's cost accounting as to offset his gain from antisocial acts. Correspondingly, in an inverse way, for a system of wages and rewards. The social efficacy（功效） of these institutions does not hinge on freedom of will as opposed to causal determinism; on the contrary, we weave reward and punishment into the causal network in order to help to cause the desired behavior.
刑法服务社会的方式是：调整个体的成本核算，从而抵消他从反社会行为中所获得的好处。工资和奖励制度的机制与刑法是对应的，但运作方式正好相反[3]。这些制度的社会效力并不依赖于排斥因果决定论的自由意志；恰恰相反，我们将奖励和惩罚编织进因果网络中去，以便能帮助引起所期望的行为。
Punishment deters by setting an example to lend credence to threat. This, and not the sweetness of revenge, is its utility. Still, let outrage（愤怒） and vengefulness not be deplored; they have had survival value in social evolution by sustaining the institution of punishment. It might otherwise languish（变弱） under pressure of fellow feeling, which is also a lively social force, valuable in its place.
惩罚通过树立榜样来表明威胁是当真的，这便是惩罚的吓阻作用。吓阻，而不是报复的快感，才是惩罚的目的。但愤怒和报复的情感并非一无是处，它们在社会进化中自有其生存价值。它们可以起到维护惩罚制度的作用；否则，惩罚制度可能会在同情心的压力下被削弱。同情心也是一种有着自身价值的活生生的社会力量。
The rightly but insufficiently maligned（诽谤） insanity（精神错乱） plea, as a defense in criminal courts, is predicated on ill health of the offender's decision-making faculties. The theory would seem to be that healthy faculties make decisions spontaneously and hence with full responsibility, while diseased ones are the pawns（走卒，工具） of outside forces. It is a hard line to draw, and the more so when one appreciates that all our actions subtend causal chains from far away and long ago. The plea has no evident place in the rationale of punishment as we have been picturing it, and a persuasive justification of it is not easy to conceive.
刑事法庭上的一种正当然而不充分的辩护策略是：声称罪犯在作案时处于神智不健全的状态。这背后的理论似乎是：神智健全的罪犯所做的决定是自主的，因此应当承担全部责任；而神智不健全的罪犯则会沦为外部力量的棋子。这里的界线是很难划定的；如果考虑到，我们所有的行为背后都有一条开始于遥远地点和久远时刻的因果链，情况就更是如此。这种辩护在我们所描述的惩罚原理中并没有当然的地位，要找到有说服力的理由也绝非易事。
[1]这个短语出自英国诗人威廉·华兹华斯（1770——1850）的诗篇“The World Is Too Much with Us”。这首诗的开头几句是：The world is too much with us; late and soon, Getting and spending we lay waste our powers; Little we see in Nature that is ours; We have given our hearts away, a sordid boon! ——译者注
[2]每一个单独谓述句，都可以被改写为概括谓述句（即全称直言句）。例如“翟玉章是江苏人”可以改写为“所有等于翟玉章的对象是江苏人”。见本书词条必然性。——译者注
[3]这里的方式是：调整个体的收益核算，从而补偿他因为社会做贡献而带来的损失。——译者注
继续阅读
阅读原文