译者 | 高翊菲 华东政法大学LL.B.
一审 | Cindy Wong University of Leeds LL.B.
二审 | 陈飞越 爱丁堡大学 LL.M.
编辑 |
罗彤 西北政法大学

         李建云 中国政法大学

责编 | 扎恩哈尔·阿黑哈提 新疆农业大学
Of Mazes and Layers: Can a UN Convention on Tax Change the Rules of the Game?
处于迷宫层叠:联合国税收公约能否改变游戏规则?
Written by Luiza Leite de Queiroz
作者:路易莎·莱特·德奎罗斯
Nov 10, 2022
原文发表时间:2022年11月10日
The Maze
迷宫
Last month, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly’s Economic and Financial Committee (Second Committee) tabled a draft resolution calling for the elaboration of a UN convention on international tax cooperation. Lauded by civil society as “a chance of legitimate, inclusive rule-setting” the initiative is yet to be remarked on, or acknowledged by, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Silence from the historical custodian of the international tax system[1] tells us very little about whether civil society’s optimism is warranted or not. However, a closer look at the OECD’s actions in the last ten years provides a good yardstick against which to measure the extent of its willingness (or lack thereof) to cede, or even just share, the international tax spotlight.
上个月,联合国大会经济及金融委员会(第二委员会)提交了一份决议草案,呼吁制定一项关于国际税务合作的联合国公约。尽管民间赞誉这项提案是“一次制定合法性、包容性规则的契机”,但经济合作与发展组织(OECD)尚未对此予以评论或认可。作为国际税收[1]制度的历史管理者,OECD的沉默性回应让我们无法判断其是否认可民间对该项提案的乐观情绪。然而,仔细观察OECD在过去十年中的行动,便可以很好地衡量其是否具有(或者缺乏)放弃或者分享国际税收焦点的意愿。
This post explores how the complexity of the reform efforts undertaken by the OECD in this area is likely to be used as an argument to prevent reform at the UN level, despite the significant problems that OECD led reforms pose for developing countries.
这篇文章探讨了OECD在国际税收这一领域主导的改革在给发展中国家带来重大问题之时,其工作的复杂性程度是如何可能被用作阻止联合国层面改革的理由。
The G20/OECD Base Erosion Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project[2] launched  in 2013 marked the onset of a new paradigm in international taxation. From a narrow focus on avoidance of double taxation to an earnest recognition of the perils of double non-taxation, the OECD has made substantive strides to reform problematic features of the international tax  regime. However, the complexity of those reform efforts have also meant that initial aspirations of streamlining the regime now seem utterly misguided and unfilled. That complexity is reflected in the fifteen BEPS Actions[3], one Multilateral Instrument (MLI)[4], one Inclusive Framework, a Two-Pillar Solution (with new Model GloBE Rules[5]) and a plethora  of commentary.
2013年启动的G20/OECD税基侵蚀和利润转移(BEPS)项目[2]标志着国际税收新模式的开始。从对避免双重征税的集中关注,到对双重不征税危险性的认真性认识,OECD通过这些措施,在改革国际税收制度的问题方面实现了实质性的飞跃。然而,这一改革过程中的努力是十分复杂的,从15项BEPS行动计划[3]、一份多边协议(MLI)[4]、一个全面性框架、一项双支柱解决方案(包括新的全球示范规则[5])以及大量的评注等这些十分具有复杂性的改革措施可以看出,实行精简制度的最初愿望在现在看来显然是错误并且无法实现的。
These reforms mean that the international tax regime has become a maze which is not tailored for practical implementation by governments grappling with resource constraints. The departing point of thousands of bilateral agreements in place pre-BEPS is now compounded by a myriad of potential legal outcomes that arise from the agreements’ interaction with the MLI and its astonishing amount of allowed reservations. As if a matrix[6] of possibilities per each pair of countries was not enough to signal the regime’s convolutedness, further layers of rules, definitions and obligations have been devised in the last few years. So far, at least three additional multilateral instruments are anticipated to be included in the existing web of norms.
这些改革意味着,国际税收制度已经如迷宫般复杂,不适合资源有限的政府去实际执行。在BEPS项目启动之前,数以千计的双边协议所带来的分歧点,与因双边协议与MLI的相互影响以及无数被允许保留的条款所导致的大量潜在法律后果混杂在一起。或许是因为对每个国家法律后果的排列组合模型[6]还不足以表明国际税收制度的错综复杂,在过去的几年里,更多层次的规则、定义和法律义务已经被设计出来。到目前为止,预计至少有三个额外的多边文书将被纳入现有规则中。
(图片来源于网络)
The post-BEPS international tax architecture can claim many wins, including its ability to convey the highly desirable message that corporate taxpayers must contribute their fair share to societies around the world. Arguably, though, the most significant victory relates to its power to discourage complete departures from the status quo such as that envisioned by the UN with the proposed new convention.
BEPS项目后的国际税收制度架构可以被宣称是成功的,这种成功包括其可以传达一种非常理想化的信息,即企业纳税人必须为世界各地的社会贡献他们的公平份额。但可以说,这一架构的能力所展现的最重要的胜利是,它阻止了对于如联合国新公约中所展望的现状的完全偏离。
The Game
游戏
Former US president Harry S. Truman is famously credited with the quote “if you can’t convince them, confuse them” while referring to a commonly employed tactic by his political opponents when attempting to win votes. As opposition can only be born out of understanding and subsequent disagreement, confusion can really work wonders in preventing dissent.
美国前总统哈里·S·杜鲁门(Harry S. Truman)有一句著名的名言:"如果你不能说服他们,那就迷惑他们",其指的是他的政治对手在试图赢得选票时通常采用的策略。由于反对意见只能在理解和理解后的分歧中产生,迷惑在防止异议方面确实有奇效。
In view of the 2008 financial crisis, and successive document leaks[7] confirming the sheer scale of corporate tax abuse, inertia ceased to be an option for the OECD over a decade ago. That the institution could not remain aloof to criticism did not mean, however, that it would, or has taken all opprobrium equally into consideration. The Secretariat has evidently spent some time reflecting on which aspects of the international tax structure are so foundational that they must be insulated from change, and which ones can be tweaked or done away with without eliciting much chagrin. So long as continuously enacted rules can broadly be seen as taking us all in the right direction, competing initiatives can successfully be precluded on the basis that work is still in progress.
鉴于2008年的金融危机以及连续的文件泄露[7]证实了公司滥用税收的巨大规模,十多年前,原地踏步就不再是OECD的一个选择。然而,OECD不对批评保持冷漠,并不意味着它将或已经平等地考虑到所有的批评之处。该机构的秘书处显然已经花费一些时间来思考国际税收结构中的哪些方面是基础性的,以至于它们必须远离变化,又有哪些方面可以调整或取消,而不会引起过多失望。只要持续颁布的规则可以被广泛视为带领我们所有人进入正确的方向,就可以成功地以工作仍在进行为由排除竞争性举措。
The problem with such discourse is that it implies homogeneity of voices[8] and, worse, uniformity in criticism, which is decidedly not the case in the landscape of international taxation. Developing countries have long denounced the OECD’s lack of representational authority, as well as the non-inclusive and opaque nature of its procedures, even in the BEPS Inclusive Framework era. Preliminary analyses of the Two-Pillar Solution, for instance, have emphasised that the initiative accords limited to no gains to developing countries.[9] In this scenario, UN efforts – not in the least its Model Conventions, and the work done by the Committee of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters[10] – have been instrumental in drawing attention to the challenges faced by developing countries when confronted with the international tax regime’s overbearing complexity.[11]
Harry S. Truman的这一言论的问题在于其揭示了意见[8]甚至是批评的同一性。而在国际税收领域,情况显然不是这样的。发展中国家长期以来一直谴责OECD缺乏代表性权威,并谴责其程序的非包容性和不透明性,即使在BEPS全面框架时代也是如此。例如,对“双支柱解决方案”的初步分析强调,该份倡议给发展中国家带来的收益有限甚至没有。[9] 在这种情况下,联合国的努力——尤其是其示范公约和国际税务合作专家委员会所做的工作[10] ——有助于让人们注意到发展中国家在面对国际税收制度过度复杂时所面临的挑战。[11]
(图片来源于网络)
Yet, as noted before, the post-BEPS world spearheaded by the Inclusive Framework conspicuously embraces layers upon layers of unconsolidated guidance. Ironically, both the UN and the OECD have relentlessly spoken of the need to build the capacity of tax officials in developing countries. Sadly, no amount of capacity-building shall ever be enough under the current paradigm. Governments that cannot afford to maintain a dedicated branch to matters pertaining to international taxation and that do not participate in rulemaking and deciding on equal footing will simply have to undergo perennial training almost by default. A cycle of dependence is then established whereby complex rules are drafted despite arguments to the contrary, more capacity-building is required as a consequence and meaningful participation in subsequent rulemaking is ever forestalled.
然而,如前所述,以全面性框架为首的后BEPS世界显然包括了层层叠叠的、散乱的指引。具有讽刺意味的是,联合国和OECD依然一再强调,需要加强发展中国家税务官员的能力建设。但可悲的是,在目前的模式下,有再多的能力建设也是不够的。那些没有能力维持一个专门的部门来处理与国际税收有关的事务的政府,以及那些不在平等的基础上参与规则制定和决定的政府,将不得不接受几乎是默认化的常年培训。这样就形成了一个依赖性循环,在这种循环中,尽管有人持相反观点,复杂的规则仍然会被起草。为此,人们因而需要更多的建设能力去遵循这些规则,而这一循环也阻碍了人们有意义地参与后续规则的制定。
The Way Out
出路
Conceiving complexity as a strategy rather than an intrinsic quality of international taxation allows for a few tentative conclusions about the OECD’s willingness to be side-lined by a UN convention. If and when its engagement is formally requested, the organisation will likely make three fair points while negating the need for a new multilateral initiative. First, that its Secretariat has extensive expertise on the subject and is already knee-deep in initiatives on tax cooperation as it is. Secondly, that irrespective of its tangled nature, the BEPS/post-BEPS agenda undeniably represents the culmination of a lot of work, both technical and political. It would therefore be manifestly reckless to see all this hard work go to waste simply in the name of a UN-led scheme instead. Thirdly, that, if anything, an additional framework and forum will only complicate matters further.
将复杂性视为一种策略,而非国际税收制度的内在品质,可以得出一些关于OECD是否愿意因联合国公约而边缘化的暂定性结论。如果OECD被正式要求参与,该组织可能会提出以下三个合理的观点,同时否定新多边倡议的需求。首先,该组织的秘书处在这个问题上拥有广泛的专业知识,并且在制定税务合作的倡议方面非常熟练和深入。其次,无论BEPS项目/后BEPS项目议程的性质如何错综复杂,不可否认的是,它都代表了大量技术性和政治性工作的顶峰。因此,如果仅仅为了一个由联合国领导的计划而使所有这些艰苦的工作付诸东流,那显然是鲁莽的。最后,要说真有什么区别,一个额外的框架和论坛只会使问题变得更加复杂化。
So, are we then to believe that enthusiasm surrounding a UN convention on international tax cooperation is misplaced? Not quite. For one, the OECD itself naturally does not get a say on whether a UN convention is enacted or not. But, more fundamentally, OECD member states have very little power, if any, to prevent the adoption of a new UN instrument. While the OECD is largely tethered to consensus decision-making[12], the UN General Assembly can ultimately adopt resolutions by a vote through a simple majority[13] if consensus cannot be reached. This would perhaps suggest that a UN convention could still see the light of day even in the absence of OECD member states’ support. But, without their support, would the outcome still be practically relevant? It depends.
那么,我们是否应该相信,对于联合国国际税务合作公约的热情是错误的?也并非如此。首先,OECD本身自然对联合国公约的生效与否没有发言权。但更重要的是,OECD成员国几乎没有权力,如果有的话也没有办法阻止联合国通过一份新的文书。OECD在很大程度上受制于共识决策[12],而对于联合国来说,即便其内部成员无法达成共识,联合国大会最终也可以通过简单多数制[13]表决通过决议。这或许表明,即使没有OECD成员国的支持,一项联合国公约仍然有被通过的可能。但是,如果没有成员国的支持,这种通过结果是否仍然具有实际意义?这取决于不同情况。
(图片来源于网络)
Mundane as it may sound, the only true antidote against complexity is simplicity. As we presently stand, the aim and scope of the convention are yet to be determined. If the UN chooses to overlap efforts and re-write parts of existing norms to completely shift the centre of gravity of international taxation, the OECD will be perfectly vindicated in its (likely) claims. If, however, the UN uses the convention to strategically assert itself as the rightful birthplace of a new permanent inter-state dispute resolution mechanism, an important power transfer can still take place without the political fatigue that comes with direct confrontation. Unlike the UN, the OECD cannot properly claim to have adjudication expertise, and defending the integrity of current mechanisms on the basis of their adherence is hardly admissible. But what is more, the prerogative to design a fresh adjudication system must be taken for what it can offer: a real chance at changing the configuration of the maze and the dynamic of the game.
虽然听起来老生常谈,但唯一真正能解决复杂问题的方法就是使其简单化。就我们目前的情况而言,公约的目标和范围还有待确定。如果联合国选择重复相同工作并重写现有规范的一部分以完全转移国际税收制度的重心,那么OECD将完全证明其(可能的)主张是正确的。然而,如果联合国利用该公约在战略上宣称自己是一个新的永久性国家间争端解决机制的合法诞生地,在无直接对抗所致的政治疲劳感的情况下,重要的权力转移仍然可以发生。与联合国不同,OECD不能正当声称其拥有裁决方面的专业知识,而以遵守现有机制为基础来捍卫其完整性也难以被接受。但更重要的是,设计一个全新裁决系统所具有的特性必须被充分利用,因其能提供:一个改变迷宫配置和游戏动态的真正机会。
脚注
[1] 国际税收,是指对在两个或两个以上国家之间开展跨境交易行为征税的一系列税收。
[2] 税基侵蚀和利润转移(Base Erosion and Profit Shifting,以下简称“BEPS”)是指跨国企业利用国际税收规则存在的不足,以及各国税制差异和征管漏洞,人为将利润转移至仅有少量或没有经济活动的免税或低税地区,导致少缴或者总体上不缴纳公司税的税收筹划安排,造成对各国税基的侵蚀。BEPS项目是二十国集团(G20)领导人在2013年圣彼得堡峰会委托经济合作与发展组织(OECD)启动实施的国际税收改革项目,旨在修改国际税收规则、遏制跨国企业规避全球纳税义务、侵蚀各国税基的行为。BEPS项目成果包括所有15项行动计划报告和一份解释性声明。BEPS项目由34个OECD成员国、8个非OECD的G20成员国和19个其他发展中国家共计61个国家共同参与。其一揽子国际税改项目主要包括三个方面的内容:一是保持跨境交易相关国内法规的协调一致;二是突出强调实质经营活动并提高税收透明度;三是提高税收确定性。
[3] 参见https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/beps-actions/
[4] 参见https://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/multilateral-convention-to-implement-tax-treaty-related-measures-to-prevent-beps.htm
[5] 参见https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/tax-challenges-arising-from-the-digitalisation-of-the-economy-global-anti-base-erosion-model-rules-pillar-two.htm
[6] 参见https://www.oecd.org/tax/treaties/mli-matching-database.htm
[7] 参见https://www.icij.org/investigations/pandora-papers/global-investigation-tax-havens-offshore/
[8] 参见https://www.ictd.ac/blog/oecd-secretariat-unified-approach-equal-footing/
[9] 参见https://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/SC-Statement-on-IF-Two-Pillar-Solution-13-Oct-2021.pdf
[10] 参见https://www.oecd.org/legal/Resolution-Governance-Decision-Making.pdf
[11] 参见https://www.un.org/en/model-united-nations/how-decisions-are-made-un
[12] 参见https://www.oecd.org/legal/Resolution-Governance-Decision-Making.pdf
[13] 参见https://www.un.org/en/model-united-nations/how-decisions-are-made-un
原文链接:www.ejiltalk.org/of-mazes-and-layers-can-a-un-convention-on-tax-change-the-rules-of-the-game/
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