会议预告丨人大国发院“理论与政策”研讨会（第143-144期）

We provide the first quantitative evaluation of the impacts and interactions of the US-China trade wars and industrial policy competitions. We extend the model in Caliendo and Parro (2015) by incorporating sectoral external economies of scale. We find that (i) under our baseline calibration of scale economies, the “Made-in-China 2025” (“MIC 2025”) subsidies tend to improve the welfare of both China and the U.S.; (ii) the US gains from Trumpian tariffs if China does not retaliate, and the gain is larger if China had implemented the “MIC 2025” project; (iii) in a non-cooperative tariff game targeting on high-tech industries supported by the “MIC 2025”, both China and the U.S. impose high tariffs and endure welfare losses; and (iv) if it is feasible for the U.S. to subsidize its own high-tech industries, the U.S. would reduce its tariffs on high-tech imports from China and benefit from its own industrial subsidies.These results (i) provide a rationale for trade wars and industrial policy competitions between the U.S. and China and (ii) suggest that industrial subsidies, if properly implemented, may generate less distortion than import tariffs as a means of international competition.

鞠建东，清华大学五道口金融学院紫光讲席教授，教育部长江学者, 中国国际贸易研究会（CTRG）主席，清华大学国家金融研究院国际金融与经济研究中心(CIFER)主任、绿色金融研究中心(CGFR)主任，上海财经大学国际工商管理学院特聘教授；2014-2017年担任上海财经大学国际工商管理学院院长、教授，2009-2015年担任清华大学经济管理学院教授、国际经济研究中心主任，2007-2009年任国际货币基金组织常驻学者，1995-2014年担任美国俄克拉荷马大学(University of Oklahoma)经济系助理教授、副教授、终身教授；获南京大学数学学士、清华大学经济学硕士、美国宾夕法尼亚州立大学经济学博士。鞠建东教授的研究领域集中在国际贸易、国际金融和产业组织，在American Economic Review、Journal of International Economics、Journal of Monetary Economics、American Economic Journal等国际一流学术杂志上发表多篇论文，曾获2016年浦山世界经济学优秀论文奖，2020年教育部第八届高等学校科学研究优秀成果奖（人文社会科学）著作论文奖经济学类一等奖，2021年被北京市教育委员会认定为“北京高校优秀专业课（公共课）主讲教师”。

主  讲：包歌（对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院）

主  持：刘青（中国人民大学国家发展与战略研究院）

时  间：2023年11月8日15:30-17:00

地  点：立德楼11层1133会议室

We investigate how firms and markets adapt to trademark protection, an extensively used but under-examined form of IP protection to address asymmetric information, by exploring a historical precedent: China’s trademark law of 1923. Exploiting unique, newly digitized firm-employee and firm-agent datasets from Shanghai in 1872-1941, we show that the trademark law, established as an unanticipated and Western-disapproved response to end foreign privileges in China, shaped firm dynamics and relationships on all sides of trademark conflicts. Western firms with greater dependence on trademark protection grew and raised brand investment, while Japanese businesses, most frequently accused of counterfeiting, contracted despite attempts to build their own brands. The trademark law also fostered relationships with domestic intermediaries, both within and outside the boundaries of Western firms, and the growth of the Chinese intermediary sector. At the market level, the trademark law did not reduce competition or raise brand prices, leading to a coexistence of trademarks and competitive markets and ultimately gains in consumer welfare. A comparison with previous attempts by foreign powers—such as extraterritorial rights and bilateral treaties—shows that the alternative institutions were broadly unsuccessful.

包歌，对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院副教授，博士生导师，对外经济贸易大学国家对外开放研究院研究员，国家自科基金项目评审专家。2015年获乔治华盛顿大学经济学博士。曾任该校艾略特国际关系学院讲师及世界银行研究顾问。主要研究领域为全球背景下的知识产权治理、制度和经济发展、国际经济治理。发表于在AEJ: Applied Economics，World Economy, JREFE以及《中国金融》、《中国外汇》等政策期刊。主持国家自科基金（面上与青年项目），参与世界银行、财政部、国家发改委等研究课题。先后获得多项北京市以及校级教学科研荣誉。

文稿来源：人大国发院

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