会议预告丨人大国发院“理论与政策”研讨会（第135-136期）

主  讲：吕越（对外经济贸易大学全球创新与治理研究院）

主  持：刘瑞明（中国人民大学国家发展与战略研究院）

时  间：2023年10月18日14:00-15:30

地  点：立德楼11层1133会议室

We estimate the policy effect of belt and road initiative (BRI) on China’s import. We use highly detailed, product-country level data from China Customs Trade Statistics Database which covers 5364 types of products and 201 economies from 2010 to 2017 to investigate the policy effects and the underlying mechanisms. We find that the BRI has significantly boosted China’s imports from countries along the route. The BRI have significant expansion effect on imports of existing products as well as positive effects on imports of new product import and product exit, which means BRI may also contribute to the optimization of product structure and growth in value of China’s imports. Moreover, BRI have positive effects on both general trade and processing trade. Mechanism analysis shows that policy coordination, cultural affinity, and maritime transportation connectivity have strong explanatory power on the policy effects of BRI. We also find that the BRI has played a "boosting" role for import boost for new RTA partner as well as non-RTA members along the route. We further examine the impact of BRI on global bilateral trade, and the result shows that BRI has generally promoted bilateral trade among all countries along the route, not limited to origin-China pairs.

吕越，对外经济贸易大学全球创新与治理研究院执行院长，国际经济贸易学院教授、博导，入选国家级人才项目，担任国家社科基金重大项目首席专家、全国高校国际贸易学科协作组青年论坛副秘书长、新兴经济体研究会理事。已在《中国社会科学》、《经济研究》、《管理世界》、《世界经济》、《经济学（季刊）》、Review of International Economics 、World Economy、Economics Letters等杂志发表论文110余篇，撰写全球价值链研究专著两部。主持国家社科基金重大项目、国家自然科学基金面上项目等多项国家级课题。曾获得教育部高等学校科学研究优秀成果奖、安子介国际贸易研究奖、商务部商务发展研究奖、洪银兴经济学奖（青年）、邓子基财经学术论文奖等。

长期承担国家发改委、商务部、国资委、工信部、科技部等委托项目，研究成果获得获中央领导同志批示、中办和国办等国家机关部委采纳。主持教育部中国专业学位案例中心课题、获评北京市优秀本科论文指导教师。作为骨干成员获评首批中国经济学教材编写团队《中国开放型经济学》（编委）、全国高校黄大年式教学团队及国家级一流本科课程-虚拟仿真实验课。

主  讲：刘梦迪（对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院）

主  持：刘瑞明（中国人民大学国家发展与战略研究院）

时  间：2023年10月18日15:30-17:00

地  点：立德楼11层1133会议室

Random inspection is considered a law enforcement method that can decrease the likelihood of collusion between supervisors and supervised objects. Using over 160,000 inspection records from 2016 to 2019, this study examined how China’s implementation of randomized environmental inspections affects law enforcement efficiency. We find that random inspections reduce the overall efficiency of law enforcement. Random inspections revealed 11% fewer environmental problems and 5% fewer environmental violations than non-random inspections. Further examination of the mechanisms reveals that the implementation of random inspections hinders the utilization of local officials' specialized knowledge in effectively targeting polluting companies and identifying violations, thereby diminishing the overall efficiency of law enforcement. To develop more effective enforcement strategies, policymakers should weigh the benefits of random inspections in reducing collusion against the drawbacks in losing target.

刘梦迪，对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院副教授，博士生导师。刘梦迪博士具有经济学与环境管理交叉学科背景，长期从事环境经济、环境治理相关的研究，主持国家自然科学基金青年项目（72004024, 2021-2023）、面上项目（72374044, 2024-2027）。其研究成果被接收或发表于American Economic Review（AER）、American Journal of Political Science （AJPS）、Journal of Policy Analysis and Management（JPAM）、Journal of Development Economics（JDE）、Journal of Environmental Economics and Management（JEEM）等高水平国际学术期刊。

文稿来源：人大国发院

微信编辑：张菁菁