翻译：徐鑫源 乔治城大学 LLM
审稿：李梓源 英国布里斯托大学 LL.M.
          张庆 复旦大学法硕
编辑：Gary 詹远 UNSW J.D
责编：王冰子 烟台大学本科
COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW PART I
Vol. 2022 No. 1
Time for a New Sherman Act? The Debate on Antitrust Reform in Historical Perspective
现在是否是需要一部新的《谢尔曼法》的时候？从历史角度讨论反垄断立法沿革
Published Jul 25, 2022
DOI https://doi.org/10.52214/cblr.v2022i1.9977
作者：William H. Rooney & Timothy G. Fleming
Abstract
The Sherman Antitrust Act (“Sherman Act” or “Act”), the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, and the Clayton Antitrust Act represent the core antitrust statutes. While these core statutes have remained largely the same, antitrust law has undergone sea changes since the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. To place the contemporary debate in historical context, this Introduction traces the trajectory of the Sherman Act and its diverging interpretations from the Act’s inception to date. This Introduction discusses the state of antitrust law during the early years of the twentieth-century, which featured the judicial development of the rule of reason. It also address the Progressive Era amendments to the antitrust laws, which reflected that era’s increased confidence in the efficacy of governmental and regulatory intervention as reflected in the amendments to the Clayton and FTC Acts. The Introduction then focuses on the state of antitrust law during the middle years of the twentieth century, sometimes characterized as operating according to a “big is bad” principle. It then turns to the modern era and discusses the last great revolution in antitrust thought: the arrival of the consumer welfare standard, which directs courts and practitioners to view antitrust law through the prism of how a given practice affects the consumer. This standard often, though not exclusively, focuses on a practice’s impact on prices and output. The Introduction discusses what may be the next revolution in antitrust thought, which some characterize as “the New Brandeis Movement.” It largely addresses the impact of increased concentration on economic as well as social and political issues. Finally, the Introduction concludes by discussing the various legislative proposals, from both Democrats and Republicans, to reform antitrust law, either through modest alterations or thorough overhauls.
反垄断领域的核心法规是《谢尔曼反托拉斯法》、1914年的《美国联邦贸易委员会法》和《克莱顿反托拉斯法》。虽然这些核心法规的内容自始至今大多保持不变，但从十九世纪末和二十世纪初以来，反垄断领域经历了巨大的变化。为了在历史语境中展开当代的讨论，本导论追溯了《谢尔曼法》的发展轨迹及该法诞生至今的不同解释。文章先讨论了二十世纪初期反垄断法规的状况，这段时期的特点是见证了合理原则在司法上的发展。本文也讨论了反垄断法规在进步时代 的修改，反映了这一时期人们对于政府效能和监管干预的信心增强。这一点在《克莱顿法》和《联邦贸易委员会法》的修正案中得以体现。文章随后将重点聚焦于二十世纪中期反垄断法规的状况，这一时期的特点是市场遵循着“以大为恶”的原则运行。然后，文章着眼于现代，讨论了反垄断领域的最新一次重大变革，即消费者福利标准的诞生。这一标准的确立引导法院和反垄断领域从业者从实践中消费者行为是如何被具体影响的角度来审查反垄断行为。这一标准通常，但并不一定，会关注实践中市场行为对价格和产量的影响。文章继续讨论了反垄断领域下一个可能出现的变革，有些人认为会是“新布兰代斯运动”。该运动主要关注经济乃至社会和政治领域里的权力集中问题。文章结尾讨论了民主共和两党提出的各项立法提案，这些提案旨在对反垄断法进行适度修改或是彻底改革。
Do We Need a New Sherman Act?
我们是否需要一部新的《谢尔曼法》？
Published Jul 25, 2022
DOI https://doi.org/10.52214/cblr.v2022i1.9979
作者：Fiona Scott Morton & Kartikeya Kandula & Karissa Kang
Abstract
Mounting evidence suggests that the American economy is suffering from a lack of competition. This Article details the empirical evidence that illustrates the nature of America’s competition problem. It then discusses the causes, both legal and economic, of ineffective antitrust enforcement. Finally, this Article closes by identifying potential congressional, executive, and judicial reforms that can serve to reinvigorate competition.
越来越多的证据显示，市场缺少竞争正在拖累美国经济。本文详细介绍了揭露美国经济竞争问题本质的实证证据。文章接下来讨论了反垄断执法未能取得成效的法律和经济原因。文章结尾，作者在立法、行政和司法层面明确了一些可能的改革方向，改革目标是为了重振竞争。
Antitrust Reform and the Nirvana Fallacy: The Case Against a New Sherman Act
反垄断改革和涅槃谬误——一个反对新《谢尔曼法》的案例
Published Jul 25, 2022
DOI https://doi.org/10.52214/cblr.v2022i1.9980
作者：Joshua D. Wright & Jennifer Cascone Fauver
Abstract
Demands for major antitrust reform are coming from all directions: politicians, industrial organization (IO) economists, and antitrust lawyers. While the political, legal, and economic debates vary in important ways, they all boil down to a single question: Do we need a “New” Sherman Act? Progressive IO economists argue that a “crisis” of competition in markets—evidenced by increasing levels of aggregate industry concentration—has resulted in systematic market power across the economy, and that a crisis of institutional credibility in the courts has biased antitrust law in favor of defendants. However, as this Article illustrates, the economic and empirical evidence support neither proffer.
要求反垄断进行重大改革的呼声来自各个专业领域，包括政客、产业组织经济学家和反垄断律师。虽然政治、法律和经济层面的争论在重要方面存在不同，但它们都可以简化为一个问题，那就是我们是否需要一部新的《谢尔曼法》。进步派产业组织经济学家认为，市场中的竞争“危机”——体现在整体产业集中程度不断提高——导致对整个经济有系统性市场支配地位的经营者的诞生。且法庭的机构公信力危机使得反垄断法诉讼结果偏向被告（即具有垄断地位的一方）。然而，正如本文所阐述的，经济证据和实证证据都不足以支持上述两种说法。
Rather than reform based on upon evidence of market failure or a failure of antitrust institutions, Progressive IO economists call for reform based upon the nirvana fallacy—a comparison of the today’s institutions with an imaginary set of perfect institutions guided by omniscient and well-intending economists. But economics is not on the agenda of current proposals for antitrust reform and calls for a “New” Sherman Act threaten to upend the long-standing partnership between law and economics on which the consumer welfare standard is predicated. Without such a partnership, antitrust institutions will struggle to achieve their objective of promoting competition on behalf of Americans.
进步派产业组织经济学家们并没有把市场失灵或反垄断机构失效作为改革依据，而是根据涅槃谬误呼吁改革——将今天的制度设计与一套不切实际的完美制度设计进行比较，后者由一群理论知识丰富、本意良好的经济学家们指导得出。但是，在目前的反垄断改革提案中，经济学因素并没有被提上议程，因而对新《谢尔曼法》的呼吁有可能颠覆法律和经济学之间长期存在的（相辅相成的）伙伴关系，而消费者福利标准正是建立在这种伙伴关系之上的。反垄断机构的目标是为了美国人民利益促进竞争，然而当这种伙伴关系不复存在时，这一目标将难以实现。
Racial Rhetoric or Reality? Cautious Optimism on the Link Between Corporate #BLM Speech and Behavior
关于反种族歧视，花言巧语还是付诸现实？对公司BLM言论和行为间关系的审慎乐观态度
Published Jul 25, 2022
DOI https://doi.org/10.52214/cblr.v2022i1.9968
作者：Lisa M. Fairfax
Abstract
The summer of 2022 marks the two-year anniversary of the dramatic rekindling of the #BlackLivesMatter movement because of the murders of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor and other unarmed Black people at the hands of police. The summer of 2020 saw cities in the United States and around the world erupt in protest, with calls to dismantle racist policies and practices both in the criminal system and within the broader society, with a particular emphasis on policies and practices impacting Black people. The summer of 2022 also marks the two-year anniversary of the visible and somewhat surprising avalanche of corporate statements proclaiming solidarity with the Black community, condemning racism and bigotry, and pledging to help eradicate racist policies and practices within their own institutions. Corporations and their brands inundated the public with black squares, #BlackLivesMatter signs, and emphatic insistence that corporate leaders would “not be silent about our fight against racism and discrimination,” and that they would “do more . . . and do it now.”
2022年夏天是#BlackLivesMatter（黑人的命也是命）运动大规模席卷重来的两周年，起因是George Floyd, Breonna Taylor和其他手无寸铁的黑人被警察（在执法过程中）谋杀。2020年夏天，美国和世界各地的城市爆发了抗议活动，呼吁废除存在于刑事体系和更广泛的社会范围中的种族主义政策和做法，尤其是针对黑人的政策和做法。2022年夏天也标志着一批又一批公司接连宣布声援黑人社区，谴责种族主义和种族歧视，并承诺帮助消除其机构内部的种族主义政策和做法的两周年。发声公司的数量引人关注，甚至有些出人意料。来自各个公司和它们旗下品牌的黑色方块和#BlackLivesMatter标志（和承诺）不断将公众淹没。这些企业强调坚定立场，即“他们的领导人将不会对反种族主义和种族歧视的斗争保持沉默”，并且他们将 “做得更多......而且立刻付诸行动”。
Most commentators viewed these corporate statements with severe skepticism, characterizing them as “cheap talk,” a “marketing ploy,” or “an outright lie.” Relying on original empirical research, this Article refutes that skepticism and demonstrates that, just one year later, many corporations followed through on their talk with actions aimed at promoting diversity and eroding racist and discriminatory practices. This Article makes three critical assertions with respect to these corporate statements. First, this Article uses original empirical research to reveal that the vast majority of the corporate statements made in the summer of 2020 embodied a commitment to actively work against racism and discrimination and actively promote diversity and inclusion. Second, this Article draws upon original empirical research to refute critics and demonstrate that, on the one-year anniversary of these commitments, many corporations followed through on their speech with concrete actions, at least with respect to their boards. Third, after examining the impact of structural limitations and other roadblocks, this Article sounds a note of caution about whether and to what extent we can expect long-term changes in corporate behavior that meaningfully moves the needle on improving racial diversity and equity in the corporate sphere.
大多数评论家对这些公司的言论持严重怀疑态度，将其描述为 “空谈不做”、“营销策略”或 “彻底的谎言”。本文依据原创的实证研究，驳斥了这种怀疑论点，并表明，仅仅一年之后，许多公司就用实际行动落实了他们的言论，目的是增加多样性和消除种族主义和歧视性做法。本文提出了三个重要的论据来支持这些公司的声明。首先，本文通过原创的实证研究，揭示了绝大多数在2020年夏天发表的声明都体现了公司对积极反对种族主义和种族歧视并积极促进多样性和包容性的承诺。第二，本文通过原创实证研究来驳斥批评者，证明在做出这些承诺的一周年之际，许多公司已经用具体行动落实了他们的言论，至少从董事会决定方面看确实如此。第三，在分析研究了结构性限制和其他障碍的影响后，本文对我们是否可以期待公司行为会有长期改变以及这种改变在多大程度上可以有效地改善企业领域的种族平等和多样性难题，提出了审慎意见。
The Rejected Threat of Corporate Vote Suppression: The Rise and Fall of the Anti-Activist Pill
一项被否决的公司投票压制威胁：反股东积极主义毒丸计划的兴衰
Published Jul 25, 2022
DOI https://doi.org/10.52214/cblr.v2022i1.9981
作者：Jeffrey N. Gordon
Abstract
As disciplinary takeovers are replaced by activist shareholder campaigns, managements may well want to turn to the “anti-activist pill” as shelter from the storm. The economic shock from the widespread shutdown to combat the Covid-19 pandemic produced dozens of so-called “crisis pills.” The defense of these pills as avoiding “disruption” and “distraction” of managements can be seen as a test run for broader use of poison pills to fend off shareholder activism. The Delaware courts, first Chancery and then the Supreme Court, rejected this managerial defense tactic in a way that clarifies the role of the poison pill in corporate governance. In the context of a hostile tender offer, the pill may be legitimated as protecting the statutory “two-step” for a merger: first, screening and negotiating by the board, followed by a shareholder vote on a proposed merger. 
随着惩戒式接管被积极股东运动所取代，管理层很可能想把“反积极股东毒丸计划”用作避免被积极股东施压的工具。为抗击Covid-19大流行而大面积停产所导致的经济冲击催生了数十种所谓的“危机毒丸”。这些毒丸计划的预防作用可以使管理层免受“破坏”和“分心”，这可以被视为一次试水，目的是测试能否更广泛地使用毒丸计划来抵御股东积极主义。特拉华州的法院，从州衡平法院到州最高法院，根据明确毒丸计划在公司治理中所起作用的角度，否决了这种管理防御措施。在公司面临敌意收购要约的情况下，法定的合并计划需要经历“两步走”。首先，合并计划由董事会进行审查和讨论，然后由股东对拟议的合并进行投票。保护这种合并程序的毒丸可能会被认定为是合法的。
Delaware’s board-centric model relies on another statutory mechanism—a director election contest—as the appropriate avenue for managerial accountability. Various elements of the poison pill—the cap on share ownership and a definition of “beneficial owner” that goes beyond “record owner”—have unfortunate side effects on election contests but are necessary to prevent unvetted shifts in control via tender offer or the gradual accumulation of stock (a “creeping tender offer”) either directly or with confederates. An anti-activist pill converts these side effects into its very mechanism, precisely to block a successful director election contest. An election contest is different from a tender offer in this critical respect: Success requires persuasion of a shareholder majority who will remain shareholders after the event. A low pill trigger reduces the activist’s economic incentives and can reduce its credibility; a capacious definition of beneficial ownership burdens its task of persuasion. The Delaware Courts’ reaffirmation of the legitimating role of the shareholder franchise is particularly important now, as the set of shareholder activists expands to include ESG activists who will use director election contests to propose broader conceptions of corporate purpose and shareholder value pursuit.
特拉华州普通公司法采用的“董事会中心”模式，依赖于另一种法定机制——董事选举，这是一种对管理层问责的合理途径。毒丸的各种要素会对董事选举产生不利的副作用，如持股上限和对“受益股东”的范围之定义不仅限于“显名股东”，但它们对于防止收购方通过要约收购或者通过直接或间接逐步增持股票（又称“爬行标购”）的方式进行未经审核的控制权转移是必要的。“反积极股东毒丸”将这些副作用设计入其机制之中，目的是为了精确阻止董事选举被利用于收购目的。董事选举和要约收购的成功要件在这一方面有所不同，即是否需要取得大多数事后仍具有股东身份的股东的同意。一项易于被触发的毒丸条件会减少积极股东的经济动机，并可能降低其可信度；对实际所有权的宽泛定义也加重了其游说其他股东的负担。随着积极股东的范围扩大至ESG（环境、社会和公司治理）活动家，他们将利用董事选举来提出更广泛的公司目的和股东价值追求概念，因而特拉华州法院对股东参与决策权的合法性的重申在现在看来尤为重要。
Digital Cluster Markets
数字集群市场
Published Jul 25, 2022
DOI https://doi.org/10.52214/cblr.v2022i1.9982
作者：Herbert Hovenkamp
Abstract
One foundational requirement of markets in antitrust cases is that they consist of products that are close substitutes for one another. Even though markets are nearly always porous, this principle is very robust in antitrust analysis and there are few deviations. The principle is also important for ensuring that changes in substantive antitrust law are not made through the back door as a result of overly broad or narrow market definitions.
在反垄断案件中，界定市场的一个基本要求是市场系由相近的替代产品组成。尽管市场几乎都是有漏洞的，但这一原则在反垄断分析中是非常有力的，极少会产生偏差。这一原则对于确保防止有人利用过于宽泛或狭窄的市场定义，通过不正当手段改变反垄断实体法至关重要。
This Article considers the role of “cluster” markets, or markets for goods that are not close substitutes, in antitrust litigation, the minimum requirements for recognizing such markets, and the relevance of network effects in identifying them. Clustering noncompeting products into a single market for purposes of antitrust analysis can be valuable, provided that its limitations are understood. Clustering contributes to market power when (1) many customers prefer the convenience of receiving the defendant’s grouping of products rather than any single one, or (2) economies of joint provision (economies of scope in production) make joint distribution of the cluster cheaper per good than distribution of each separately, and (3) entering into competition with the cluster is difficult.
本文考虑了 “集群”市场，即非相近替代品组成的市场在反垄断诉讼中的角色，并认定此类市场的最低要求，以及网络效应在识别此类市场中的关联性。出于反垄断分析的目的，将非竞争性产品归集到一个单独市场可能是有意义的，前提是要先意识到这种做法的局限性。在下列情况中，集群有助于对市场支配地位的认定：（1）出于便利角度，许多顾客更愿意接受被告的产品组合而不是其他单一的产品；（2）联合供应经济（生产范围经济）使在集群中联合分销比单独分销每个产品的成本更低；（3）（其他经营者）很难进入集群市场参与竞争。
When network effects are present, an important additional reason is what might be termed economies of scope in consumption, or increased value that accrues as a group of goods or services offered on the same platform becomes not only more numerous but also more diverse. Often the best way to address the cluster market problem is to avoid market definition altogether. Here, digital markets are particularly susceptible to direct measurements of market power that do not depend on a market definition. One limitation on their use, however, is that many of the methodologies require estimating demand changes in response to price changes, but several digital platforms engage with consumers at a price of zero. Here, however, changes in product quality can operate as an adequate (inverse) surrogate for changes in price.
当网络效应存在时，另一个重要原因是消费范围经济的概念，或是随着在同一平台上提供的商品或服务变得更多且更多样化而随之产生的增值部分。通常来说，解决集群市场问题的最佳方式是避免将不同市场定义在一起。在这种情况下，对数字市场中市场支配地位的认定特别容易受到不依赖市场定义的直接判定方法的影响。然而，使用这种方法的一个限制是，许多判定方法需要预估随价格变化的需求变化，但一些数字平台免费向消费者提供产品服务，不存在价格变化。因而，在这种情况下，产品质量的变化可以被视为判断价格变化的一个合适的（逆向的）替代因素。
Finally, the logic of cluster markets carries an implicit warning about antitrust remedies. Clustering occurs when it creates value, and for consumers as well as producers. As a result, antitrust enforcers should be wary about aggressive breakup remedies that serve to break apart components that were clustered for the very reason that clustering is valuable.
最后，集群市场的逻辑暗含了一个与反垄断补救措施有关的警告。集群市场存在的同时也在创造价值，这价值对消费者和生产者都有利。因此，反垄断执法者应该谨慎采取那些激进的拆分市场的补救措施，这些补救措施会把一个因产生价值而聚集起来的集群市场变得支离破碎。
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