译者 | 徐志成 UCLA LL.M.
审稿 | Jessie PKU硕士 
岳文豪 上海交大硕士
编辑 | MC BU LL.M.
编辑 | 陈远航，美国西北大学LL.M.
01
A Transaction Cost Assessment of SEC Regulation Best Interest
美国证券交易委员会最佳利益规则的交易成本评估
作者：D. Bruce Johnsen
ABSTRACT 摘要
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) is required to provide an economic analysis of proposed regulations and to show they plausibly meet a cost-benefit test. It recently proposed Regulation Best Interest (RBI) to replace the longstanding suitability rule for securities brokers when providing their retail clients with incidental investment advice. Despite a dearth of empirical support, the proposing release concludes that a best interest standard would better mitigate the conflicts of interest brokers face between providing their clients with impartial advice and inflating their own compensation. The empirical vacuum is a result of the SEC’s failure to ask the right economic questions, which Nobel laureate Ronald Coase raised over half a century ago: why does the rule of liability matter? What transaction costs prevent parties–who in this setting negotiate face-to-face–from correcting any market failure through private ordering? This essay provides a transaction cost assessment of RBI and concludes that a far more thorough economic analysis is necessary to justify imposing a best interest standard on retail brokers.
美国证券交易委员会（SEC）被要求为其提议的规则提供经济学分析，并证明它合理地满足了成本-收益测试的要求。最近，SEC提议以“最佳利益规则”（RBI）代替先前长期使用的规范证券经纪人向其零散客户提出附带建议的合适性规则。尽管缺乏实践经验，但提案得出的结论是最佳利益标准能够缓和证券经纪人在为客户提供公正建议和增加自身报酬之间的利益冲突。SEC对某些经济问题考虑的欠缺导致了这类实践经验的空白。而诺贝尔奖得主罗纳德·科斯（Ronald Coase）早在半个多世纪前就已经提出了这些问题：为什么责任规则如此重要？什么交易成本阻止了磋商双方通过私人秩序纠正市场失灵？本文为最佳利益规则提供了交易成本的评估，并得出以下结论：为了证明对从事零散服务的证券经纪人实施最佳利益标准的正当性，需要进行全面经济学分析

02
MONEY AS INFRACTURES
作为基础设施的货币
作者：Morgan Ricks
ABSTRACT 摘要
Traditional infrastructure regulation–the law of regulated industries–rests atop three pillars: rate regulation, entry restriction, and universal service. This mode of regulation has typically been applied to providers of network-type resources: resources that are optimally supplied as integrated systems. The monetary system is such a resource; and money creation is the distinctive function of banks. Bank regulation can therefore be understood as a subfield of infrastructure regulation. With few exceptions, modern academic treatments of banking have emphasizes banks’ intermediation function and downplayed or ignored their monetary function. Concomitantly, in recent decades U.S. bank regulation has strayed from its infrastructural roots. This regulatory drift has been unwise.
传统的基础设施（高速网络服务）监管—旨在规范受监管行业的法律—建立在费率监管、进入限制和普遍服务这三个支柱之上。这一监管模式已经在网络型资源（资源在综合系统下得到了最佳供应）的提供中得到了典型应用。而货币系统也是这样一种资源，由于银行拥有的投放货币的独特功能，银行业监管规则因此也能被理解为基础设施监管的次领域。除了极少数例外，现代学术界对银行业的研究都强调银行的中介功能，而淡化或忽视了银行的货币功能。伴随而来的，是近几十年来美国银行业监管偏离基础设施这一根基，显然这种监管趋势是不明智的。
03
Sunrise, Sunset
An Empirical And Theoretical Assessment of Dual-Class Stock Structures
日出、日落条款对双层股权结构的实证和理论评估
作者：Andrew Winden
ABSTRACT 摘要
A battle is brewing for control of America’s most dynamic companies. Entrepreneurs are increasingly seeking protection from interference or dismissal by public investors through the adoption of dual-class stock structures in initial public offerings. Institutional investors are pushing back, demanding that sucks structures be abandoned or strictly limited through subset provisions. The actual terms of dual-class stock structures, however, have been remarkably understudied, so the debate between proponents of prohibition and private ordering is ill-informed. This paper presents the first empirical analysis of the initial, or sunrise, and terminal, or sunset, provisions found in the charters of dual-class companies, with a data set of 139 U.S. pubic companies. Careful selection of such provisions can satisfy both the desire of entrepreneurs to pursue their idiosyncratic visions for value creation without fear of interference or dismissal and the need of investors for a voice to ensure management accountability. Private law firms representing entrepreneurs in initial public offerings play a critical role in the selection of charter provisions, so the onus is on such firms to ensure that private ordering produces a satisfactory resolution before momentum builds for a regulatory solution to investors’ concerns.
一场争夺美国最具活力公司控制权的战斗正在酝酿。现在，越来越多的企业家们希望通过首次公开发行股票并上市时（IPO）的双层股权结构寻求保护，使他们免受大众投资者的干扰和解雇。而机构投资者们正在反击，要求（这些企业家们）放弃这种双层结构和通过子条款实现的严格限制。然而，对双层股权结构这一概念的研究目前是显著不足的，这导致通过双层股权结构和设置子条款施加限制的反对者与支持者之间的争论建立在了知识匮乏的基础之上。本文通过分析139家美国上市公司的数据，首次对双层股权结构公司章程中的日出条款（起始条款）和日落条款（终止条款）进行了实证分析研究。通过对这些条款的谨慎选择，企业家们追求创造价值而不必担心受到干扰或被解雇的独特愿景，和投资者对企业管理者问责的呼声都能够得到满足。由于私人律所在IPO时代表了这些企业家，并对前述章程规则的选择起到了至关重要的作用，因此这些律所有责任保证在监管机构解决投资者的担忧前，通过私人秩序达成一个满意的解决方案。
04
Hacking Our Securities Disclosure System
The Need for Federal Broker-Dealer Disclosure Requirements Vis-À-Vis Cyber Incidents
针对我们证券披露系统的网络入侵
联邦证券经纪人披露要求的必要性与网络事件之间的关系
作者：Jason Auman
ABSTRACT 摘要
Broker dealers provide investors with the platform to access security markets. To facilitate this access, clients entrust them with sensitive information, including their names, addresses, and social security numbers. Cyberattacks on the financial sector have advances in sophistication and grown more frequent due to technological advances, adjustments in firm business models, and changes in customer behavior, causing new vulnerabilities in firm information systems. However, even with this increase of cyberattacks against broker-dealers, the lack of public disclosure requirements means little is known about the extent of broker-dealer cyber safety.
证券经纪人为投资者提供了进入证券市场的平台。为了拓宽进入证券市场的途径，客户将敏感信息委托给经纪人，包括客户的姓名、住址和社会保险号码。由于技术的进步、公司业务模式的调整和客户行为的变化，对金融业的网络攻击越来越复杂，越来越频繁，导致公司信息系统出现新的漏洞。然而尽管针对证券经纪人的网络攻击正在增加，但因为公开披露要求的缺失，人们对证券经纪人网络安全的程度知之甚少。
Under current SEC regulations, broker-dealers must take preventative action, such as establishing safeguards against cyber breached and maintaining security programs that can identify red flags. However, after a cyberattack occurs, firms are only required to file a Suspicious Activity Report to FinCEN, a bureau within the Treasury Department. Unlike public companies and banks, broker-dealers do not have any federal disclosure requirement to the general public for cybersecurity incidents. Addressing this gap requires a comprehensive examination of the tradeoffs involved in implementing broad new federal disclosure requirements for broker-dealers following cybersecurity incidents.
在SEC的监管规则之下，证券经纪人必须采取预防性措施，例如建立防止网络入侵的安全措施，并维持能够识别潜在危险的安全程序。然而，在网络攻击发生后，公司仅被要求向财政部下属机构FinCEN提交一份可疑行为报告。与上市公司和银行不同，目前针对证券经纪人并没有任何联邦层面的信息披露要求，以要求他们向公众披露网络安全事件。为了解决这一问题，需要对网络安全事件发生后施加于证券经纪人的全新联邦信息披露要求进行利益权衡。
05
Move Last and Take Things
Facebook and Predatory Copying
Facebook：伺后行动，侵略性地抄袭夺取
作者：Josh Obear
ABSTRACT 摘要
Facebook’s now decade-long dominance of the social media landscape stands in start contrast with the industry’s early history of dynamism and disruption. The company played a key role in growing the social media industry from the small, niche communities of the early 2000s into the omnipresent societal force it is today. Capitalizing on this growth, Facebook pioneered a business model that now transforms the attention of billions of users into billions of dollars of advertising revenue. But for all of Facebook’s success, perhaps its greatest triumph has been in defending its golden goose from a swarm of competitors eager to claim a share of the profits. Countless challenges from Snapchat, Twitter, Google, and dozens of social network startups have all failed to break Facebook’s hold of the market.
Facebook当前在社交媒体领域长达数十年的主导地位与该行业早期动态和混乱的历史形成了鲜明的对比。在社交媒体从21世纪的小众社区发展为今天无所不在的社会力量的过程中，脸书起到了至关重要的作用。利用社交媒体行业的发展，Facebook开创了将数十亿用户的关注转化为数十亿美元广告收入的商业模式。但对于Facebook所取得的全部成功，它的最大胜利或许是保护了自己的摇钱树不被其他急于分享利益的竞争者所瓜分。来自Snapchat、Twitter、Google等数十家社交媒体初创公司的无数次挑战，都未能撼动Facebook在市场中的主导地位。
This Note argues that Facebook has exploited its market dominance to exclude competitors in the social media market. Despite complaints from competitors and business commentators, Facebook has so far avoided serious antitrust inquiry. By examining Facebook’s history, its business model, and the structural incentives of the social media market, one can see how Facebook leverages its position toward anticompetitive ends. In particular, this Note explores how Facebook copies the popular apps and features developed by its rivals in order to prevent those rivals from establishing a foothold in the social media market. This copycat strategy causes significant non-monetary consumer harms, such as product degradation and stifled innovation, currently neglected by antitrust doctrine. Facebook’s copying campaign highlights the need for courts o consider new frameworks and theories that help identify new forms of anticompetitive conduct.
本文认为，Facebook通过其市场支配地位，在社交媒体领域排挤其他竞争者。尽管受到竞争者和商业评论家们的抱怨，但Facebook至今为止避免了所有反垄断法的调查。通过研究Facebook的历史、它的商业模式和社交媒体市场的结构性激励，我们可以看到Facebook是如何应用它的地位达成反竞争的目的。本文特别探究了Facebook是如何通过复制其竞争对手开发的流行应用和功能，以防止其竞争者在社交媒体市场立足。这一抄袭策略对消费者造成了重大的非金钱损害，例如产品降级和扼杀创新。但这些损害正被目前的反垄断法所忽略。Facebook的抄袭活动强调了法院寻找新的框架和理论，以判定反竞争行为的必要性。
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