译者|Kiki LSE LL.M.
审稿|Ellen ChenCornell LL.M.;
       中南财经政法大学法本 左亦惟
编辑|徐晓彤 UNSW LL.M
原文链接|
https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/print/article/rebutting-the-presumption/
1
Reassignment 
指定管辖
作者:Toby J. Heytens
This Article is about something federal courts of appeals have done for more than fifty years and more than 600 times. That something is reassignment, a practice where a reviewing court returns a case to a lower court for further proceedings while also directing that those proceedings be conducted by a different trial court judge. Drawing on an examination of the local rules and informal reassignment practices of every federal circuit and district in the United States, as well as an original dataset of 668 decisions in which reassignment was ordered, this Article represents the first scholarly examination of when reassignment happens, who orders it, and how it is ordered. More broadly, this Article uses reassignment as a means to explore the various ways that appellate courts might seek to control trial court judges and influence trial court outcomes. It also discusses what reassignment can teach us about notions of judicial impartiality and neutrality. Finally, this Article discusses reassignment’s implications for familiar debates about whether legal tests are better expressed through rules or standards and the extent to which it is desirable for judges to give reasons for their decisions.
指定管辖在联邦上诉法院已经应用了50多年、超过600次。指定管辖,意即上诉法院将案件退回下级法院,同时指定不同一审法院的法官进一步审理。本文通过研究地方法院规则、美国联邦巡回法院和地方法院的非正式指定管辖,以及668个指定管辖的原始数据,首次对指定管辖何时发生,由谁下令,以及如何下令进行了学术研究。从更广泛的层面上来说,本文探讨了以指定管辖为手段、上诉法院可能寻求的控制一审法院法官和影响审判结果的各种方式。本文亦通过指定管辖探讨了司法公正和中立的理念。最后,本文阐述了指定管辖对人们熟悉的争论的影响,即对司法检验是否最好通过规则或固定标准来表示,以及达到何种程度才能判定法官为决定提供理由是可取的。
https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/print/article/reassignment/
2
Is Data Speech? 
数据是言论吗
作者:Jane Bambauer
Privacy laws rely on the unexamined assumption that the collection of data is not speech. That assumption is incorrect. Privacy scholars, recognizing an imminent clash between this long-held assumption and First Amendment protections of information, argue that data is different from the sort of speech the Constitution intended to protect. But they fail to articulate a meaningful distinction between data and other more traditional forms of expression. Meanwhile, First Amendment scholars have not paid sufficient attention to new technologies that automatically capture data. These technologies reopen challenging questions about what “speech” is.
(图片来源于网络)
隐私法依靠一个未经验证的假设:收集到的数据不是言论。这一假设并不正确,研究隐私的学者认识到该长期占据主流的假设与第一修正案对信息的保护之间可能发生冲突,认为数据与宪法旨在保护的言论不同。但他们没有阐明数据和其他更传统的表达形式之间的显著区别。同时,研究第一修正案的学者们还没有充分意识到自动捕捉数据的新技术。这些技术重新引出了什么是“言论”这一具有挑战性的问题。
This Article makes two overdue contributions to the First Amendment literature. First, it argues that when the scope of First Amendment coverage is ambiguous, courts should analyze the government’s motive for regulating. Second, it highlights and strengthens the strands of First Amendment theory that protect the right to create knowledge. Whenever the state regulates in order to interfere with the creation of knowledge, that regulation should draw First Amendment scrutiny.
本文对第一修正案的相关研究做出了两项迟来的贡献。首先,本文认为,当第一修正案覆盖的范围不明确时,法院应分析政府的监管动机。其次,本文强调并深入论述了第一修正案理论中保护知识创造权的部分。每当国家为了干涉知识的创造进行监管,这种监管就应该受到第一修正案的审查。
In combination, these claims show clearly why data must receive First Amendment protection. When the collection or distribution of data troubles lawmakers, it does so because data has the potential to inform and to inspire new opinions. Data privacy laws regulate minds, not technology. Thus, for all practical purposes, and in every context relevant to privacy debates, data is speech.
综合来看,这些主张清楚地表明了为什么数据必须得到第一修正案的保护。数据的收集或分发确实会给立法者带来麻烦,因为数据有可能提供信息并引出新的观点。数据隐私法规范的是思想,而不是技术。因此,就实际目的而言,在与隐私争论有关的每一种情况下,数据都是言论。
https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/print/article/is-data-speech/
3
The Creation of the Department of Justice: Professionalization Without Civil Rights or Civil Service
司法部的建立:与民权和公务员制度无关的职业化
作者:Jed Handelsman Shugerman
This Article offers a new interpretation of the founding of the Department of Justice (DOJ) in 1870 as an effort to shrink and professionalize the federal government. The traditional view is that Congress created the DOJ to increase the federal government’s capacity to litigate a growing docket due to the Civil War. More recent scholarship contends that Congress created the DOJ to enforce Reconstruction and ex-slaves’ civil rights. However, it has been overlooked that the DOJ Act eliminated about one-third of federal legal staff. The founding of the DOJ had less to do with Reconstruction, and more to do with “retrenchment” (budget cutting and anti-patronage reform). The DOJ’s creation was linked with major professionalization efforts, such as the founding of modern bar associations, to make the practice of law more exclusive and more independent from partisan politics. In this new interpretation, the DOJ’s creation runs in the opposite direction from one historical trend, the growth of the federal government’s size. Instead, it was at the very leading edge of two other major trends: the professionalization of American lawyers and the rise of bureaucratic autonomy and expertise. This story helps explain a historical paradox: how the uniquely American system of formal presidential control over prosecution evolved alongside the norms and structures of professional independence.
本文对1870年司法部(DOJ)的成立重新进行了解释:司法部成立的目的是缩小联邦政府的规模并使之职业化。传统观点认为,国会创建司法部是为了提高联邦政府的诉讼能力,以应对因内战而不断增长的诉讼案件。而最近的学术研究认为,国会创建司法部是为了执行重建(reconstruction)[ 重建时期(Reconstruction):即1863年到1877年,这一时期,当南方邦联与奴隶制度在南北战争中一并被摧毁后,美国试图从南方分离各州重返联邦、确认南方邦联领导人的公民地位、确认黑人自由民的法律地位等方面解决南北战争的遗留问题。]和奴隶制前的公民权利。然而,人们忽视了《司法部法案》裁撤了大约三分之一的联邦法律工作人员。司法部的成立与重建的关联不大,而与“紧缩”(retrenchment,削减预算和反贿赂改革)更关系紧密。司法部的成立与致力于专业化有关,如现代律师协会的成立,以使法律实践更具有排他性并更独立于党派政治。在本文作出的新解释中,司法部的成立与联邦政府规模增长这一历史趋势分道扬镳。反之,它处于另外两个主要趋势的最前沿:美国律师的职业化和官僚自主性及官僚专长的崛起。这有助于解释一个历史悖论:美国独特的总统控制起诉制度是如何与职业独立的规范和结构同时演变的。
(图片来源于网络)
https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/print/article/the-creation-of-the-department-of-justice/
4
Rebutting the Presumption: An Empirical Analysis of Parole Deferrals Under Marsy’s Law 
反驳推定:《马西法》下推迟假释的实证分析
作者:David R. Friedman & Jackie M. Robinson
The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation oversees the largest population of inmates serving life terms, or “lifers,” in the country. Every year, over 1800 of these lifers go before the Board of Parole Hearings, and around 75% are denied parole. Proposition 9, or Marsy’s Law, dramatically changed the consequences of that denial. Previously, when lifers were denied parole, they typically waited a maximum of two years to have the opportunity to plead their case again. Under the new system implemented by Marsy’s Law, lifers who are denied parole must presumptively wait fifteen years for another chance at release. Though many scholars have examined the decision to grant or deny parole, almost nothing has been written about the related decision of how long to defer the reconsideration of parole after a denial. Given the sheer magnitude of the change ushered in by Marsy’s Law, we seek fill this void in the literature by empirically exploring the operation of this new system in practice. This Note ultimately finds evidence that several extralegal considerations, such as gender and commissioner identity, may be influencing the length of deferral periods granted under this new regime. It also provides a firm empirical footing for our recommendation that new guidelines be promulgated that specifically address this phase of the parole decisionmaking process.
加州惩教署(The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation)监管着全国最多的无期徒刑的囚犯,即可被称为 “无期徒刑犯”(lifers)的一群人。每年有超过1800名无期徒刑犯被提交给假释听证会,其中约75%的人会被拒绝假释。第9号提案,即《马西法》,极大地改变了这一现状。之前,当无期徒刑犯被拒绝假释时,通常情况下他们最多等待两年就有机会再次申请。但根据《马西法》实施的新制度,被拒绝假释的无期徒刑犯须等待15年才有机会再次提出假释。尽管许多学者已经研究了批准或拒绝假释的裁定,但关于假释被拒绝后要经过多长时间才能重新申请的研究仍付之阙如。鉴于《马西法》带来的变化之大,我们试图通过探索新制度在实践中的应用进行研究来填补这一研究空白。本文最终发现,有证据表明,一些法律以外的因素,如性别和委员身份,有可能会影响这个新制度下规定的再申请期限。它还为我们的建议提供了坚实的经验基础,即颁布专门针对假释决策过程这一阶段的新准则。
https://www.stanfordlawreview.org/print/article/rebutting-the-presumption/
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