翻译 | 伍雪畅 杜伦大学 LL.M. 
审稿 | 一审 岳文豪 上海交大法学硕士
         二审 Caramel 西北LL.M.
编辑 | LIU YUAN UCB LL.M.
Columbia Law Review Vol. 122 No.1
哥大法律评论122卷第1期
 01 
Trade Transparency: A Call for Surfacing Unseen Deals
交易透明：呼吁公开隐形的交易
作者：Anita S. Krishnakumar
For many years, the executive branch has concluded foreign commercial agreements with trading partners pursuant to delegated authority from Congress. The deals govern the contours of a wide range of U.S. inbound and outbound trade: from food safety rules for imported products to procedures and specifications of exported goods, to name two. The problem is that often no one-apart from the executive branch negotiators-knows what these deals contain. A lack of transparency rules has inhibited the publication of and reporting to Congress of these unseen deals. Dozens if not hundreds of foreign commercial deals are unseen in two ways: (1) The executive branch rarely makes their texts readily available, and (2) the texts of many such deals appear largely to have been lost by the executive branch itself. This Piece lays out how the Biden Administration and Congress could ameliorate such problems in the trade transparency and recordkeeping systems. It identifies the flaws in our separation of trade law powers that have led to the hiddenness of such deals, drawing from interviews with U.S. officials that help to shed light on the deals’ obscurity. Expecting that the Biden Administration is likely to rely on these deals despite these acute problems, this Piece suggests changes to the system without hampering the executive’s use of this increasingly important tool.
许多年来，行政部门根据国会的授权，与贸易伙伴签订了外贸协议。这些协议确定了美国广泛的进出口贸易的轮廓：从进口产品的食品安全规则到出口货物的手续和规格（仅举两例）。问题是，除了行政部门的谈判方之间，往往没有其他人知道这些交易的内容。透明性的缺失阻碍了这些隐形交易向国会公开与报告。几十个甚至上百个外贸交易通过以下两种途径隐匿：（1）行政机关几乎不公开其文本；（2）许多此类交易文本被行政部门遗失。本篇文章阐述了拜登政府与国会如何改善外贸透明性和存档系统中的这些问题，揭示了我们的贸易法中权力分立的缺陷，这些缺陷导致了贸易的隐蔽，并通过对美国官员的采访，进一步揭示这些交易的隐蔽性。尽管存在上述尖锐的问题，拜登政府仍有可能依赖这些交易。本篇建议在不妨碍行政部门使用这一日益重要的工具的前提下，对这一系统进行一些修改。
  02
When Double Jeopardy Should Bar Retrial In Cases Of Prosecutorial Misconduct: A Call For Broader State Protection
在检察官渎职的情况下，一罪不二审何时应当禁止重审：呼吁提供更广泛的国民保护
作者：Emily McEvoy
In Oregon v. Kennedy, the Supreme Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar the reprosecution of a defendant in cases in which prosecutorial misconduct causes the defendant to move for a mistrial. The Court established only one exception to this rule: If the prosecutor’s misconduct was intended to provoke the defendant into moving for a mistrial, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars the retrial of the defendant. The Kennedy standard thus allows for the retrial of a defendant in any case in which prosecutorial misconduct was aimed at securing the conviction of the defendant.
在Oregon诉Kennedy案中，最高法院认为，在公诉人的渎职行为导致被告提出无效审判的情况下，一罪不二审规则并不排除重新起诉被告（即下文“肯尼迪标准”）的可能。法院对此规则只设定了一种例外：如果公诉人渎职是为了刻意诱使被告提出无效诉讼，那么一罪不二审规则同样禁止对被告进行重审。因此，肯尼迪标准允许任何旨在确保对被告定罪的公诉人渎职案件中对被告进行重审。
Since Kennedy was decided, only seven states have determined that their state double jeopardy clauses provide defendants with broader protection against retrial in cases of prosecutorial misconduct. Each provides that a defendant cannot be retried in cases of egregious or overly prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct, regardless of whether the misconduct was aimed at goading the defendant to move for a mistrial.
自Kennedy案判决以后，仅有七个州确保了在州内的一罪不二审条款为被告提供了更广泛的保护，使其在检察官渎职的情况下避免被重审。他们规定在公诉人严重渎职的情况下，无论该渎职行为是否旨在诱使被告申请重审，被告都不能被重审。
This Note argues that all states ought to adopt standards broader than Kennedy under their state constitutions. Broader standards better uphold the purpose of double jeopardy by more rigorously protecting defendants’ rights while also accommodating the interests of society in preventing crime. Additionally, this Note argues that lower courts in the seven states that have adopted broader standards have not struggled to apply these standards, and the Supreme Court’s concern that judges will not grant mistrials under broader standards has not been borne out by experience.
本文认为，所有的州都应当根据其州宪法采用比Kennedy案更宽泛的标准。采用更宽泛的标准有助于更好地达到一罪不二审的立法目的，即更严格地保护被告的权利，同时也更好地维护社会在预防犯罪方面的利益。此外，本文认为，七个州的原审法院在适用更宽泛标准时并没有遇到困难，并且最高法院对法官在适用更宽泛标准时不会宣告审理无效的担忧并没有实践经验的支持。
  03 
The Antifascist Roosts of Presidential Administration
总统制的反法西斯根源
作者：Noah A. Rosenblum
This Article uncovers the intellectual foundations of presidential administration and—on the basis of original archival research and new contextualization—grounds its legitimacy in the fight against fascism. It shows how the architects of presidential control of the administrative state reconciled a strong executive with democratic norms by embracing separation of powers in order to make the government responsible and antifascist. It then draws out the consequences of these overlooked developments for presidential administration today.
本篇文章揭示了总统制的思想基础，并在原始档案与新背景的基础上，阐述了其在反法西斯斗争中的合法性。本文展示了总统制国家的顶层设计师们如何通过拥护三权分立来调和强势的行政机关与民主制度的矛盾，进而塑造一个负责任的反法西斯的政府。然后，本文指出了这些被忽视的权力建构对于如今总统行政管理权的影响。
The Article takes inspiration from the turn to history in Article II scholarship and jurisprudence. In search of legitimating foundations, champions of presidential administration have embraced the work of the New Deal–era President’s Committee on Administrative Management. This Article uses untapped sources and overlooked historical context to advance a new reading of the Committee’s report, showing how it drew from and adapted an older Progressive Era tradition. At the heart of this story is a notable reversal: Where Progressive Era reformers rejected formal constitutionalism and the principle of separation of powers, the New Dealers embraced both to empower the President while guarding against fascism. This history raises a pair of challenges for the unitary executive theory, while providing a historical and doctrinal foundation for the competing “internal separation of powers” school of Article II jurisprudence. It also motivates an “antifascist litmus test,” which can help assess proposals for executive branch reform.
这篇文章从宪法第二条的学理与判例的历史转型中受到启迪。为了寻找合法化基础，总统制的拥护者接受了（罗斯福）新政时期总统行政管理委员会的工作。本文结合尚未被研究过的资料与被忽视的历史，对该委员会的报告进行了新的解读，展示其如何借鉴与改编进步时代（1890s-1920s）的传统。这个故事的核心是个明显的对立：进步时代的改革者拒绝法定的宪政主义与三权分立原则，而新政支持者则接受了这两者，在防范法西斯主义的同时扩张总统权力。这一历史给单一制国家理论提出了两项挑战，同时为宪法第二条中相互竞争的“内部分权”学派提供了历史与法理基础。这一历史还促进了一个“反法西斯试金石”的形成，这可以帮助评估行政部门改革的议案。
  04
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION FROM THE OUTSIDE
来自外部的法律解释
作者：Kevin Tobia, Brian G. Slocum & Victoria Nourse
How should judges decide which linguistic canons to apply in interpreting statutes? One important answer looks to the inside of the legislative process: Follow the canons that lawmakers contemplate. A different answer, based on the “ordinary meaning” doctrine, looks to the outside: Follow the canons that guide an ordinary person’s understanding of the legal text. We offer a novel framework for empirically testing linguistic canons “from the outside,” recruiting 4,500 people from the United States and a sample of law students to evaluate hypothetical scenarios that correspond to each canon’s triggering conditions. The empirical findings provide evidence about which traditional canons “ordinary meaning” actually supports.
法官在解释法规时应当适用何种语言规范？其中的一个重要答案是着眼于立法过程的内部：遵循立法者的考量。另一个答案是基于“通常含义”学说，着眼于外部：遵循一般人理解法律文本的规范。我们提供了一个新的框架，招募了包括法学生在内的4500名美国人，来评估与每个规范的触发条件相对应的模拟情景，用于“从外部”实证性地测试语言规范。本次实证性研究提供了关于“通常含义”实际上支持哪些语言规范的证据。
This Essay’s theory and empirical study carry several further implications. First, linguistic canons are not a closed set. We discovered possible new canons that are not yet reflected as legal canons, including a “nonbinary gender canon” and a “quantifier domain restriction canon.” Second, we suggest a new understanding of the ordinary meaning doctrine itself, as one focused on the ordinary interpretation of rules, as opposed to the traditional focus on “ordinary language” generally. Third, many of the canons reflect that ordinary people interpret rules with an intuitive anti-literalism. This anti-literalism finding challenges textualist assumptions about ordinary meaning. Most broadly, we hope this Essay initiates a new research program in empirical legal interpretation. If ordinary meaning is relevant to legal interpretation, interpreters should look to evidence of how ordinary people actually understand legal rules. We see our experiments as a first step in that new direction.
本文的理论与实证研究有如下进步意义。首先，语言规范并非一个封闭的集合。我们发现了一些可能存在但还尚未体现在法规中的新的用语规范，包括“非二元性别规范”与“量词领域限制规范”。第二，我们提出了一个关于通常含义学说本身的新理解，即侧重于对规则的一般解释，而非传统上对“日常用语”的关注。第三，许多规范发现大众以一种直观的反字面含义来解释法律。这一发现挑战了大众对通常含义进行字面解释的假设。概括来讲，我们希望这篇论文在实证性法学研究中开创一个新的研究项目。如果通常含义与法律解释相关，那么释义者就应当寻求大众实际上如何理解法律法规的证据。我们认为我们的实验是朝这个方向迈进的第一步。
  05 
Who Is the Reasonable Police Officer? A Localized Solution to A Nationwide Problem
谁是理性警官？一个全国性问题的地域性解决办法
作者：Jesse Chang
In Graham v. Connor, the Supreme Court held that a Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard governed the analysis of any allegation that a law enforcement officer used excessive force during an arrest or investigatory stop. In particular, courts were to evaluate the reasonableness of the need to use force from the perspective of a hypothetical reasonable police officer at the scene. While this test seems straightforward, the Supreme Court has provided little guidance on how exactly to apply the reasonable police officer analysis. As a result, it has been criticized as a vague standard, which is difficult for courts to apply, and unduly deferential to the police.
在Graham v. Connor案中，最高法院认为第四修正案的合理性标准适用于分析对执法人员在逮捕或拦截调查期间过度使用暴力手段的任何指控。尤其是，法院要从假设一个理性警官在场的角度，来评估使用武力的合理性。虽然这个测试看上去很直白，但是最高法院对于如何准确运用理性警官分析并没有提供什么指导。因此，它被批评为一个法院难以运用、对警官过于宽容的模糊标准。
This Note proposes that courts adopt a localized conception of the reasonable police officer as a modest reform within the existing framework for excessive force analysis. Under the localized conception, courts would assign objective attributes, particular to the jurisdiction where the excessive force allegedly happened, to the hypothetical reasonable police officer. Accordingly, the reasonable police officer becomes less of an amorphous standard and more of a concrete vehicle for analysis that is responsive to local notions of acceptable police behavior.
本文建议法院采用理性警官的地域性概念，作为对现有分析框架中的一项适度改革。法院将根据地域性概念为假定的理性警官划定客观标准，特别是在据称发生了警方过度使用暴力事件的辖区。因此，理性警官不再是一个抽象的标准，而是一个对警官行为可接受度概念本地化响应的具体分析工具。
  06 
Ice Ruses: From Deception to Deportation
冰上诡计：从欺诈到驱逐出境
作者：Min K. Kam
In 2005, the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency enacted a policy sanctioning its civil ICE agents to use strategic deception, known as “ruses,” to facilitate community immigration enforcement operations. This policy provided agents a means to overcome the limitation that civil immigration arrest warrants are administrative as opposed to judicial in nature, which effectively precluded agents from entering a target’s home without first obtaining consent. Since, civil ICE agents have deployed various ruses to lure targets outside of their homes or, more controversially, elicit consent to gain entry into their homes. Once inside, agents often conduct sweeping searches and execute “collateral arrests” of nontarget bystanders who are also suspected to be undocumented.
2005年，联邦移民与海关执法局（ICE）颁布了一项政策，准许其民间调查员使用战略性欺骗手段，即所谓的“诡计”，以促进社区移民执法行动。这项政策为调查员提供了一种手段，以克服非法移民入境逮捕令属行政性质而非司法性质的限制，有效地排除了调查员在未获得许可时进入目标家庭住所的可能性。因此，ICE民间调查员就使用各种诡计把目标人群引诱至住所之外，更有甚者，在征得同意后进入他们家中。一旦调查员进入家中，调查员通常进行全面搜查，并对被怀疑为无证滞留的“旁观者”进行“附带逮捕”。
The Fourth Amendment has always tolerated some degree of law enforcement deception. But the existing body of law that delineates the constitutional limits of government deceit contemplates the use of ruses in only the criminal context, which assumes that criminal law enforcement officers are employing subterfuge only against purported criminals. Legal analysis of the use of deception in the civil immigration context is almost entirely lacking, largely because ICE ruse practices have escaped judicial scrutiny. This Note seeks to close this gap by examining both the legal and policy questions raised when a civil government agency uses deception against those who have committed a civil immigration infraction. It then proposes two limitations on the current policy that would address the constitutional concerns and better align it with the policy justification underlying the use of government deception.
第四修正案一直以来容忍某种程度的执法欺诈行为。但是目前规范政府欺诈的宪法性限制仅考虑在刑事背景下使用“诡计“，它假定刑事执法官员只针对潜在罪犯使用欺诈手段。由于ICE的欺诈行为并没有受到司法审查，所以针对非法移民入境使用欺诈手段的法律分析极为匮乏。本文试图通过研究移民局调查员对有非法移民入境行为的人使用欺诈手段所引起的法律与政策问题，来填补这一空白。然后，本文提出了对现行政策的两项限制，以解决宪法与政府欺诈手段合理性基础之间的的矛盾。
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