法律翻译 | 《耶鲁法律评论》第127卷第6期目录+摘要

This Article sets forth a new paradigm for describing, understanding, and shaping children’s relationship to law. The existing legal regime, which we term the “authorities framework,” focuses too narrowly on state and parental control over children, reducing children’s interests to those of dependency and the attainment of autonomy. In place of this limited focus, we envision a “new law of the child” that promotes a broader range of children’s present and future interests, including children’s interests in parental relationships and nonparental relationships with children and other adults; exposure to new ideas; expressions of identity; personal integrity and privacy; and participation in civic life. Once articulated, these broader interests lay the foundation for a radical reconceptualization of the field of children and law. We propose a new tripartite framework of relationships, responsibilities, and rights that aims to transform how law treats children and their interactions with others. The framework addresses children’s needs for state and parental control in many instances while also moving beyond those concerns to foster children’s interests in the here and now.

本文意图提出一个全新的范式来描述、理解并塑造儿童与法律的关系。已有的法律制度，即我们称之为“权威架构”的那些部分，太过关注于国家与家长对于儿童的控制，减损儿童对于此种依赖关系的利益以及自主性的习得。本文预想一种“新的儿童法”以代替这种局限的关切，促进儿童更广范围的现实与未来利益，包括儿童在亲子及与其他成人间的非亲子关系；对新事物的开放；身份表达；个人尊严及隐私；以及对于公民生活的参与这些方面的利益。这些更加广阔的利益一旦被联结起来，将为一场儿童与法律领域的根本重构打下基础。我们主张一种“关系、责任与权利”的三方架构，从而转变法律对待儿童以及其与其他主体互动的方式。该架构解决儿童对于国家以及父母在许多情形下的管束需求，但同时也超越这些关切来促进儿童当下的利益。

The administrative state is suffering from a crisis of legitimacy. Many have questioned the legality of the myriad commissions, boards, and agencies through which much of our modern governance occurs. Scholars such as Jerry Mashaw, Theda Skocpol, and Michele Dauber, among others, have provided compelling institutional histories, illustrating that administrative lawmaking has roots in the early American republic. Others have attempted to assuage concerns through interpretive theory, arguing that the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 implicitly amended our Constitution. Solutions offered thus far, however, have yet to provide a deeper understanding of the meaning and function of the administrative state within our constitutional framework. Nor have the lawmaking models of classic legal process theory, on which much of our public law rests, captured the nuanced democratic function of these commissions, boards, and agencies.

行政国家正在遭受合法性危机。很多人质疑数目庞杂的委员会，董事会与代理中介的合法性，而现代治理通过它们得以实现。诸如杰瑞·马肖，希达·斯科克波以及米凯莱·道伯尔等学者，已经提供了关于提供了令人信服的制度史，显示行政立法扎根于早期美洲的共和政体。其他人则已尝试通过解释性理论来平息关切，主张1946年的《行政程序法》含蓄地修改了宪法。但迄今为止给出的所有结论，没有能够在宪法框架下提供一个更深层次的关于行政国家的意义与功能的理解。作为本国公法基础的经典法律程序理论的立法模型同样也没能把握住这些委员会，董事会以及代理中介精细化的民主功能。

This Article takes a different tack. It begins with an institutional history of the petition process, drawn from an original database of over 500,000 petitions submitted to Congress from the Founding until 1950 and previously unpublished archival materials from the First Congress. Historically, the petition process was the primary infrastructure by which individuals and minorities participated in the lawmaking process. It was a formal process that more closely resembled litigation in a court than the tool of mass politics that petitioning has become today. The petition process performed an important democratic function in that it afforded a mechanism of representation for the politically powerless, including the unenfranchised. Much of what we now call the modern “administrative state” grew out of the petition process in Congress. This Article offers three case studies to track that outgrowth: the development of the Court of Claims, the Bureau of Pensions, and the Interstate Commerce Commission. These case studies supplement dynamics identified previously in the historical literature and highlight the integral role played by petitioning in the early administrative state—a role unrecognized in most institutional histories. Rather than simply historical, this excavation of the petition process is distinctly legal in that it aims to name the petition process and to connect it with the theory and law that structure the practice.

本文将采取不同的进路。其从请愿程序的制度史开始，从原始数据中提取史实。该数据由500,000份自国会产生直至1950年的时间内被提交的请愿以及之前未被公开的第一届国会档案材料组成。在历史上，请愿程序是个人与少数群体参与立法程序的重要手段。它是一种正式的程序，更类似法院中的诉讼，而不像今天的请愿已成为大众政治的工具。请愿程序展现了重要的民主功能，因其为政治上无权无势的群体，包括无选举权的群体，提供了一个得到代表的机会。我们现在所称的“行政国家”很大一部分即从国会的请愿程序中发展而来。本文提供三个案例：索赔法院，津贴局，以及州际贸易委员会，并追踪他们自然发展的过程。这些案例研究补充了历史性文献中已经被识别出的维度，同时强调了请愿在早期行政国家中所扮演的必不可少的——但未被大多数制度史认同的角色。对于请愿程序的发掘不仅具有简单的历史属性，从其目标来说更具有鲜明的法律属性：因为其旨在为情愿程序正名，并将其与塑造实践的理论与法律相连接。

Excavating the historical roots of these myriad commissions, boards, and agencies in the petition process provides a deeper functional and textual understanding of the administrative state within our constitutional framework. First, it highlights the function of the administrative state in facilitating the participation of individuals and minorities in lawmaking. By providing a mechanism of representation for individuals and minorities, the “participatory state” serves as an important supplement to the majoritarian mechanism of the vote. Second, it offers new historical context against which to read the text of Article I and the First Amendment. This new interpretation could begin to calm discomfort, at least in part, held by textualists and originalists with regard to the administrative state. Lastly, this Article offers a few examples to illustrate how this new interpretation could provide helpful structure to our administrative law doctrine. With its concern over procedural due process rights, administrative law largely reflects the quasi-due process protections offered by the Petition Clause. This Article explores two areas where the Petition Clause could direct a different doctrinal result, arguing for a stronger procedural due process right for petitioners of the administrative state than that offered by Mathews v. Eldridge and arguing against the Supreme Court’s decision in INS v. Chadha holding the legislative veto unconstitutional.

对庞杂的委员会，董事会以及代理中介历史的发掘，提供了对于本国宪法框架下行政国家更深层次的功能及文义理解。首先，其强调了行政国家在促进个人以及少数群体参与立法过程的功能。通过为个人和少数群体提供一个代表机制，“参与性国家”可以作为多数主义投票机制的重要补充。其次，它提供一个与宪法第一条以及第一修正案相左的全新历史情境，。这一新的解释将要抚平那些文本主义者和原旨主义者面对行政国家所造成的（宪法上的）龃龉之处，至少是其中的一部分。最后，本文提供了新的例证，来展示这一新的解释如何为我们的行政法学说提供有帮助的结构。行政法与其对于正当程序权利的关切，反映了请愿条款所提供的准正当程序保护。本文探讨请愿条款可能导致不同学理结果的两个领域，主张面对行政国家的请愿者提供相对于马修斯诉埃尔德里奇案更强的正当程序保护，并且反对最高法院在移民及归化局诉查德哈案中判决立法反对是违宪的这一意见。