译者 |周文君 布里斯托大学LL.M.
一审 |毛雨嫣 中国政法大学
二审 |peipei Bristol LL.M.
编辑 |NYZ 武汉大学本科
责编 |陈宣颖 西南政法大学本科
Introduction
Introduction to the Special Issue on the Law of the Territories
领地法特刊简介
作者:Rachel Valentina Sommers
The Yale Law Journal is thrilled to present a Special Issue on the Law of the Territories, which explores unresolved controversies and debates concerning the U.S. territories. In the pages that follow, our authors examine the complex and often-fraught relationship between the U.S. government and its territories. Their pieces discuss the implications of recently decided cases involving the territories, survey the vulnerabilities of longstanding territorial precedents, and propose alternative frameworks for understanding and litigating issues pertaining to the rights of territorial residents and the sovereignty of their governments.
《耶鲁法律评论》非常高兴推出领地法特刊,以探讨关于美国领地尚未解决的争议和辩论。在接下来的篇幅中,我们的作者研究了美国政府及其领地之间复杂且常常令人担忧的关系。他们的文章讨论了近期裁决中涉及领地案件的影响,检视了长期存在的领地先例的脆弱性,并提出了对领地居民的权利及其政府主权问题进行理解和起诉的替代性框架。
Debates about these and various other topics relevant to the territories have often taken place in the courts. Indeed, the resurgence of litigation concerning the territories in the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts demonstrates the enduring relevance and importance of the law of the territories. This Term, the Supreme Court held in United States v. Vaello-Madero that the Constitution does not require Congress to grant Supplemental Security Income benefits to residents of Puerto Rico. In a concurring opinion, Justice Gorsuch called on the Court to overrule the Insular Cases, a series of early twentieth-century cases infamously holding that the Constitution does not fully apply to “unincorporated” territories. The petitioners in Fitisemanu v. United States have heeded his call to action. In their pending petition for a writ of certiorari, they ask the Court to decide whether persons born in the territories are entitled to birthright citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause—and whether the Court should overrule the Insular Cases once and for all.
关于上述内容以及其他各种领地相关话题的讨论经常在法院发生。实际上,领地相关诉讼在最高法院和下级联邦法院中的复苏表明领地法具有长久的相关性和重要性。这一届最高法院在美国诉Vaello-Madero案中认为,宪法不要求国会给予波多黎各居民社会安全金福利。在一项协同意见中,戈萨奇大法官呼吁最高法院推翻岛屿案。(岛屿案)是二十世纪早期一系列臭名昭著的案件,在这些案件中法院认为宪法不完全适用于“非合并”领土。在Fitisemanu诉美国案中的请愿者将其呼吁付诸行动。在他们即将提出的复审令申请中,他们请求最高法院裁决,出生在海外领地的人是否享有宪法第十四修正案公民权条款中规定的出生公民权——以及法院是否应一次性从根本上推翻所有岛屿案。
Outside of courthouses and legislatures, debates concerning the territories have also taken place in the scholarly literature, including in the pages of the Journal. A century ago, those pages contributed to the development, dissemination, and popularization of racist notions of territorial subordination. The Supreme Court would later adopt those same notions to justify its holdings in the Insular Cases, demonstrating the important—and sometimes pernicious—role that legal scholarship can play in shaping legal and political realities. In publishing this Special Issue, the Journal hopes to begin the critical work of both recognizing its role in perpetuating damaging conceptions of the territories and uplifting scholarship that has the intention and potential to forge a new future.
在法院和立法机构之外,关于领地的讨论也发生在学术文献中,包括本期刊的内容。一个世纪前,那些文献对领地从属关系的种族主义观念的发展、传播和普及作出了贡献。最高法院后来也采用了相同的概念来证明其在岛屿案中的观点是合理的,这表明法律学术研究在塑造法律和政治现实方面具有非常重要的作用,有时也是有害的作用。通过发行本期特刊,本刊希望开始一项重要工作,即承认其在延续破坏性的领地概念方面的作用,同时提升有意愿且有潜力打造新未来的学术研究。
The Special Issue features four Articles by renowned and emerging scholars. After advertising a call for papers on the law of the territories and receiving submissions, the Journal selected each Special Issue Article in accordance with its traditional review process, including several rounds of anonymized review by Journal editors and peer review by scholars specializing in the law of the territories.
本特刊刊登了四篇由知名学者和新兴学者撰写的文章。在发布关于领地法的征稿广告并收到投稿后,本刊根据传统评审程序精选出每篇特刊文章,(该程序)包括数轮期刊编辑匿名评审和专业领地法学者的同行评审。
The first Article, Navassa: Property, Sovereignty, and the Law of the Territories, is by Joseph Blocher and Mitu Gulati. It draws on the history of the first overseas U.S. territory, Navassa Island, to demonstrate how property and private law can help to dismantle colonial structures in the territories. In doing so, it encourages readers to think beyond traditional, public-law conceptions of the territories as sovereign land to be governed, proposing instead a private-law conception of the territories as property to be owned. So long as that property is understood to belong to the people of the territories, it argues, a private-law approach could provide concrete solutions to the harms wrought by colonialism, including negotiated economic settlements and auctions for sovereign control.
第一篇文章《纳弗沙:财产、主权和领地法》,作者为Joseph Blocher 和Mitu Gulati。本文借鉴了美国第一个海外领地纳弗沙岛的历史,展示了财产和私法是如何能够帮助瓦解领地上的殖民结构。在此过程中,本文引导读者突破海外领地的传统公法概念,即将其视为需要治理的主权土地。相反,该文章提出海外领地是可以拥有的财产这一私法概念。该文章认为,只要这个财产被理解为属于领地人民,私法方法就可以为殖民主义造成的伤害提供具体的解决办法,包括协商经济解决方案和拍卖主权控制权。
The second Article, The Insular Cases Run Amok: Against Constitutional Exceptionalism in the Territories, is by Christina Duffy Ponsa-Kraus. Scholars and practitioners have recently argued that the Insular Cases should be repurposed to protect cultural practices in the territories from constitutional challenges. This Article disagrees. It calls on the Supreme Court to overrule—rather than repurpose—the Insular Cases, and it points to constitutional doctrines beyond their reach that can preserve cultural practices without spawning a crisis of political illegitimacy in the unincorporated territories.
第二篇文章《岛屿案失控:反对海外领地宪法例外论》,作者为Christina Duffy Ponsa-Kraus。学者和从业者最近认为,岛屿案应该被重新利用,以保护海外领地的文化习俗免受宪法挑战。该文章不赞同此观点。它呼吁最高法院推翻而非重新利用岛屿案,并且指出其范围之外的宪法学说可以保护文化习俗,而不会在非合并领地造成政治非法性危机。
The third Article, Aurelius’s Article III Revisionism: Reimagining Judicial Interventions for the Insular Cases and “The Law of the Territories,” is by James T. Campbell. It challenges Ponsa-Kraus’s argument head-on, arguing that simply overruling the Insular Cases, as the Supreme Court recently did with Korematsu v. United States in Trump v. Hawaii, could pose a grave threat to territorial self-determination. In doing so, the Article demonstrates how courts can and do engage in territorial status manipulation without explicit reliance on the Insular Cases.
第三篇文章《奥勒留第三条款修正主义:重新构想岛屿案的司法干预和“领地法”》,作者为James T. Campbell。该文章正面挑战了Ponsa-Kraus的观点,认为正如最高法院在特兰普诉夏威夷案中对Korematsu诉美国案中所做的那样,简单地推翻岛屿案可能会对领地自决权构成重大威胁。在此过程中,该文章展示了在不明确依赖岛屿案的情况下,法院如何可以参与且确实参与了领地地位的控制。
The fourth and final Article is Indigenous Subjects by Addie C. Rolnick. Centering on the wide-ranging implications of the Supreme Court’s decision in Rice v. Cayetano, it argues that the Court’s race jurisprudence threatens Indigenous self-determination and land rights in the territories. It concludes by offering several strategies that litigants can use to protect Indigenous rights within the existing doctrinal landscape. Along the way, it also addresses the law’s reluctance to recognize the distinctions and intersections between various political identity categories—including “indigeneity,” “Indianness,” “colonized,” race, and ancestry—by clarifying their meanings and manifestations across various legal subfields—including Federal Indian law, international law, the law of the territories, and race law.
第四篇也是最后一篇文章,是由Addie C. Rolnick撰写的《原住民主体》。该文章以最高法院在赖斯诉卡耶塔诺案中裁决的广泛影响为中心,认为最高法院的种族判例威胁着海外领地上的原住民自决权和土地权。该文章最后提出了诉讼当事人可以在现有理论框架内用来保护原住民权利的几项策略。在此过程中,它还解决了法律不愿意承认多种政治身份类别和血统之间的区别和交叉问题。该类别包括“原住民”、“印第安人”、“被殖民的”、种族。该文章通过阐明它们在各法律分支领域的含义和表现——包括联邦印第安人法、国际法、领地法和种族法,解决了上述问题。
Article 1
Navassa: Property, Sovereignty, and the Law of the Territories

纳弗沙:财产、主权和领地法
作者:Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati
ABSTRACT. The United States acquired its first overseas territory—Navassa Island, near Haiti—by conceptualizing it as a kind of property to be owned, rather than a piece of sovereign territory to be governed. The story of Navassa shows how competing conceptions of property and sovereignty are an important and underappreciated part of the law of the territories—a story that continued fifty years later in the Insular Cases, which described Puerto Rico as “belonging to” but not “part of” the United States.
摘要:美国通过将纳弗沙岛概念化为一种可以拥有的财产,而不是一块需要治理的主权领地,从而获得了它第一个海外领地——靠近海地的纳弗沙岛。纳弗沙岛的故事说明,财产和主权这两个竞争概念是领地法中重要却被低估的部分——这个故事在50年后的岛屿案中继续上演,该案将波多黎各描述成“属于”美国但不是美国的“一部分”。
Contemporary scholars are drawn to the sovereignty framework and the public-law tools that come along with it: arguments about rights and citizenship geared to show that the territories should be recognized as “part of” the United States. But it would be a mistake to completely reject the language and tools of property and private law, which can also play a role in dismantling the colonial structure—so long as it is clear that the relevant entitlements lie with the people of the territories. Doing so can help conceptualize the harms of colonialism in different ways (not only conquest, but unjust enrichment), and can facilitate the creation of concrete solutions like negotiated economic settlements, litigation against colonial powers, and the possibility of auctions for sovereign control.
当代学者被主权框架和随之而来的公法工具吸引:关于权利和公民权的主张调整配合,旨在说明海外领地应该被视为美国的“一部分”。但是,完全拒绝财产和私法的语言和工具将会是个错误,它们也可在废除殖民结构方面发挥作用——只要明确相关权利被赋予了领土居民。这样做有助于以不同方式将殖民主义的危害概念化(不仅是征服,还有不公平的敛财),同时还便于构建具体解决方法,比如协商经济解决方案、对殖民国家提起诉讼、以及拍卖主权控制权的可能性。
Article 2
The Insular Cases Run Amok: Against Constitutional Exceptionalism in the Territories
岛屿案失控:反对海外领地宪法例外论
作者:Christina D. Ponsa-Kraus
ABSTRACT. The Insular Cases have been enjoying an improbable—and unfortunate—renaissance. Decided at the height of what has been called the “imperialist” period in U.S. history, this series of Supreme Court decisions handed down in the early twentieth century infamously held that the former Spanish colonies annexed by the United States in 1898—Puerto Rico, the Philip- pines, and Guam—“belong[ed] to, but [were] not a part of, the United States.” What exactly this meant has been the subject of considerable debate even as those decisions have received unanimous condemnation. According to the standard account, the Insular Cases held that the “entire” Constitution applies within the United States (defined as the states, the District of Columbia, and the so-called “incorporated” territories) while only its “fundamental” limitations apply in what came to be known as the “unincorporated” territories (today, Puerto Rico, Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, the Northern Mariana Islands, and American Samoa). Scholars unanimously agree that the Insular Cases gave the Court’s sanction to U.S. colonial rule over the unincorporated territories— and that the reason for it was racism. Yet courts and scholars have recently sought to hoist the Insular Cases on their own racist petard—by “repurposing” them to defuse constitutional objections to certain distinctive cultural practices in the unincorporated territories. Adopting the standard account of the Insular Cases, according to which they created a nearly extraconstitutional zone, proponents of repurposing argue that the relative freedom from constitutional constraints that government action enjoys in the unincorporated territories can and should be exploited now to vindicate their peoples’ right to cultural self-preservation. This Article disagrees. Although I share the view that the Constitution should not ride roughshod over the cultural practices of the people of the unincorporated territories, I do not agree that the Constitution necessarily must bend to any such practices it finds there or that the Insular Cases present a legitimate—let alone desirable— doctrinal vehicle for preserving such practices. Instead, constitutional doctrines available outside of the Insular Cases present the most promising—and the only legitimate—doctrinal means for making the constitutional case in favor of cultural accommodation. Against the repurposing project, I argue that the Insular Cases gave rise to nothing less than a crisis of political legitimacy in the unincorporated territories, and that no amount of repurposing, no matter how well-intentioned— or even successful—can change that fact. On the contrary: repurposing the Insular Cases will pro- long the crisis. They should be overruled.
摘要:岛屿案一直在享受一种荒谬且不幸的复兴。该系列案在美国历史上被称为“帝国主义”时期的高峰期被裁决,在二十世纪早期最高法院对该系列案作出了臭名昭著的宣判,判决美国在1898年吞并的前西班牙殖民地——波多黎各、菲律宾和关岛“属于美国,但不是美国的一部分”。这一判决到底意味着什么,已经成为大量辩论的主题,即使这些裁决已经受到一致的谴责。根据标准解释,岛屿案认为“整部”宪法适用于美国境内(包括各州、哥伦比亚特区和所谓的“合并”领地),而只有宪法的“基本”限制适用于后来被称为“非合并”领地(现在,波多黎各、关岛、美属维尔京群岛、北马里亚纳群岛和美属萨摩亚)。学者一致同意,岛屿案使法院认可美国对非合并领地的殖民统治——并且认为其原因是种族主义。然而,法院和学者正通过“重新利用”它们来化解对非合并领地某些独特文化习俗的宪法反对意见,试图自食其在岛屿案中种下的种族主义恶果。采用对岛屿案的标准解释,根据该解释岛屿案创造了一个几乎不受宪法约束的地带,支持重新利用的人认为,政府行为在非合并领地所享有的相对不受宪法约束的自由,可以且应该被用来维护其人民的文化自卫权利。本文不同意该观点。虽然我同意宪法不应该践踏非合并领地人民的文化习俗,但我不同意宪法必须屈从于在那里发现的任何此类习俗,也不同意岛屿案为保护此类习俗提供了一个合法的,更谈不上理想的理论工具。相反,岛屿案之外的宪法学说是最有希望的且是唯一合法的理论手段,可以为文化包容提供宪法案例支持。我反对重新利用方案,我认为岛屿案造成的影响不亚于一场在非合并领地的政治合法性危机,而且即使再多的重新利用,不论出于怎样的好意,即便是成功的也不能改变那个事实。相反:重新利用岛屿案将会延长这场危机。这些岛屿案应该被推翻。
Article 3
Aurelius’s Article III Revisionism: Reimagining Judicial Engagement with the Insular Cases and “The Law of the Territories”
奥勒留第三条款修正主义:岛屿案司法干预和“领地法”的重构
作者:James T. Campbell
ABSTRACT. The Supreme Court’s unanimous decision upholding the appointments structure of Puerto Rico’s controversial Financial Oversight and Management Board in FOMB v. Aurelius has, to date, yielded commentary fixated on what the Justices did not say. The bulk of that commentary criticizes the Court for declining to square up to and overturn the Insular Cases, the series of early twentieth-century decisions holding that the Constitution does not fully apply to Puerto Rico and other “unincorporated” possessions populated by “savages” and persons of “uncivilized race.” However, Aurelius teaches that the core constitutional problems of territorial exceptionalism and status manipulation run far deeper than the doctrinal framework of the Insular Cases—such that those cases’ ceremonious judicial overthrow is unlikely to spell an end to the harms of the legal order they represent.
摘要:最高法院在FOMB诉奥勒留案中作出一致决定,支持饱受争议的波多黎各财政监督与管理委员会的任命安排,该决定至今已引起了对法官未表之事的评论。大部分评论批判最高法院拒绝正面直视并推翻岛屿案,即二十世纪早期的一系列裁决,认为宪法并未完全适用于波多黎各和其他居住着“野蛮人”和“原始文明”人类的“非合并”属领地。然而,奥勒留案告诉我们,领地例外论和地位控制的核心宪法问题远不只是岛屿案的理论框架,以至于这些案件正式的司法改判不可能终结他们所代表的法律秩序带来的伤害。
Observing the Aurelius Court’s inclination to erase overseas expansion from its account of Article III doctrine, this Article questions the wisdom of urging judicial overthrow of the Insular Cases without a coherent rubric for the many doctrinal universes that might emerge from such an intervention. Together, the framing problems on display in Aurelius and the lessons from the recently overturned Japanese-internment case Korematsu v. United States suggest that although the Insular Cases are plainly indefensible, ill-considered judicial intervention will pose a grave threat to procedurally legitimate self-determination and to path-dependent interests with roots in that troubled framework. This Article reorients a conversation inclined to view judicial overthrow of the Insular Cases as an end in itself toward more informed and productive judicial engagement that secures legal recognition of territories’ agency in charting their own future. Formally condemning or overruling the Insular Cases will mean little if judges fail to account for the threshold ambiguities enabling territorial status manipulation across constitutional domains, which Aurelius shows can be effected with or without express reliance on the Insular Cases or the Incorporation Doctrine. Ultimately, this Article proposes a conversation with Federal Indian law as a starting point for theorizing judicial engagement with the Insular Cases and the so-called “law of the territories.”
本文探究奥勒留法院倾向于将海外扩张从其对第三条款学说的解释中抹掉,质疑在对这种干预中可能出现的许多学说领域缺乏调理清晰的指示的情况下,敦促司法界推翻岛屿案这一做法是否明智。同时,奥勒留案中所呈现的架构问题以及来自于近期被推翻的日本人被拘留案Korematsu 诉美国的经验教训,表明尽管岛屿案很明显站不住脚,但考虑不周的司法干预将会对程序上合法的自决权和根植于该问题框架的路径依赖利益构成严重威胁。本文将倾向于将司法推翻岛屿案本身视为目的的对话重新调整为更明智和富有成效的司法参与,确保在法律上承认领地政府部门具备筹划他们自己未来的职能。如果法官不能解释使领地地位在宪法领域内被控制的门槛性歧义,那么正式的谴责或者推翻岛屿案几乎没有意义,奥勒留案表明无论是否明确依赖于岛屿案或合并学说都会实现这一点。最后,本文提出将与联邦印第安人法的对话作为其起点,用以将岛屿案的司法参与和所谓的“领地法”理论化。
Article 4
Indigenous Subjects
原住民主体
作者:Addie C. Rolnick
ABSTRACT. This Article tells the story of how race jurisprudence has become the most intractable threat to Indigenous rights—and to collective rights more broadly. It examines legal challenges to Indigenous self-determination and land rights in the U.S. territories. It is one of a handful of articles to address these cases and the only one to do so through the lenses of Indian law, the law of the territories, international law, and race law. These recent challenges rest on the 2000 case of Rice v. Cayetano, in which the Supreme Court struck down a Hawaii law that allowed only Indigenous Hawaiians, defined by reference to ancestry, to vote for trustees who controlled land and assets held in trust for them. The Court’s holding—that ancestry can be, and was in that specific factual context, a proxy for race—rested on a thin conception of race as a static biological fact and a narrow construction of indigeneity. In the hands of aggressive litigants, it has been transformed into a shorthand rule that ancestry and race are equivalent; that ancestry-based classifications are therefore illegal under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments; and that legal protection for Indigenous rights is limited to a narrow class of American Indian tribal citizens. This rule has emerged as a significant threat to Indigenous rights and driven a deep wedge between the individual rights protected by the Reconstruction Amendments and the group-based harms they were intended to remedy. It threatens to juridically erase Indigenous peoples in the territories by equating any recognition of their historical claims with an illegal racial classification. This Article un- packs the doctrinal evolution of the Rice rule, examines its theoretical and practical consequences, and proposes a multitiered strategy to resist it.
摘要:本文讲述了种族法学如何变成了对原住民权利以及更广泛的集体权利最严重的威胁。本文研究了美国领地上原住民自决权和土地权的法律挑战。本文是少数关注这一话题的文章之一,也是唯一通过印第安人法、领地法、国际法和种族法角度研究这一话题的文章。近期的这些挑战基于2000年的赖斯诉卡耶塔诺案,在该案中最高法院推翻了夏威夷的一项法律,该项法律只允许根据血统定义的夏威夷原住民投票选举受托人,而受托人可以控制土地和为夏威夷居民代管资产。法院的裁决表明,血统可以是在那个特定事实背景下也曾是种族的代名词——基于一个静态生物学事实的单薄种族概念和一个对原住民的狭义解释。在强势的诉讼当事人手中,它已经被转化为一种速记规则,即血统和种族是等同的;因此,根据宪法第十四和第十五修正案,基于血统的分类是不合法的;对原住民权利的法律保护仅限于美国印第安部落公民这一狭窄阶层。这项规则已经成为原住民权利的重大威胁,并在宪法重建修正案所保护的个人权利和它们试图补救的群体伤害之间插入了深深的楔子。通过将对领地原住民的历史诉求的任何认可等同于一个非法的种族分类,这项规则威胁着要在法律上抹杀领地原住民。本文解析了赖斯规则的学说演变,研究了其理论和实践影响,并提出抵抗它的多层次策略。
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