译者：邱琛茜 中国社会科学院大学 法律硕士
审稿：Kristing BJTU LLB 
曾梓栩 外交学院法本
编辑：刘潇阳 UCH J.D.
责编：陈逸漩 中国人民大学法本
Unpacking Third-Party Standing
《解读第三方资格》
作者：Curtis A. Bradley & Ernest A. Young
Abstract: Third-party standing is relevant to a wide range of constitutional and statutory cases. The Supreme Court has said that, to assert such standing, a litigant must ordinarily have a close relationship with the right holder and the right holder must face obstacles to suing on their own behalf. Yet the Court does not seem to apply that test consistently, and commentators have long critiqued the third-party standing doctrine as incoherent. This Article argues that much of the doctrine’s perceived incoherence stems from the Supreme Court’s attempt to capture, in a single principle, disparate scenarios raising distinct problems of both theory and practice. The Article “unpacks” third-party standing in two respects. First, it identifies true third-party standing problems by distinguishing them from first-party claims, largely by reference to the “zone-of-interests” concept. If litigants fall within the zone of interests of the substantive right they wish to invoke and they have an injury in fact, they may establish first-party standing based on their own rights. If they do not fall within the zone of interests, then they must rely on the rights of third parties. Second, the Article distinguishes among three types of parties invoking third-party standing: directly regulated parties, collaterally injured parties, and representative parties. The results in the Court’s third-party standing cases tend to track these distinctions, and we argue that it is time for the Court to recognize them in doctrine. The Article also rejects prior efforts by scholars to posit a general “valid rule” requirement as a way of reconciling the cases, an approach that we contend is both under and overinclusive. The Article concludes by highlighting aspects of modern litigation practice that may need revision in light of the unpacked third-party standing doctrine.
摘要：第三方资格与大量的宪法和法律案件有关。最高法院表示，要主张这种资格，诉讼当事人通常必须与权利人有密切的关系，且权利人必须在以自己的名义起诉时面临障碍。然而，法院似乎并没有始终如一地应用这一测试。评论家们长期以来也一直在批评第三方资格理论的不连贯性。本文认为，第三方资格理论被认为不连贯的原因在于，最高法院试图以一个单一的原则来涵盖不同的情况，这在理论上和实践中都引起了突出问题。本文从两方面“解读”了第三方资格。首先，本文主要通过参考“利益区间”的概念，将第三方资格问题与第一方索赔相区分，从而确定真正的第三方资格问题。如果诉讼当事人希望援引的实质性权利在利益区间的范围内，并且他们有事实上的损害，那么他们可以根据自己的权利建立第一方资格。如果他们希望援引的实质性权利不在利益区间的范围内，那他们便必须依靠第三方的权利。其次，本文对援引第三方资格的三类当事人进行了区分：直接受管制的当事人、附带损害的当事人和代表当事人。法院对第三方资格案件倾向于根据不同的当事人类型做出不同判决，本文认为现在是法院在理论上承认这些区别的时候了。本文不赞同学者们之前提出的以一般“有效规则”的要求作为调和这些案件的方法，这种方法既不充分又过度包容。本文最后强调了现代诉讼实践中一些解读第三方资格理论后需要进行修改的事项。
Subordination and Separation of Powers
《从属关系和权力分立》
作者：Matthew B. Lawrence
Abstract: This Article calls for the incorporation of antisubordination into separation-of-powers analysis. Scholars analyzing separation-of-powers tools—laws and norms that divide power among government actors—consider a long list of values ranging from protecting liberty to promoting efficiency. Absent from this list are questions of equity: questions of racism, sexism, and classism. This Article problematizes this omission and begins to rectify it. For the first time, this Article applies critical-race and feminist theorists’ subordination question—are marginalized groups disproportionately burdened?—to three important separation-of-powers tools: legislative appropriations, executive conditions, and constitutional entrenchment. In doing so, it reveals that each tool entails subordination by creating generalized benefits at the expense of marginalized groups. It illustrates this skewed distribution through novel case studies tracing harm to Native peoples to the use of appropriations to empower Congress, harm to residents of Puerto Rico to the use of executive conditions to empower the President, and disparate coronavirus harms to Black communities to the use of nonentrenchment to empower the future and disempower the “dead hand” of the past.
摘要：本文呼吁将反从属理论纳入分权理论进行分析。学者们在分析分权工具时，即在分析政府机构之间划分权力的法律和规范时，考虑了从保护自由到促进效率的一系列价值。在这个价值清单中，并没有提到有关公平的问题：种族主义、性别歧视和阶级歧视。本文对这一遗漏提出了质疑，并试图纠正这个问题。本文首次将一个批判性种族主义和女权主义理论者的从属问题，即边缘化群体是否承受了过重的负担，应用于三个重要的分权工具：立法拨款、行政条件和宪法保障。如此，本文揭示了每一种分权工具都会通过牺牲边缘化群体的利益来创造普遍的利益，从而导致了从属关系。本文通过新的案例研究来说明这种不平衡的分配，通过立法拨款授予国会权力导致了对原住民的伤害，通过行政条件授予总统权力导致了对波多黎各居民的伤害，通过非堑壕战的方式赋予未来权力并剥夺过去“死亡之手”的权力导致了在新冠疫情下对黑人社群的差异化伤害。
The Article’s descriptive insight that separation-of-powers tools can and do entail subordination motivates its call for the incorporation of antisubordination into both institutional and doctrinal separation-of-powers analysis. The antisubordination movement’s rights-focused approach has stagnated. The separation of powers offers a desirable, upstream means through which to pursue the goal of antisubordination by shifting attention beyond the courts and toward other political actors. Moreover, considering antisubordination in separation-of-powers analysis has historical precedent, is consistent with the aspiration for “neutral principles,” and advances already established separation-of-powers values such as liberty and accountability.
本文的见解是，分权工具能够且确实造成了从属关系。因此，本文呼吁将反从属理论纳入制度和理论分权分析。反从属运动中以权利为重点的方法逐渐落后。权力分立提供了一个理想的上游途径，即通过将注意力从法院转移到其他政治机构，来实现反从属的目标。此外，在分权分析中考虑反从属是有历史先例的，其与“中立原则”的目标相一致，并推进了已经确立的分权价值观，例如自由和问责制。
Incorporating antisubordination alters institutional analysis, doctrinal analysis, and the agenda of separation-of-powers theory. The subordination question (“who pays?”) should be as familiar to institutional analysis of separation-of-powers questions as is the legal-process question (“who decides?”). This question might be used to interrogate particular separation-of-powers tools, categories of such tools, or overarching doctrinal and conceptual approaches. Antisubordination should also change doctrinal analysis, where courts should at the very least include antisubordination among the structural values they consider in resolving ambiguities, weighing interpretive tools, and conceptualizing constitutional questions. In this context, antisubordination’s greatest impact may be as a counterweight to courts’ use of historical gloss. Finally, antisubordination requires a new, creative agenda for separation-of-powers theory that focuses not on evaluating existing arrangements or the relative power of the branches, but instead on developing alternative arrangements that maintain the balance of power without imposing skewed costs. The Article illustrates these interventions with novel prescriptions for ongoing legal controversies about the debt ceiling, foreign affairs, legislative standing, and government shutdowns.
纳入反从属理论改变了制度分析、理论分析和分权理论的议程。对于权力分立问题的制度分析来说，从属理论问题（“谁付钱？”）应该和法律程序问题（“谁决定？”）一样熟悉。这个问题可以用来审查特定的分权工具、这类工具的分类或总体的理论和概念方法。反从属理论也应改变理论分析，法院至少应在解决歧义、权衡解释工具和概念化宪法问题时将反从属理论纳入他们所考虑的基本价值中。这样一来，反从属理论的最大影响可能是作为对法院借鉴历史的一种制衡。最后，反从属理论要求为权力分立理论制定一个新的、创造性的议程，其重点不是评估现有的权力安排或各部门的相对权力，而是制定替代性的权力安排，在不施加不平衡的成本的基础上维持权力平衡。本文通过对目前有关债务上限、外交事务、立法资格和政府停摆的法律争议的新方法来阐明这些干预措施。
Recovering the Moral Economy Foundations of the Sherman Act
《恢复〈谢尔曼法〉的道德经济基础》
作者：Sanjukta Paul
Abstract: This Feature deepens and seeks to provide a foundation for the current broadening in the anti-trust debate and, ultimately, in adjacent areas relating to market organization. As normative reconstruction, it may help guide current reform efforts as well as the interpretation and implementation of the existing antitrust laws. The Feature traces a thread beginning with the “moral economy” origins of antitrust and the common law of restraint of trade; continues through the American antimonopoly coalition’s distinctive and egalitarian moral economy vision; and culminates in a reinterpretation of the legislative history of the Sherman Act, both as to affirmative purpose and as to judicial role. I propose a core prescription: the command to disperse economic coordination rights. This core prescription in turn implies three key tasks: taking affirmative steps to contain domination, to accommodate and promote democratic coordination, and to set rules of fair competition.
摘要：本文深化并试图为当前反垄断的争论，以及最终与市场组织相关的邻近领域的拓展提供一个基础。作为规范性的重建，本文可能有助于指导当前改革做出的努力以及现有对反垄断法的解释和实施。本文从反垄断的“道德经济”的起源和限制贸易的普通法展开，通过美国反垄断联盟独特的、平等的道德经济愿景以深入，并最终从肯定性的目的和司法作用两个方面对《谢尔曼法》的立法历史进行了重新解释。本文提出了一个核心方法，即分散经济协调权的命令。反过来说，这个核心方法又意味着三个关键任务：采取积极的措施来遏制统治、包容和促进民主协调、以及制定公平竞争的规则。
The normative thread traced here, culminating in an argument about legislative purpose, is interwoven with an argument about institutional roles. The widely held conventional wisdom is that the Sherman Act is the paradigmatic “common-law statute,” entailing a delegation of law-making power by Congress to the courts that spans the field of antitrust. The common-law-statute thesis is more than just the proposition that the courts should guide the application of the law as circumstances change. Instead, it has been understood as an effective “blank check” to federal courts to generate the foundational normative criteria according to which the statutory framework will function. But the legislative history of the Sherman Act undermines both the argument for judicial supremacy and the particular prescriptions with which the most pronounced, current episode of judicial lawmaking has been associated. Finally, the Feature briefly sketches the broad outlines of an alternative path for implementing antitrust’s core prescription, emphasizing the potential role of the Federal Trade Commission in administering the moral economy.
本文在此所追溯到的规范性线索，最终与立法目的的论证有关，并与关于机构作用的论证交织在一起。人们普遍认为，《谢尔曼法》是典型的“普通法法规”，它意味着国会将制定法律的权力授予法院，而这种权力超出了反垄断的领域。普通法法规理论不仅主张法院应该随着情况的变化指导法律的适用，相反，它被理解为一张联邦法院出具的有效“空白支票”，以产生基本的规范性标准，而法定框架将根据这些规范性标准发挥作用。但是《谢尔曼法》的立法历史既削弱了司法至上的观点，也削弱了与当前最显著的司法立法情况有关的具体方法的适用。最后，本文简要介绍了实施反垄断核心方法的替代路径的大致内容，强调了联邦贸易委员会在管理道德经济方面的潜在作用。
Not Hers Alone: Victim Standing Before the CEDAW Committee After M.W. v. Denmark
《不是她一个人的：M.W.诉丹麦案后，在消除对妇女歧视委员会前的受害者》
作者：Jessica Tueller
Abstract: M.W. v. Denmark constitutes the first case in which the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW Committee) granted victim standing to an individual who did not identify as a woman to allege a violation of their rights under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). This Note argues that the CEDAW Committee should embrace and expand on its admissibility decision in M.W. v. Denmark by allowing any individual to allege CEDAW violations without restriction on the basis of sex, gender, or gender identity.
摘要：M.W.诉丹麦案是消除对妇女歧视委员会(CEDAW委员会)给予性别认同非女性的个人以受害者的资格后，指控其在《消除对妇女一切形式歧视公约》(CEDAW)下的权利受到侵犯的第一案。本文认为，CEDAW委员会应欣然接受并扩大其在M.W.诉丹麦案中的受理决定，允许任何个人不受基于生理性别、心理性别或性别认同的限制而指控对CEDAW的违反。
Reconstructing the Bankruptcy Power: An Originalist Approach
《重构破产权：一种原创主义的方法》
作者：Joseph E. Simmons
Abstract: This Note responds to two distinct difficulties in the constitutional law of bankruptcy. First, many bankruptcy scholars and practitioners intuit that the Thirteenth Amendment places important limitations on the law of personal bankruptcy, but this intuition is difficult to cash out in a convincing legal argument. Second, modern bankruptcy law requires an expansive construction of the bankruptcy power, but such a construction is difficult to ground in the meaning of the Bankruptcy Clause in 1789. This Note resolves both difficulties by showing how the proper legal construction of the bankruptcy power changed during Reconstruction with the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865. Before Reconstruction, the bankruptcy power was limited to the creation of collective-creditor remedies against merchants who committed acts of insolvency. The Thirteenth Amendment both granted Congress new powers to legislate against relations of economic domination, including relations between creditors and insolvent debtors, and altered the function that the bankruptcy power plays within the Constitution. These changes amounted to a reconstruction of the bankruptcy power, such that bankruptcy law now has as its primary purpose the provision of a “fresh start” to the honest unfortunate debtor. This argument helps ground the constitutionality of both voluntary bankruptcy and corporate bankruptcy, but its most important implications are for consumer bankruptcy law, particularly the status of the debtor’s fresh start and the grounds on which it can be denied.
摘要：本文对美国宪法破产条款中的两个明显的困境做出了回应。首先，许多破产法学者和从业人员都认为宪法第十三修正案对个人破产法施加了重要的限制，但这种观点很难通过令人信服的法律论证来证实。其次，现代破产法要求对破产权进行广泛的解释，但这种解释很难说没有超越了1789年破产条款的含义。本文通过阐明由于1865年宪法第十三修正案在重建时期被批准，导致破产权的适当法律解释有所变化，从而解决了宪法破产条款面临的两个问题。在重建时期之前，破产权仅限于建立针对破产商人的集体债权人的补救措施。宪法第十三修正案既赋予了国会新的权力，即对包括债权人和破产债务人之间的关系的经济支配关系进行立法，又改变了破产权在宪法中所发挥的功能。这些变化相当于重构了破产权，因此，破产法现在的主要目的是为诚实的、不幸的债务人提供一个“新的开始”。这一观点有助于确认自愿破产和公司破产的合宪性，但其最重要的影响是对消费者破产法的影响，特别是债务人重新开始的状态和可以拒绝这一重新开始的理由。
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