作者  |  左雅旻,中南财经政法大学法本
一审  |  吴如闻,UMN LL.M.
二审  |  曹炜嘉,WUSTL J.S.D.
编辑  |  罗志锋,CUHK J.D.
1. Article: The Other American Law
另一种美国法律
作者: Elizabeth A. Reese
American legal scholarship focuses almost exclusively on federal, state, and local law. However, there are 574 federally recognized tribal governments within the United States, whose laws are largely ignored. This Article brings to the fore the exclusion of tribal governments and their laws from our mainstream conception of “American law” and identifies this exclusion as both an inconsistent omission and a missed opportunity. Tribal law is no less “American law” than federal or state law. It is made, enforced, and followed by American citizens, and tribal governments have a distinct place as subsovereigns within the American system of overlapping sovereigns. Nor is tribal law an unimportant or small part of the American legal landscape, since these 574 legal systems govern millions of Americans and as much land as California. And yet, tribal law is excluded from our shared conception of “American law”—and therefore from our research projects, classrooms, and even conversations. This exclusion perpetuates the othering of Indians and the invisibility of both Indian people and their governments. Tribal governments were previously delegitimized and described as “lawless” in order to legitimize legal theories of conquest. But tribal law is real, and it is time to end its marginalization. Moreover, tribal law is vast, varied, and often innovative. As demonstrated by the three examples in this piece, tribal governments struggle with the same problems that the other American sovereigns face, and their similarities, differences, successes, failures, and innovations can inform other American sovereigns’ work or public law questions more broadly. Omitting tribal law from American legal scholarship is not only a troubling inconsistency; it is a missed opportunity to tap a potentially valuable resource—a disservice to the search for good government ideas. Tribal law belongs in the mainstream study of American law and legal systems. This Article places it there.
美国的法学研究几乎只关注联邦、州及地方层面的法律。然而,美国境内存在着574个获得联邦承认的部落政府,而它们的法律在很大程度上遭到了忽视。本文突出了部落政府及其法律被我们从关于“美国法律”的主流概念中排除出去的境况,并指出这种排斥既是具有矛盾性的遗漏,也意味着错失机会。部落法律的“美国法律”特质并不逊色于联邦或州的法律。它是由美国公民制定、执行并遵守的,且部落政府作为美国重叠主权体系中的次主权实体,具有其独特的地位。部落法律也并非美国法律版图中不重要或很小的一部分,因为这574个法律体系规制着数百万美国人以及与加利福尼亚州一样广阔的土地。然而,部落法律被排除在我们关于“美国法律”的共享概念之外——因此也被排除在我们的研究项目、课堂甚至交谈之外。这种排斥延续了印第安人的他者地位,以及印第安民族及其政府被忽视的状态。部落政府以前被非法化,并被描述为“目无法纪”,以便使与征服有关的法律理论得到合法化。但部落法律是真实存在的,而现在是结束其边缘化状态的时候了。此外,部落法律为数甚众、多种多样且常常具有创新性。正如本文中的三个例子所示,部落政府与美国的其他主权实体面临着同样的问题,而他们的相似、差异、成功、失败和创新可以为美国其他主权实体的运作或更宽泛意义上的公法问题提供启示。在美国法学研究中遗漏部落法律,不仅仅具有令人不安的矛盾性,而且是错失了一个挖掘潜在宝贵资源的机会——这不利于我们探寻良好政府的理念。部落法律应在美国法律及法律体系的主流研究中占有一席之地。本文赋予其这样的地位。
2. Article: An Empirical Assessment of Pretextual Stops and Racial Profiling
对借口性拦停及种族定性的实证评估
作者: Stephen Rushin & Griffin Edwards
This Article empirically illustrates that legal doctrines permitting police officers to engage in pretextual traffic stops may contribute to an increase in racial profiling. In 1996, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Whren v. United States that pretextual traffic stops do not violate the Fourth Amendment. As long as police officers identify an objective violation of a traffic law, they may lawfully stop a motorist—even if their actual intention is to use the stop to investigate a hunch that by itself does not amount to probable cause or reasonable suspicion.
本文从经验上说明,允许警察进行借口性交通拦停的法律理论可能会导致种族定性的加剧。1996年,美国联邦最高法院在Whren v. United States案中认为,借口性交通拦停并不违反第四修正案。只要警察确定存在客观上违反交通法的行为,他们就可以合法地拦停驾驶员——即使他们的实际意图是利用拦停来证实一种就其本身而言并不构成合理根据或合理怀疑的预感。
Scholars and civil rights activists have sharply criticized Whren, arguing that it gives police officers permission to engage in racial profiling. But social scientists have struggled to empirically evaluate how Whren has influenced police behavior.
学者和民权活动家尖锐地批评了Whren案,认为其允许警察进行种族定性。但社会科学家们一直在努力从经验上评估Whren案是如何影响警察行为的。
A series of court decisions in the State of Washington presents an opportunity to test the effects of pretextual-stop doctrines on police behavior. In the years since the Whren decision, Washington has experimented with multiple rules that provide differing levels of protection against pretextual stops. In 1999, the Washington Supreme Court held in State v. Ladson that the state constitution barred police from conducting pretextual traffic stops. However, in 2012, the court eased this restriction on pretextual stops in State v. Arreola.
华盛顿州的一系列法院判决提供了一个机会,以检视借口性拦停理论对警察行为的影响。在Whren案判决后的几年间,华盛顿州尝试针对借口性拦停制定了多种规则,以提供不同层次的保障。1999年,华盛顿州最高法院在State v. Ladson案中认为,州宪法禁止警察进行借口性交通拦停。然而,在2012年的State v. Arreola案中,法院放松了这一针对借口性拦停的限制。
Exploiting a dataset of 8,257,527 traffic stops conducted by the Washington State Patrol from 2008 through 2015, we carry out difference-in-differences and triple-difference analyses to assess whether the Arreola decision increased traffic stops among drivers of color relative to white drivers. We find that the Arreola decision is associated with a statistically significant increase in traffic stops of drivers of color relative to white drivers. Further, we find this increase in traffic stops of drivers of color is concentrated during daytime hours, when officers can more easily ascertain a driver’s race through visual observation.
我们利用华盛顿州巡警在2008年至2015年期间进行的8257527次交通拦停的数据集,进行双重差分法及三重差分法分析,以评估Arreola案判决是否增加了有色人种司机相对于白人司机遭到交通拦停的次数。我们发现,Arreola案判决与有色人种司机相对于白人司机遭到交通拦停的次数在统计学意义上的增长相关。此外,我们发现有色人种司机遭到交通拦停次数的增长集中在白天,这时警察可以通过视觉观察更容易地确定司机的种族。
These insights suggest that judicial decisions like Whren and Arreola increase the probability of racial profiling by police officers. We conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for the literature on police accountability.
这些见解表明,像Whren案和Arreola案这样的司法判决使得警察更有可能进行种族定性。最后,我们讨论了本文的这些研究成果对于警察问责制的影响。
(图片来源于网络)
3. Note: Second Amendment Federalism
第二修正案联邦主义
作者: Brian Erickson
In the decade since District of Columbia v. Heller, the paradigm-shifting 2008 Supreme Court case affirming the right of individuals to keep handguns in the home for self-defense, lower courts have struggled to reconcile the case’s broad conception of the Second Amendment with longstanding restrictions on the keeping and bearing of firearms. A burgeoning literature has urged courts and scholars to approach this tension with an eye toward Heller’s repeated proclamations that self-defense is the “central component” of the Second Amendment right, suggesting that principles of common law self-defense may offer insight into the scope of the Amendment’s protections. Examining self-defense law as a U.S. tradition, this Note contends that the right to self-preservation has evolved significantly from its common law origins, with different states adopting different standards, procedures, and definitions over time. This diversity makes it difficult to extract universal principles of self-defense law for purposes of shaping Second Amendment doctrine.
自District of Columbia v. Heller案(这一颠覆性的2008年联邦最高法院案件确认个人有权在家中保留手枪用于自卫)以来的十年间,下级法院一直努力在该案赋予第二修正案的宽泛概念,以及长久以来针对保留和携带枪支的限制之间进行调和。一篇新发表的文献敦促法院和学者在处理这种紧张关系时,要注意到Heller案中反复宣称自卫是第二修正案权利的“核心组成部分”,并认为普通法上的自卫原则可能为确认修正案的保护范围提供了启示。在考察作为美国传统的自卫法时,本评注认为自卫权与其在普通法上的起源相比有了很大的演变,不同的州随着时间的推移采用了不同的标准、程序及定义。这种多样性使得我们很难提炼出自卫法的普遍性原则,以服务于塑造第二修正案学说的目的。
But even as the law has changed across time and jurisdictions, federal courts have been consistent in allowing states to define the contours of the self-defense right. Therefore, courts today should recognize self-defense law as a site of iterative policy development, and treat laws regulating the instrumentalities of self-defense (for example, firearms) with a degree of deference. This Note argues that this approach, which I term “Second Amendment Federalism,” comports with the dictates of Heller and provides a roadmap for doctrinal development.
但即使法律因时间的流逝及司法管辖区的不同而发生了变化,联邦法院自始至终都允许各州对自卫权的轮廓进行定义。因此,现今的法院应承认自卫法是一个政策发展反复迭代的领域,并在一定程度上以司法谦抑的态度对待规制自卫械备(例如枪支)的法律。本评注认为,我称之为“第二修正案联邦主义”的这种方法遵循了Heller案的指示,并为学说的发展提供了方向指引。
4. Note: Crimes of Omission: 
State-Action Doctrine and Anti-Lynching Legislation in the Jim Crow Era
不作为犯罪:
吉姆·克劳时代的州行为理论及反私刑立法
作者: Magdalene Zier
After more than a century of failure, Congress now stands closer than ever to making lynching a federal crime. As the pending legislation acknowledges, at least 4,742 people were lynched in the United States between 1882 and 1968, but Congress continually declined to pass any of the nearly 200 bills introduced during those decades.
经过一个多世纪的失败以后,国会现在比以往任何时候都更为接近将私刑定为一项联邦罪行。正如审议中的法案所承认的那样,在1882年至1968年期间,美国至少有4742人被处以私刑,但国会一直拒绝通过这几十年来提出的近200项法案中的任何一项。
Although Black Americans had faced lethal racial terror before, during, and immediately following emancipation, the rate of lynching rose significantly in the 1890s as Redemption and Jim Crow segregation took hold. States had the authority to prosecute violent crimes, but many had made clear that they had no will to prevent or punish lynch mobs. Activists worked to expose the savagery of lynching as an apparatus of racial violence and to revive the public and legislative concern for Black lives that seemingly died during the retreat from Reconstruction. Proponents of anti-lynching legislation faced the challenge of convincing Congress that it had the authority under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause to prosecute individuals, not only state actors, in particularly egregious circumstances.
尽管美国黑人在解放前、解放期间及之后都面临着致命的种族主义恐怖行径,但随着进入救赎期,种族隔离大行其道,19世纪90年代的私刑率大幅上升。各州有权起诉暴力犯罪,但许多州已明确表示,它们没有意愿去防止或惩罚实施私刑的暴徒。活动家们努力揭露私刑作为种族暴力工具的野蛮性,并唤起公众及立法机构对黑人性命的关注——这种关注在重建期临近尾声时似乎已经消逝。反私刑立法的支持者面临的挑战是说服国会,它根据第十四条修正案的执行条款有权在特别恶劣的情形下起诉个人,而不仅仅是州行为主体。
This Note centers on one particularly promising proposal: the Dyer Anti-Lynching Bill. Introduced in 1917, the ambitious Dyer Bill was the first to clear the House, and it soon incited controversy in the Senate and heated debate in the public press. Many Americans—Black and white, Northern and Southern, Democrat and Republican—had something to say about the Dyer Bill.
本评注聚焦于一项尤其有希望的提案:《戴尔反私刑法案》。雄心勃勃的《戴尔反私刑法案》首先在众议院通过,它很快在参议院引起了争议,并在公众媒体中引发了激烈的辩论。许多美国人——黑人和白人,北方人和南方人,民主党人和共和党人——关于戴尔法案都有些话想说。
Scholars, however, have since said relatively little. Few treatments of the anti-lynching movement capture the enduring constitutional significance of this legislative campaign. Likewise, legal commentary on the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment too often omits this period, skipping from the Reconstruction era to the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s.
然而,自此以后,学者们对此却鲜有表态。很少有关于反私刑运动的论述能够捕捉到这场运动在宪法上的持久意义。同样地,关于第十四修正案执行条款的法律评论也常常忽略这一时期,而直接从重建时期跳到20世纪50年代和60年代的民权运动。
This Note offers a novel reading of the Dyer Bill’s development and demise, challenging the standard narrative about how members of Congress and their constituents regarded the Fourteenth Amendment in the Jim Crow era and about Black citizens’ fidelity to the Republican Party. Upending the assumption that Americans in the first half of the twentieth century considered the Fourteenth Amendment a dead letter for achieving racial justice, this Note reveals a country actively concerned with the amendment’s promise and possibilities. Long before the 1964 Civil Rights Act and even the New Deal, the Dyer Bill debates prompted politicians and the public to consider the scope of state action and of Congress’s unique prerogatives under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Enforcement Clause. The Dyer Bill’s history holds lasting lessons for assessing Congress’s obligations and political parties’ incentives to address ongoing issues of racial injustice.
本评注为戴尔法案的发展和消亡提供了新的解读,挑战了关于国会议员及其选民在吉姆·克劳时代如何看待第十四修正案,以及黑人公民对共和党忠诚度的标准叙事。本评注推翻了下述假设,即20世纪上半叶的美国人认为第十四修正案对于实现种族正义而言不过是一纸空文,并揭示了一个积极关注该修正案所作承诺及其实现之可能性的国家。早在1964年的《民权法案》甚至新政之前,关于戴尔法案的辩论就促使政治家和公众考虑州行为的范围,以及国会在第十四修正案执行条款下享有的独特特权。戴尔法案的历史为评估国会解决种族不公正问题的义务和政党解决该问题的动机提供了持久的借镜。
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