第三课
这律的确存在
The Reality Of The Law

I now go back to what I said at the end of the first chapter, that there were two odd things about the human race. First, that they were haunted by the idea of a sort of behaviour they ought to practise, what you might call fair play, or decency, or morality, or the Law of Nature. Second, that they did not in fact do so. Now some of you may wonder why I called this odd. It may seem to you the most natural thing in the world. In particular, you may have thought I was rather hard on the human race. After all, you may say, what I call breaking the Law of Right and Wrong or of Nature, only means that people are not perfect. And why on earth should I expect them to be? That would be a good answer if what I was trying to do was to fix the exact amount of blame which is due to us for not behaving as we expect others to behave. But that is not my job at all. I am not concerned at present with blame; I am trying to find out truth. And from that point of view the very idea of something being imperfect, of its not being what it ought to be, has certain consequences.
现在回头讲一讲我在第一章结束时说的话,也就是人的两种奇怪的情况。一方面,我们梦寐以求,希望自己的行为能达到一种标准,我们把这叫做公平、正当、道德或者人理。一方面,我们实际并没有做到。你们也许会问,为什么我把这情况称之为“奇怪”,因为在你们看来,这是世间最自然不过的事。你甚至很可能会觉得,我对人要求有点过份。你也许会说,我所谓的人破坏了是非之律或人理,只不过说明世上无完人罢了。既然无完人,那我为什么要强求?如果我所要做的,只是将我们希望他人做自己却没有做到的事,为自己走出应负的那一份责任;那麽,你这种世上无完人论,可以是个好答覆。但是,这不是我要做的事。我现在关心的不是责任问题,而是要找出真相。从这个角度来看,说世上无完人,所以人达不到他应达到的目标,会有不好的後果。
If you take a thing like a stone or a tree, it is what it is and there seems no sense in saying it ought to have been otherwise. Of course you may say a stone is "the wrong shape" if you want to use it for a rockery, or that a tree is a bad tree because it does not give you as much shade as you expected. But all you mean is that the stone or tree does not happen to be convenient for some purpose of your own. You are not, except as a joke, blaming them for that. You really know, that, given the weather and the soil, the tree could not have been any different. What we, from our point of view, call a "bad" tree is obeying the laws of its nature just as much as a "good" one.
比方你眼前有块石头或一棵树,他们生来就是那个样子,你没有理由说他们应该是另一个样子,说了也无用。你当然可以说,这块石头要是用来做假山,“形状不合”;或者这棵树不好,因为不够大,不能遮荫。你这样说,只不过指出这块石头或者这棵树,不巧对你自己不方便。你不是责备他们,除非是开玩笑的口吻。你心里明白,那种气候,那种土壤,这棵树只可以是那个样子。从我们的观点来说,一棵树的好与坏,都是遵循他的生长之理或律的结果。
It follows that what we usually call the laws of nature—the way weather works on a tree for example—may not really be laws in the strict sense, but only in a manner of speaking. When you say that falling stones always obey the law of gravitation, is not this much the same as saying that the law only means "what stones always do"? You do not really think that when a stone is let go, it suddenly remembers that it is under orders to fall to the ground. You only mean that, in fact, it does fall. In other words, you cannot be sure that there is anything over and above the facts themselves, any law about what ought to happen, as distinct from what does happen.
这样推理下去,我们可以知道,我们通常叫做自然之理或律的东西,例如天气、雨水等等对一棵树的作用,严格说来,并不真正是什麽律或理,只是说话的一种方式。比方你说,掉下来的石头总得遵守地心引力之律。你这样说,并不等於说,律的意思是“一切的石头一定会是这样的”吧?你决不会认为,一块石头抛出去後,他会突然记起,得遵守命令掉到地上;你只是认为,这块石头实际上是掉向地上。换句话说,你很难确定,有什麽东西在背後超然地左右这个事实,有什么律或理要他们一定发生,而这律或理和发生的事实不同。
The laws of nature, as applied to stones or trees, may only mean "what Nature, in fact, does." But if 
you turn to the Law of Human Nature, the Law of Decent Behaviour, it is a different matter. That law certainly does not mean "what human beings, in fact, do"; for as I said before, many of them do not obey this law at all, and none of them obey it completely. The law of gravity tells you what stones do if you drop them; but the Law of Human Nature tells you what human beings ought to do and do not.
自然律应用到石头或者树本身,指的只是“自然在实际上做的事”。可是一转到人理或人性之律,一转到正当行为之律,情形便完全不同。这律当然不等同於“人在实际上做的事”,因为,像我已说过的,许多人根本不遵守这律,更没有一个人完全遵守。地心引力律告诉你,要是你抛出一块石头,石头会怎样做;可是人性之律却告诉你,人应该做什麽却没有去做。
In other words, when you are dealing with humans, something else comes in above and beyond the actual facts. You have the facts (how men do behave) and you also have something else (how they ought to behave). In the rest of the universe there need not be anything but the facts. Electrons and molecules behave in a certain way, and certain results follow, and that may be the whole story. But men behave in a certain way and that is not the whole story, for all the time you know that they ought to behave differently.
换句话说,你的对象一旦是人,有种超乎事实之外的东西出现。你除了事实(人的行为),还另外有一样东西(人应该怎样行为)。人之外的宇宙,只讲事实。电子和分子会照某种方式运动,产生某种结果,就是这样简单。可是人照某种方式运动时,却并不这麽简单,因为你明白,他们的行为会不照这方式来进行。
Now this is really so peculiar that one is tempted to try to explain it away. For instance, we might try to make out that when you say a man ought not to act as he does, you only mean the same as when you say that a stone is the wrong shape; namely, that what he is doing happens to be inconvenient to you. But that is simply untrue. A man occupying the corner seat in the train because he got there first, and a man who slipped into it while my back was turned and removed my bag, are both equallyinconvenient. But I blame the second man and do not blame the first.
这的确很特别,大家都想找出其理何在。比方说,你讲一个人不应该做他做出的那件事,我们其实只想说明,就像我们说一块石头的形状不对一样,他做出来的事对我不方便。这当然不是真的。一个人占住火车厢一角的座位,因为他比我早到那儿;另外一个人趁我背转身,移动行李时,偷偷占了那个座位。对我来说,二者都对我不方便。可是我只会责备第二个人,不会怪第一个人。
I am not angry—except perhaps for a moment before I come to my senses—with a man who trips me up by accident; I am angry with a man who tries to trip me up even if he does not succeed. Yet the first has hurt me and the second has not. Sometimes the behaviour which I call bad is not inconvenient to me at all, but the very opposite.
我不会因为一个人不经意地占了我的便宜而大发脾气,也许会有一刻的不快,然後冷静下来;可是,要是谁蓄意占我的便宜,虽然他没有如愿以偿,我也会大发脾气。不过,前者虽然不经意却妨碍到我,後者虽蓄意却没有成功,没有妨碍到我。可见有些我们叫做坏的行为,有时并不会对我构成不方便,反而刚好相反。
In war, each side may find a traitor on the other side very useful. But though they use him and pay him they regard him as human vermin. So you cannot say that what we call decent behaviour in others is simply the behaviour that happens to be useful to us. And as for decent behaviour in ourselves, I suppose it is pretty obvious that it does not mean the behaviour that pays. It means things like being content with thirty shillings when you might have got three pounds, doing school work honestly when it would be easy to cheat, leaving a girl alone when you would like to make love to her, staying in dangerous places when you could go somewhere safer, keeping promises you would rather not keep, and telling the truth even when it makes you look a fool.
和敌国开战时,要是对方有个肯卖国的人,这个人对我方很有用处,我方尽管利用他,给他金钱,但在我们眼中,他只是个人渣。所以,你不能说,我们叫做正当的他人的行为,只是对我们有用的行为;而我们自己的正当行为,也很明显并不等於值得去做的行为。你有本领得到叁英镑,却要你满足於叁十先令;本来可以找人帮忙轻轻松松交的功课,却要老老实实自己做完交卷;本来可以向一个女孩子示爱,却将她弃而不顾;本来可以去到安全的地方,却要留在危险中;不想履行的承诺偏偏要实行;不想说实话让人家说我傻瓜,却偏偏要说,都属这一类。
Some people say that though decent conduct does not mean what pays each particular person at a particular moment, still, it means what pays the human race as a whole; and that consequently there is no mystery about it. Human beings, after all, have some sense; they see that you cannot have real safety or happiness except in a society where every one plays fair, and it is because they see this that they try to behave decently.
有人会说,正当的行为对某一个人在某一特别情况下来说,也许并不值得,但对整个人类来说,则是有价值的。正当的行为因此并不难理解。人类归根到底总是有理性的,他们明白,只有在一个人人公平对待彼此的社会里,才有真安全、真幸福,因为人能理智地认识到这点,所以才能努力做正当的事。
Now, of course, it is perfectly true that safety and happiness can only come from individuals, classes, and nations being honest and fair and kind to each other. It is one of the most important truths in the world. But as an explanation of why we feel as we do about Right and Wrong it just misses the point If we ask: "Why ought I to be unselfish?" and you reply "Because it is good for society," we may then ask, "Why should I care what's good for society except when it happens to pay me personally?" and then you will have to say, "Because you ought to be unselfish"—which simply brings us back to where we started. You are saying what is true, but you are not getting any further. If a man asked what was the point of playing football, it would not be much good saying "in order to score goals," for trying to score goals is the game itself, not the reason for the game, and you would really only be saying that football was football—which is true, but not worth saying.
对,安全和幸福只有在个入、团体和国家都能坦诚、公平、友善相处时,才能达到。这也是世上最重要的一个真理。但若用这来说明为什么我们在是非问题上会有那样的想法,则是文不对题的。要是我们问:“我为什麽应该不自私自利?”而你的答覆是,“为了社会的利益。”我要是接上问,“要是对我本身没有好处,干吗要理对社会有没有利益?”你然後不得不说,“你别忘记,你应该不自私自利。”你兜了一个大圈子,仍归回到原处。你说了一番大道理,但是兜不出去。要是有人问你,踢足球有什麽意思,若回答他说,“踢足球是为了得分”,没有谁会相信你,因为得分是球赛的目的,而不是玩足球的目的。你说来说去只能说踢足球就是为了踢足球。
In the same way, if a man asks what is the point of behaving decently, it is no good replying, "in order to benefit society," for trying to benefit society, in other words being unselfish (for "society" after all only means "other people"), is one of the things decent behaviour consists in; all you are really saying is that decent behaviour is decent behaviour. You would have said just as much if you had stopped at the statement, "Men ought to be unselfish."
对,但说了又有何用。要是有人问你,行为正当有何目的,若回答他“是为了造福社会”,这种答案没有什么用处,因为造福社会,换言之,就是不自私(因为“社会”毕竟指“他人”),不自私已包含在正当行为中。你说来说去,不过在说正当行为就是正当行为。其实,你说出“人应该不自私自利”。
And that is where I do stop. Men ought to be unselfish, ought to be fair. Not that men are unselfish, nor that they like being unselfish, but that they ought to be. The Moral Law, or Law of Human Nature, is not simply a fact about human behaviour in the same way as the Law of Gravitation is, or may be, simply a fact about how heavy objects behave. On the other hand, it is not a mere fancy, for we cannot get rid of the idea, and most of the things we say and think about men would be reduced to nonsense if we did. And it is not simply a statement about how we should like men to behave for our own convenience; for the behaviour we call bad or unfair is not exactly the same as the behaviour we find inconvenient, and may even be the opposite.
之後就停在那里,和说不说出一大堆解释的话,效果完全一样。这也正是我停下来的地方。人应该不自私,应该公平。不是因为人不自私,也不是因为他们喜欢不自私,而是他们应该如此。道德律或者人理,不像地心吸力之律,也不像有重量的物体怎样运动,不是人类行为的一个事实。从另一方面来说,他也不仅仅是头脑中的想像,因为我们想忘却他,他总在那里;而且我们一讲到人,一想到人,大部份到头来都是说了想了毫无作用。你不能光说一个人应该为了我们自己的方便怎样行为,便把话说清楚;因为我们叫做坏或不公平的行为,并不就是我们觉得对自己不方便的行为,很可能正好相反,是对我们有利的行为。
Consequently, this Rule of Right and Wrong, or Law of Human Nature, or whatever you call it, must somehow or other be a real thing— a thing that is really there, not made up by ourselves. And yet it is not a fact in the ordinary sense, in the same way as our actual behaviour is a fact. It begins to look as if we shall have to admit that there is more than one kind of reality; that, in this particular case, there is something above and beyond the ordinary facts of men's behaviour, and yet quite definitely real—a real law, which none of as made, but which we find pressing on us.
因此,这个是非之律,或人理,或随你怎样称呼他的那个东西,一定是一种真实的存在一的确在那儿,不是我们捏造出来的。但他不是普通说的那事实,不像我们实际的行为那样的一种事实。我们得开始承认:现实不只一种,在我们探讨的这件事上,在人的行为这种普遍的事实之外,还有一种东西在那里左右。他的确在那里,是真实的,是真正的律,不是谁想出来的,他左右着我们的行为。
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